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KEEPING THE “FREE” IN TEACHER SPEECH RIGHTS: 
PROTECTING TEACHERS AND THEIR USE OF 
SOCIAL MEDIA TO COMMUNICATE WITH STUDENTS BEYOND 
THE SCHOOLHOUSE GATES 
 
By Mark Schroeder* 
 
Cite as: Mark Schroeder, Keeping the “Free” in Teacher Speech Rights: 
Protecting Teachers and Their Use of Social Media To Communicate with 
Students Beyond the Schoolhouse Gates, 19 RICH. J. L. & TECH 5 (2013), 
available at http://jolt.richmond.edu/v19i2/article5.pdf. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
[1] Debate is raging within many school districts around the country 
about public school teachers’ interactions with their students outside of 
school through social media sites, such as Facebook and MySpace.1  
                                                
* Mark Schroeder, Assistant Professor of Legal Skills, Quinnipiac University School of 
Law; J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law; B.A., Williams College.  I received 
helpful comments on this article during a faculty colloquium at Quinnipiac University 
School of Law.  Thanks to Dean Brad Saxton for his research support and to Susan 
Dailey, William Dunlap, Neal Feigenson, Elizabeth Marsh, and Joseph Olivenbaum for 
their comments.  I am deeply indebted to Martin Margulies for his comments, insights, 
and encouragement.  Thanks also to Peggy for making this possible.  Any errors, of 
course, are my own. 
 
1 See Jennifer Preston, Rules to Stop Pupil and Teacher From Getting Too Social Online, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/business/media/rules-
to-limit-how-teachers-and-students-interact-online.html; see also Karen Matthews, 
Should teachers “friend” students?, USA TODAY (Apr. 19, 2012),  
http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/story/2012-04-19/facebook-teachers-social-students/
54416058/1 (“At least 40 school districts nationwide have approved social media 
policies.”).  Nothing in this Article should be interpreted as requiring teachers to engage 
in off-campus communications with students using social media.  Under current law, if 
schools require this type of speech, schools can regulate it.  Rather, this Article assumes 
that some teachers may choose to communicate with students in this context.  
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While most of the controversy involves only the major social media sites, 
the overall debate is not so limited and includes teachers’ communications 
with students through other electronic means, such as Tweeting or even 
texting.2  Attempts to regulate the use of social media and other forms of 
electronic communication between teachers and students have occurred 
both on the state level,3 and more frequently, on the local school district 
level.4  In fact, local school boards in California, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, 
Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, 
and Virginia have all updated, or are currently revising, their social media 
policies, focusing on limiting teacher-student contact through social 
media.5  The New York City Department of Education recently unveiled a 
new policy, which bans interactions between teachers and students on 
                                                
2 See, e.g., M.L. Schultze, Schools, lawmakers develop social media bans, WKSU NEWS 
(Sept. 1, 2011), http://www.wksu.org/news/story/29290 (noting that the Dayton Public 
School District instituted a ban that includes Tweeting, instant messaging, and texting).  
Most of these prohibitions or restrictions do not yet specifically include blogging.  See id.  
But see, e.g., N.Y.C. DEP’T OF EDUC., NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SOCIAL MEDIA 
GUIDELINES 1 (2012), available at http://schools.nyc.gov/NR/rdonlyres/BCF47CED-
604B-4FDD-B752-DC2D81504478/0/DOESocialMediaGuidelines20120430.pdf 
(including restrictions on blogging). 
 
3 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 162.069.1 (2012). 
 
4 See Preston, supra note 1.  Local school boards in Connecticut have also joined the fray.  
See David Moran, Interim Superintendent Says Controversial Social Media Policy 




5 See Preston, supra note 1.  While attempts to restrict teachers’ use of social media are a 
relatively recent occurrence, attempts to restrict teachers’ off-campus conduct are not 
new.  See Jonathan Zimmerman, When Teachers Talk Out of School, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 
2011), www.nytimes.com/2011/06/04/opinion/04zimmerman.html.  In 1927, a 
schoolteacher in New Jersey lost her teaching license for smoking cigarettes after school 
hours.  Id.  Additional grounds for teacher dismissal included card playing, dancing, and 
even failure to attend church.  Id.  After Prohibition ended, teachers could still be 
dismissed for drinking or frequenting a place where liquor was served.  Id.  
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non-school sanctioned social media sites.6 
  
[2] Districts imposing these bans and lesser restrictions generally 
justify them based on two major concerns: first, the worry that teachers 
will reveal inappropriate information about themselves to students; and, 
second, the fear that teachers will use social media to develop 
inappropriate relationships with their students.7  Typically, these 
limitations on speech do not distinguish between speech originating on 
school grounds and “off-campus speech.”8 
 
[3] Of course, other educational stakeholders, including teachers, 
administrators, and parents, oppose any restrictions on teacher-student 
interactions beyond a teacher’s existing professional obligations, such as 
student confidentiality.9  While acknowledging the concerns underlying 
the movement to restrict teacher-to-student social media speech, these 
advocates oppose any ban or restrictions on teacher communication with 
students via social media, arguing that a teacher’s use of social media can 
create a more effective, inclusive learning environment and develop 
                                                
6 See NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 4.  
Over thirty years ago, the Second Circuit warned of the danger of school officials 
“ventur[ing] out of the school yard and into the general community.”  Thomas v. Bd. of 
Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979).  That danger has arrived.   
7 See Rules to Limit How Teachers and Students Interact Online, TEACHER WORLD (Dec. 
20, 2011), http://www.teacher-world.com/teacher-blog/?p=2248. 
8 See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. §162.069.1.  For purposes of this Article, “on campus” speech 
includes any speech made on school premises or using school technology, or any speech 
made at a school-sanctioned event, even if the event occurs off-campus.  “Off-campus” 
speech refers to any other teacher speech.  This Article prefers “off-campus” speech to 
“off-duty” speech because the best teachers are seldom “off-duty.” 
 
9 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006) (protecting student records); CONN. AGENCIES 
REGS. § 10-145d-400a(b)(1)(J) (1998).  This Article supports extensive protection of 
teachers’ First Amendment rights, but given special student confidentiality and safety 
issues, it does not support full First Amendment rights for teachers.  
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stronger teacher-student relationships.10  Furthermore, social media have 
become, to a large extent, “Main Street.”11  Because a school district could 
not ban or restrict a conversation between a teacher and student that occurs 
outside of campus on Main Street, the district should not be able to ban or 
restrict the electronic equivalent of a Main Street interaction. 
 
[4] The law governing teacher-student interactions through social 
media and other electronic communication is still evolving.  At present, no 
state has regulated this type of communication, although Missouri has 
come close.12  The most widely publicized statewide attempt to regulate 
teacher-student interactions through social media, Missouri’s Amy Hestir 
Student Protection Act,13 failed when a Missouri court enjoined it shortly 
                                                
10 These proponents note that teachers, especially newly-trained teachers, use social 
media.  See Emily H. Fulmer, Privacy Expectations and Expectations for Teachers in the 
Internet Age, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 14, ¶ 6 (2010) (citing Teresa S. Foulger et al., 
Moral Spaces in MySpace: Preservice Teachers’ Perspectives about Ethical Issues in 
Social Networking, 42 J. RES. ON TECH. & EDUC. 1, 7 (2009)).  Furthermore, given the 
pivotal role this technology has played in recent history in social movements around the 
world, banning its use within an educational context seems myopic and antiquated. 
11 See State of the Media: The Social Media Report Q3 2011, NIELSEN, 
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/social/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2012) (noting that “nearly 
4 in 5 active Internet users visit social networks” and “[a]cross a snapshot of 10 major 
global markets, social networks and blogs reach over three-quarters of active Internet 
users,” suggesting that social media is the “Main Street” of the Internet). 
 
12 See Amy Hestir Student Protection Act, 2011 MO. LEGIS. SERV. S.B. 54 (West) 
(providing that “[n]o teacher shall establish, maintain, or use a nonwork-related internet 
site which allows exclusive access with a current or former student”); Amended Order 
Entering Preliminary Injunction, Missouri State Teachers Ass’n v. Missouri, No. 11AC-
CC0053, 2011 WL 4425537 (Mo. Cir. Ct. Sept. 23, 2011). 
  
13 See Missouri: Amy Hestir Davis Student Protection Act - Student Abused by a Jr. High 
School Teacher, SEXLAWS.ORG, 
http://www.sexlaws.org/Amy_Hestir_Davis_student_protection_act (last visited Nov. 17, 
2012) (describing that Amy Hestir, while a seventh grade student, was repeatedly 
molested by one of her junior high school teachers); cf. Brett Borders, A Brief History Of 
Social Media, COPY BRIGHTER MARKETING (June 2, 2009), 
http://copybrighter.com/history-of-social-media (demonstrating that social media sites 
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before it was to go into effect.14  In response, the Missouri legislature 
revised the statute, thereby eliminating the regulation of teachers’ use of 
social media.  Instead, the Missouri legislature settled for encouraging 
school districts to promulgate a written policy concerning school 
employee-student communication using social media.15  At the moment, 
there exists sparse case law examining this issue.  
 
[5] This Article aims to provide a consistent approach for protecting 
off-campus teacher-to-student speech using social media, which protects 
most teacher-student speech so long as the speech does not unduly disrupt 
the workplace or the school learning environment.  
 
[6] Given the dearth of authority, the trends regarding First 
Amendment16 protection provided to teachers, particularly with respect to 
off-campus speech, are difficult to discern.  To date, the United States 
Supreme Court has not examined the issues concerning off-campus 
teacher-to-student communication.  Furthermore, a few lower courts have 
issued rulings in this area, but these decisions are not particularly 
illuminating.  For instance, the speech in the most frequently cited teacher-
                                                                                                                     
like Facebook or MySpace did not exist at the time Amy was molested).  See generally 
infra Part II(A)(1) (discussing the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act in further detail). 
 
14 Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 12. 
 
15 See Mo. REV. STAT. § 162.069.1 (2012). 
 
16 The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The First Amendment’s speech protections 
apply to the states through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  See 
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).  The government can regulate speech in 
two capacities: as a sovereign or as an employer.  Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 
(1994) (plurality opinion).  The government’s authority to regulate speech as a sovereign 
is far more limited than its authority to regulate speech as an employer.  Id. (stating that 
the government has “far broader powers” to regulate speech than it does “as [a] 
sovereign” in its role as an employer).  This Article contends that the government is also 
limited in regulating speech occurring on the outer fringes of the employment 
relationship.  
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to-student social media case involved egregious conduct on the teacher’s 
part, thus providing little guidance as to how courts would treat teacher 
conduct not rising to that level.17 
  
[7] This Article focuses on a public school teacher’s off-campus use of 
social media to communicate with students.18  This type of communication 
does not fit neatly into the developing free speech jurisprudence.  Under 
current law, to receive First Amendment protection, a teacher must 
establish that she did not speak pursuant to her official job duties19 and 
that her speech implicated a matter of public concern.20  If so, the burden 
of production shifts to the school to establish that the government’s 
interests in providing efficient services, including a safe learning 
environment, outweigh the citizen-teacher’s interests in commenting on 
these matters and the public’s interests in hearing the speech.21 
   
[8] This Article explains how the Court’s current free speech 
jurisprudence governs this type of speech, concluding that any wholesale 
ban on teacher-to-student speech in this context is likely overbroad, and 
therefore violates the First Amendment.  In addition, these categorical 
bans might also be unconstitutional "as-applied" to particular speech. 
                                                
17 See Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 298 (D. Conn. 2008) (stating that the 
teacher’s MySpace page included “pictures of naked men with . . . ‘inappropriate 
comments’” below the pictures).  
18 As previously stated, “on-campus” speech includes any speech made on school 
premises or using school technology, or any speech made at a school-sanctioned event, 
even if the event occurs off-campus.  “Off-campus” speech refers to any other teacher 
speech.   
19 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). 
20 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983). 
21 See Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 106 (2d Cir. 2011); Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of 
Educ., 624 F.3d 334, 338 (6th Cir. 2010); Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070-72 (9th 
Cir. 2009). 
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[9] Finally, the Article suggests a simpler test for evaluating teacher-
student speech using social media, which seeks to balance a teacher’s 
interest in speech with a school’s interest in promoting an efficient 
workplace and providing an effective learning environment.  This test 
would offer protection to any teacher speech in this context if, first, the 
teacher communication is not made pursuant to the teacher’s official 
duties or, second, the message’s recipient could not reasonably conclude 
that the expression was made in the teacher’s official capacity.  However, 
this protection is not absolute.  If school officials can then establish that 
the school’s interests in prohibiting the speech outweigh the teacher’s free 
speech interests, the teacher’s speech can still be restricted.  In a departure 
from current law, this test would not require that the speech implicate a 
matter of public concern to receive First Amendment protection.22  
 
[10] Under this proposed test, to restrict a teacher’s off-campus speech 
to a student using social media, a school administrator would need to 
demonstrate that the school’s interests in maintaining an effective learning 
environment or efficient working environment outweigh the teacher’s free 
speech interests.  The political nature of the speech is a crucial component 
in weighing these concerns.  The more political the speech, the greater the 
level of disruption that school administrators would need to demonstrate in 
order to restrict the speech.  Nevertheless, even speech with no political 
import would require some on-campus disruption, whether actual or 
foreseeable, to limit this type of teacher-student communication.  
 
[11] This proposed framework attempts to honor the competing policies 
underlying free speech jurisprudence by balancing a public teacher’s off-
campus rights to free speech with a school district’s interests in providing 
an age-appropriate learning environment and efficient working 
                                                
22 The public concern requirement should be eliminated for all public employees.  The 
focus of this Article, however, is on teachers using social media to communicate with 
students in an off-campus setting.  Given the interactive, rapidly evolving nature of social 
media speech and the indirect benefits this speech might generate, a public concern 
limitation is particularly unnecessary.   
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environment.23  The framework recognizes that while the government, as 
an employer, can at times limit employees’ speech based on workplace 
efficiency concerns, the government’s ability to restrict employees’ speech 
is more limited when the government seeks to restrict speech at the outer 
edges of the employment relationship and is far more limited when the 
government restricts speech as a sovereign.24  In the case of most off-
campus teacher-to-student communications using social media, school 
districts are regulating teacher speech at the outer fringes of the 
employment relationship because teachers are under no obligation to 
engage in this speech.25  The proposed framework for regulating teacher-
to-student communication using social media also recognizes the special 
relationships existing within schools and therefore does not provide full 
First Amendment protection to teacher off-campus speech with students.  
Instead, it provides extensive protection for teacher off-campus speech 
since the framework requires some disruption to the working or learning 
environment before a teacher’s speech can be regulated. 
 
[12] In addition, this framework seeks to engender some parity between 
the treatment of off-campus teacher speech using social media and off-
campus student speech using social media.26  While teachers and students 
                                                
23 The Supreme Court has justified First Amendment free speech protection on two 
grounds: the rights of the speaker to engage in the speech and the rights of the audience 
to hear the speech.  The Court has never endorsed one theory to the exclusion of the 
other.  See Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos 
Makes Sense, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 641 (2012). 
24 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he 
government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as 
sovereign.”).  
25 This Article posits that, in most circumstances, school districts will be regulating 
teachers’ off-campus, social-media speech to students almost in a “sovereign” role 
because the districts are regulating speech that lies on the fringes of the employment 
relationship.  Courts should be more hostile to government speech regulation when the 
regulation does not directly involve an employee’s core job responsibilities.    
26 See generally Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596-600 (6th Cir. 2007) (deciding a 
student-athlete free speech claim by analogizing to public employee cases).  
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are not similarly situated with respect to their First Amendment rights and 
therefore the protection of their speech need not be identical, the disparity 
in courts’ protection of teacher and student speech is apparent.  The trend 
with respect to student off-campus speech using social media is that this 
speech receives virtually full First Amendment protection.27  By contrast, 
the few existing decisions with respect to teacher off-campus speech using 
social media have ruled in favor of the school district.  While public 
school teachers’ and students’ free speech rights to use social media need 
not be identical, there should be more parity in their treatment.   
 
[13] This proposal focuses on regulating teacher-student 
communication using social media, given the special concerns applicable 
to the relationship between public school teachers and students.28  This 
Article does not contend that this test is appropriate in all public-employee 
contexts. 
  
                                                
27 See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Synder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 920 (3d Cir. 
2011) (holding that a student’s criticism of his principal is protected speech even though 
it contained false allegations of sexual misconduct between the principal and students at 
the school because the speech did not disrupt the school environment).  Notably, the 
speech at issue was not “political” speech.  Id. at 939 (Smith, J., concurring).  
28 This Article will not address any potential teacher First Amendment freedom of 
association claims, nor will it address any potential academic freedom exception to the 
Pickering-Connick test.  See Jeffries v. Harleston, 52 F.3d 9, 14-15 (2d Cir. 1995) 
(implying, in dicta, that there may be an academic freedom exception to Pickering-
Connick).  Whether academic freedom is itself constitutionally required or is merely an 
academic tradition embraced by the free speech clause is debatable.  See RONNA GREFF 
SCHNEIDER, EDUCATION LAW: FIRST AMENDMENT, DUE PROCESS AND DISCRIMINATION 
LITIGATION § 2:2 (2011).  Post Garcetti, lower courts have been hostile to free speech 
arguments grounded on academic freedom concerns when non-university level faculty 
make these arguments.  See, e.g., Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 334 (6th 
Cir. 2010) (holding that a teacher’s curricular speech was made pursuant to her official 
duties).   
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II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGULATION OF TEACHERS’ 
OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH 
 
A.  Statewide Regulation 
 
1.  Missouri: The Amy Hestir Student Protection Act 
 
[14] The most widely publicized attempt to prohibit off-campus 
teacher-student speech is Missouri’s Amy Hestir Student Protection Act 
(“AHSPA”).29  In July 2011, Missouri Governor Jay Nixon signed the 
AHSPA into law.30  According to the AHSPA’s sponsor, Missouri Senator 
Jane Cunningham, the law’s purpose was to limit private communications 
between teachers and students on social networking sites in order to 
prevent sexual abuse of students by their teachers.31  Cunningham noted 
that in certain cases of teachers’ sexual exploitation of students, some of 
the communications between teachers and students occurred on social 
networking sites.32 
 
[15] The AHSPA required every school district to promulgate a policy 
concerning teacher-student communication.33  The less controversial part 
of AHSPA mandated that each school district’s policy must include, at a 
minimum, that “no teacher shall establish, maintain, or use a work-related 
                                                
29 See Kayla Webley, Missouri Law: Teachers and Students Can’t Be Facebook Friends, 
TIME (Aug. 1, 2011), http://newsfeed.time.com/2011/08/01/in-missouri-teachers-and-
students-legally-cant-be-facebook-friends/. 
30 See Tanya Roscorla, The Reason Why Missouri Passed the Amy Hestir Student 
Protection Act, CTR. FOR DIGITAL EDUC. (Oct. 31, 2011), 
http://www.centerdigitaled.com/policy/Missouri-Electronic-Communications-Part-
One.html.   
31 Id.   
32 Id.  
33 Amy Hestir Student Protection Act, 2011 MO. LEGIS. SERV. S.B. 54 (West). 
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internet site unless such site is available to school administrators and the 
child’s legal custodian, physical custodian, or legal guardian.”34  However, 
the statute went beyond regulating work-related Internet sites to include 
social networking sites.  In short, the AHSPA required that each school 
district’s policy prohibit teachers from “establish[ing], maintain[ing], or 
us[ing] a nonwork-related site which allows exclusive access with a 
former or current student.”35  Under the AHSPA, “exclusive access” 
means “the information is available only to the owner (teacher) and user 
(student) by mutual explicit consent and where third parties have no 
access to the information on the website absent an explicit consent 
agreement with the owner (teacher).”36  A “nonwork-related internet site” 
means “any internet website or web page used by a teacher primarily for 
personal purposes and not for educational purposes.”37  In essence, the 
statute aimed to prevent any private communication between teachers and 
students attending the teachers’ schools through sites like Facebook and 
MySpace, at least until the student reaches the age of nineteen or 
graduates.38  
 
[16] The Missouri State Teachers Association (“MSTA”) sought to 
enjoin the AHSPA, claiming that it violated the free speech clauses of 
both the United States Constitution and the Missouri Constitution.39  A 
few days before the AHSPA was scheduled to take effect, a Missouri 
Circuit Court granted a preliminary injunction to the MSTA prohibiting its 
enforcement.40  The court concluded that social networking is “extensively 





38 See id.  
39 Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 12. 
40 Id. 
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used by educators.”41  In particular, the court found the “breadth of the 
prohibition [to be] staggering.”42  Consequently, the court held that the 
AHSPA would have a significant “chilling effect” on free speech.43  
Because this “chilling effect” resulted in the deprivation of free speech 
rights, the court held that the resulting injury was irreparable.44  Finally, 
the court concluded that the MSTA had demonstrated a substantial 
likelihood of success on the merits of its free speech claims and that the 
public interest was best served by delaying the implementation of the 
AHSPA until a trial occurred.45   
 
[17] Shortly following the enjoining of the AHSPA, the Missouri 
legislature passed a revised law requiring each school district to 
promulgate a written policy concerning employee-student 
communication.46  These policies must cover the use of electronic media 
to prevent improper communications between staff members and 
students.47  In October 2011, Governor Nixon signed the bill into law 
before the preliminary injunction expired, effectively repealing the portion 
of the AHSPA related to teachers’ use of social media.48  The new law 




44 Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 12; see also Elrod v. 
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373-74 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“The loss of First Amendment 
freedoms, for even minimal periods of time . . . constitutes irreparable injury.”).   
45 Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 12. 
46 See MO. REV. STAT. § 162.069(1) (2012).  
47 See id. 
48 See David A. Lieb, Missouri Repeals Law Restricting Teacher-Student Internet and 
Facebook Interaction, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 21, 2011, 6:06 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/21/missouri-repeals-law-rest_n_1025761.html. 
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does not provide any guidance as to the appropriate limits on teachers’ use 
of social media sites for Missouri’s 523 public school districts.49  The 
critics of the new law contend that it is unlikely that individual school 
districts will properly balance the rights involved given that the state itself 
could not do so.50  
 
2.  Virginia 
  
[18] Although Missouri was the first state to codify a prohibition 
against exclusive teacher and student speech using social media, 
Virginia’s Board of Education considered a teacher-student social media 
ban in November 2010.51  The primary purpose of this ban was to deter 
sexual conduct between school employees and students.52  The proposed 
guidelines would have limited teachers’ electronic communication with 
students to accounts, systems, and platforms provided by the school.53  
Similar to Missouri’s original law, Virginia’s proposed guidelines would 
have prohibited any "texting" between teachers and students as well as any 
teacher-student interaction through social networking sites.54  Ultimately, 
the Virginia Board of Education passed guidelines merely calling for 
transparency in communication between employees and students, 
accessibility to parents and administrators, and professionalism in content 
and tone.55 
                                                
49 See MO. REV. STAT. § 162.069(1). 
50 See Lieb, supra note 48.   
51 VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., PROPOSED GUIDELINES FOR THE PREVENTION OF SEXUAL 
MISCONDUCT & ABUSE IN VIRGINIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 5-12 (Jan. 13, 2011), available at 
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/boe/meetings/2011/01_jan/agenda_items/item_j.pdf.   
52 See id.  
53 Id. at 8. 
54 Id.  
55 VA. DEP’T OF EDUC., GUIDELINES FOR THE PREVENTION OF SEXUAL MISCONDUCT AND 
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3.  Louisiana 
 
[19] In 2009, Louisiana enacted a law that requires school employees 
who contact students by phone, email, or other electronic means to use 
only school-provided devices and to discuss only  "educational services" 
in these communications.56  If a teacher violates this provision, he or she 
must report the violation in a manner that the school board sanctions.57  
These restrictions have not yet faced any constitutional challenge. 
 
B.  Local School Districts 
 
[20] As recently reported, local school boards in California, 
Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, 
New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia have updated or are 
in the process of revising their social media policies, focusing on limiting 
teacher-student contact using social media.58  As previously stated, the 
New York City Department of Education recently unveiled its new policy 
banning interaction between teachers and students on social media web 
pages, at least when these sites are not school-sponsored.59  
 
[21] The policy adopted by Dayton, Ohio, is illustrative.  In Dayton, the 
Board of Education’s new social networking policy bars teachers from 
"friending" their students on Facebook.60  It also prohibits educators from 
                                                                                                                     
ABUSE IN VIRGINIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS 3 (Mar. 24, 2011), available at 
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/boe/guidance/safety/prevent_sexual_misconductabuse.pdf. 
56 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:81(Q)(2)(b) (2012). 
57 Id. at § 17.81(Q)(2)(c). 
58 See Preston, supra note 1; see also Moran, supra note 4.     
59 NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 4. 
60 See Margo Rutledge Kissell, Local teachers banned from ‘friending’ students on 
Facebook, DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Aug. 30, 2011, 11:22 PM), 
http://www.daytondailynews.com/news/news/local/local-teachers-banned-from-
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texting or sending instant messages to their students.61  
 
[22] While courts have not yet been required to decide many of these 
disputes, this situation will undoubtedly change shortly.62 
   
III.   TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH TO STUDENTS USING SOCIAL 
MEDIA: A BRIEF EXAMINATION OF THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
CATEGORICALLY BANNING THIS SPEECH 
 
[23] To date, there have been no academic studies regarding primary 
and secondary school teachers’ use of social media with students beyond 
the classroom setting.  This Article posits that without empirical support 
for restricting teacher speech in this context, school districts should be 
apprehensive about censuring this speech even if the censorship does not 
violate the First Amendment.63  
 
[24] The policy arguments surrounding the regulation of teacher-to-
student communication through social media are complex.  On a general 
level, categorical bans of this type of speech are driven by a fear of newer 
technologies; few of the bans include older technologies such as the 
telephone, or perhaps even the most dangerous type of off-campus 
                                                                                                                     
friending-students-on-f/nMtkR/; see also DAYTON PUBLIC SCHOOLS, DAYTON PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS POLICY MANUAL 295 (Apr. 27, 2012), available at 
http://www.dps.k12.oh.us/documents/contentdocuments/document_23_5_2038.pdf (“To 
maintain a more formal staff-student relationship, district employees shall not ‘friend’ 
current students on social networking sites such as Facebook and MySpace (except when 
that employee is a relative or legal guardian of the student).”).  
61 Kissell, supra note 60. 
62 See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d Cir. 1979) (warning of the 
danger of school officials “ventur[ing] out of the school yard and into the general 
community”).   
63 See infra Part XIII (concluding that categorical bans are likely unconstitutional).  
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interactions between teachers and students, those occurring “in-person.”64  
But concern about new technologies is rarely used to justify these bans or 
restrictions.   
 
[25] In the debates surrounding the passage of these bans or restrictions, 
the benefits of this speech are infrequently discussed.  Consequently, these 
benefits are likely underestimated.  More typically, bans or restrictions on 
this type of speech are justified on two concerns: the concern that teachers 
may disclose inappropriate information and the concern that teachers may 
potentially use these mediums to engage in predatory conduct.65  These 
concerns are certainly legitimate, but likely overstate the dangers of this 
speech.   
 
[26] There are tangible benefits to allowing this type of teacher off-
campus speech.  Teachers are trained to interact with minors and can serve 
as role models for appropriate social media discourse.  In addition, 
teachers may discover bullying or other dangerous behavior by 
participating in social media with students.  Even if teachers are off-duty, 
they could intervene in constructive ways.66 
  
                                                
64 See supra Part II (discussing the social media website and text messaging focus in the 
teacher-student communication bans in Missouri, Virginia, and New York). 
 
65 Two incidents sparked the Amy Hestir Student Protection Act.  One incident included 
reports of teachers being disciplined for compromising photos found online.  Another 
incident involved a teacher exchanging more than 700 text messages with a student while 
the teacher engaged in a sexual relationship with the student.  See Roscorla, supra note 
30. 
 
66 For example, as an adult trained to deal with school-aged children, a teacher may be 
well-positioned to encourage a suicidal student to seek help.  Allowing social media 
interaction between teachers and students may also benefit students’ emotional and social 
development in other, more general, ways.  In one recent study, the authors concluded 
that social media helps teens develop empathy.  See B. A. Birch, Study: Social Media 
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[27] Furthermore, allowing this type of off-campus teacher speech with 
students may have important residual educational benefits to the school’s 
learning environment as well.  One potential benefit of these 
communications is that they may help develop a better learning 
environment at school by making students more comfortable with their 
teachers.67  Current primary and secondary school students, as well as 
many of the newer teaching graduates, are immersed in this electronic 
environment.  As a recent study indicates, the number one technology that 
students use outside of school is social networking.68  Prohibiting off-
campus communication between teachers and students in this context—
widening the gap between in-school and out-of-school life for the 
student—potentially inhibits the development of better relationships 
between teachers and students.69 
 
[28] In addition, the use of social media may allow teachers to better 
target particular learning styles in the classroom.70  For example, students 
who are uncomfortable speaking during class may be less hesitant to 
converse through social media.71  Once these students gain confidence by 
                                                
67 See Katherine Bindley & Timothy Stenovec, Missouri 'Facebook Law' Limits Teacher-
Student Interactions Online, Draws Criticism And Praise, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 
2011, 8:58 AM),  
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/03/missouri-facebook-law_n_916716.html. 
68 Christine Greenhow, an assistant professor at the College of Education and the College 
of Information Studies at the University of Maryland, whose area of expertise is learning 
in social media contexts, notes that social media is students’ “one-stop place for 
communication.”  Id.  
69 Id.  For this reason, Greenhow argues that limiting communication between teachers 
and students only furthers the gap between a student's in-school life and his or her life 
outside of school.  
70 See Editorial - Facebook not appropriate for students, teachers, but alternatives 
possible, STARNEWS ONLINE (Aug. 5, 2011), 
http://www.starnewsonline.com/article/20110805/ARTICLES/110809781; see also 
Preston, supra note 1. 
  
71 See Bindley & Stenovec, supra note 67.  
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interacting through social media, they may more readily participate in 
classroom discussions.72 
 
[29] However, teachers’ off-campus use of social media with students is 
not without its drawbacks.  As previously mentioned, those who advocate 
restricting or banning teachers’ use of social media to communicate with 
students argue two points.  First, these advocates contend that teachers’ 
use of social media will facilitate inappropriate relationships, particularly 
sexual relationships, between teachers and students.73  Second, these 
                                                
72 See id.  
73 See Dariena Bonds, Past sexual misconduct in Missouri: FaceBook ban teachers using 
site with students, ALLVOICES  (Aug. 23, 2011, 7:21 AM), 
http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/10103283-past-sexual-misconduct-in-
missouri-facebook-ban-teachers-using-site-with-students; see also States miss a social-
media opportunity, WASH. POST (Aug. 19, 2011), 
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/states-miss-a-social-media-education-opportunity/20
11/08/16/gIQATbqlQJ_story.html (quoting the Director of the American Civil Liberties 
Union who described these types of bans as “taking a bazooka to a fly”).  But the 
underlying concern is certainly valid.  Unfortunately, there is no national public database 
of sexual misconduct by teachers.  See Preston, supra note 1.  The statistics cited in most 
media articles are uncertain, however, because no one has ever designed a nationwide 
study for the expressed purpose of measuring the prevalence of sexual abuse by 
educators.  See Brian Palmer, How Many Kids are Sexually Abused by Their Teachers?, 
SLATE (Feb. 8, 2012, 7:14 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/explainer/2012/02/is_sexual_abuse_in_s
chools_very_common_.html.  One impetus behind New York City’s Department of 
Education’s policy is a number of incidents of alleged sexual misconduct within City 
schools.  NYC Teachers Could Soon be Banned from ‘Friending’ Students on Facebook, 
CBS N.Y. (Mar. 22, 2012, 6:00 PM), 
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2012/03/22/nyc-teachers-could-soon-be-banned-from-friend
ing-students-on-facebook/  
These bans continue to be controversial.  With respect to New York City Department of 
Education’s (“NYCDOE”) restrictions, NYCDOE’s Chancellor supported the policy but, 
at least before its adoption, the Director of Technology Innovation for Manhattan 
Schools, who argued that educators need to “interact with young people using the tools of 
their world”, opposed it.  See Francesca Duffy, Should Teachers Defriend Students?, 
EDUCATION WEEK TEACHER (Mar. 28, 2012, 4:16 PM), http://bit.ly/TiiXIT.  
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XIX, Issue 2 
 
   
19 
advocates argue that since teachers are “role models,”74 students may lose 
respect for a teacher due to a teacher’s inadvertent or deliberate disclosure 
of compromising information,75 such as a Facebook photograph of a 
teacher drinking while wearing a pirate hat captioned “drunken pirate.”76  
In turn, this disclosure may undermine the student’s educational 
experience in the classroom.  Both of these concerns are heightened since 
most American K-12 students are minors.77  
 
[30] The dangers of categorical bans of this type of speech are likely 
overstated.  With respect to a teacher’s use of social media to develop 
inappropriate sexual relationships with a student, which is certainly an 
                                                
74 Public school teachers have a long history of discrimination based on this role-model 
rationale.  Although public school teachers are protected under the First Amendment, 
their conduct, historically, has been highly regulated.  See Fulmer, supra note 10, at ¶ 28.  
In 1915, unmarried female teachers were prohibited from smoking cigarettes, dressing in 
bright colors, keeping company with men, loitering in front of ice cream stores, wearing 
fewer than two petticoats, and riding in any carriage or automobile with any man who 
was not an immediate family member.  See id. (citing Rules For Teachers --1915, N.H. 
HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.nhhistory.org/edu/support/nhgrowingup/teacherrules.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 26, 2012)).  Currently, most state certification procedures still prohibit 
teachers from “engaging in conduct which would discredit the teaching profession.”  
Fulmer, supra note 10, at ¶ 28; see also CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 10-145d-400a(c)(2)(C) 
(1998) (requiring teachers to conduct themselves as professionals, avoiding any 
misconduct that would impair the teacher’s ability to teach).  Most state teaching licenses 
contain moral codes governing teacher conduct.  See Fulmer, supra note 10, at ¶ 28 
(citing Kellie Hayden, Teachers & Social Networking Sites, SUITE101 (May 18, 2008), 
http://suite101.com/article/teachers-social-networking-sites-a54245). 
75 See Josh Wolford, Should Teachers and Students Be Friends on Facebook?, 
WEBPRONEWS (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.webpronews.com/should-teachers-and-
students-be-friends-on-facebook-2011-08.   
76 See Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
3, 2008). 
77 See Susan E. Hume, The American Education System, INT’L STUDENT GUIDE, 
http://www.internationalstudentguidetotheusa.com/articles/american_education_system.p
hp (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). 
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important concern, opponents of categorical bans of this type of speech 
argue that it is highly unlikely that a ban on this interaction will reduce 
any predatory teacher conduct.78  Moreover, if this conduct occurs, 
electronic evidence will exist to prosecute the offense.79  Importantly, 
while a few teachers have used social media to foster inappropriate 
relationships with students and others have shared questionable 
information,80 presumably the overwhelming majority of teachers use 
these mediums appropriately.   
  
[31] Furthermore, categorically banning all off-campus teacher to 
student speech using social media because some teachers might share 
inappropriate information and thus be poor “role models” is a 
disproportionate response to the perceived transgression, akin to “killing a 
fly with a bazooka.”81  As this Article will discuss, there are better ways to 
address these issues.  
  
                                                
78 See Anita Ramasastry, Can Teachers and Their Students Be Banned from Becoming 
Facebook Friends?, JUSTIA.COM (Sept. 13, 2011), 
http://verdict.justia.com/2011/09/13/can-teachers-and-their-students-be-banned-from-bec
oming-facebook-friends.  
79 See Mark L. Krotoski & Jason Passwaters, Using Log Record Analysis to Show 
Internet and Computer Activity in Criminal Cases, 59 U.S. ATT’YS BULL. 12 (2011), 
available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usab5906.pdf (stating 
web access logs can essentially retrace a Facebook user’s activity on the site). 
 
80 Documented abuse issues have been facilitated through social media.  See generally 
Jordan Bienstock, Students, Teachers and Social Networking, CNN (Jan. 20, 2012, 2:38 
PM),  
http://schoolsofthought.blogs.cnn.com/2012/01/20/students-teachers-and-social-networki
ng.  But it is unclear whether the abuse would have occurred in the absence of a teacher’s 
use of social media.  Once again, in the absence of evidence linking teachers’ use of 
social media with sexually predatory behavior, school districts should be apprehensive 
about curtailing teachers’ use of social media.  
81 See States miss a social-media education opportunity, supra note 73 (quoting the 
American Civil Liberties Union of Eastern Missouri’s legal director, Tony Rothert).  
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[32] Notably, any bans or restrictions on teachers’ use of social media 
to communicate with students will be difficult to draft and costly to 
enforce.  Would only “traditional” social media mediums like Facebook or 
MySpace count?  What about new technologies?  Who would monitor the 
sites?  Even assuming school districts could effectively monitor teachers’ 
social media usage, this monitoring would likely be time-consuming and 
costly. 
  
[33] Categorical bans on teachers’ use of social media with students fail 
to recognize that social media, in some form, are here to stay.  As a recent 
New York Supreme Court Judge observed, Facebook has rapidly evolved 
from a platform used solely by American college students to a worldwide 
social and professional network, which is commonly used to advertise 
businesses, organize parties, debate politics, and air grievances.82  Social 
media and blogs continue to dominate Americans’ online activity, 
accounting for nearly a quarter of all time spent online.83  Nearly four in 
five Internet users visit social networks and blogs.84  Americans now 
spend more time on Facebook than they do on any other webpage.85  As 
the technologies behind social media continue to evolve, the challenges of 
monitoring any bans or restrictions on teachers’ speech would likely 
increase as well.  
  
[34] Given that the benefits of teacher off-campus communications with 
students are likely understated and the dangers overstated, and given that 
the costs of implementing and monitoring these bans may be significant, 
                                                
82 Rubino v. City of N.Y., No. 107292/11, 2012 WL 373101, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 1, 
2012) (citing Somini Sengupta & Evelyn Rusli, Personal Data’s Value? Facebook Set to 
Find Out, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/01/technology/riding-personal-data-facebook-is-going-
public.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0). 
83 See State of the Media: The Social Media Report Q3 2011, supra note 11. 
 
84 See id. 
85 See id.   
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school officials should be wary of censuring this speech, even if this 
censorship is allowed under the First Amendment.86  School districts do 
not ban teacher-to-student communications on Main Street; they should 
not ban these communications using other newer mediums either. 
 
IV.   CURRENT FRAMEWORKS FOR ANALYZING  
TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH 
 
[35] The framework for analyzing teacher free speech cases with 
respect to teachers’ off-campus rights under the United States Constitution 
is evolving.  To date, there is little case authority examining teacher free 
speech rights with respect to communications with students using social 
media.  But given the widespread attempts to ban or limit teacher to 
student speech using social media, courts will be forced to address this 
issue sooner rather than later.87   
  
[36] Due to the current paucity of authority, confusion exists as to what 
proper analytical framework courts should employ to evaluate these free 
speech disputes, though it is likely that courts will use the public employee 
framework or some variation of it in this context.88  Of course, other 
potential frameworks also exist and this Article will briefly discuss these 
approaches as well.   
 
                                                
86 See infra Part XIII (concluding that categorical bans of off-campus teacher to student 
speech using social media are likely unconstitutional). 
87 Courts might have an easier time with this issue if there were consensus regarding the 
limits of teacher speech on-campus and the limits of student speech off-campus.  But 
these areas of law are evolving simultaneously.   
88 See infra Part IV.A. 
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A.  Public Employee Framework89 
 
[37] Public employees can challenge government restrictions of their 
free speech rights in two basic ways.  First, although a relatively rare 
occurrence, an employee can bring a facial challenge to the regulation 
based on overbreadth or vagueness grounds.90  Second, the employee can 
bring an as-applied challenge to the regulation as a retaliatory discharge 
claim.91  
  
[38] Most public employee claims brought under this framework are 
retaliatory discharge claims.92  To state a retaliatory discharge claim based 
on a violation of free speech rights, a teacher would need to establish the 
following:93 (1) her speech was made outside of her official duties rather 
                                                
89 Historically, public employees had no right to object to conditions placed on 
employment, including those restricting the exercise of constitutional rights.  See 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983); see also Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 
485, 496 (1952) (upholding a New York law empowering the Board of Regents to 
dismiss teachers who were members of the Communist party or other organizations 
advocating the overthrow of the United States government).  As Justice Holmes once 
remarked, “‘A policeman may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no 
constitutional right to be a policeman.’”  Connick, 461 U.S. at 143-44 (quoting McAuliffe 
v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892)).  As discussed infra, Justice 
Holmes’ observation is no longer an accurate statement of the law.  
90 See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973); see also L.A. Police Dep’t v. 
United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999). 
91 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 587 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Santa Monica 
Food Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1034 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
92 See STEVEN BADERIAN, TRENDS IN THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT RETALIATION AND 
WHISTLEBLOWING, CNA PRO (2011), available at http://www.cnapro.com/pdf/EPL%20-
%20Retaliation%20and%20Whistleblowing%20%28JacksonLewis%29%209-7-11.pdf. 
  
93 The Supreme Court has not had the opportunity to articulate, post Garcetti, a test for 
evaluating a public employee’s retaliatory discharge claim based on a violation of the 
employee’s First Amendment free speech rights.  Circuit Courts, however, generally 
apply a five-part test to examine these claims: (1) Did the employee speak pursuant to the 
employee’s official job duties?; (2) Did the employee’s speech implicate a matter of 
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than pursuant to her official duties, (2) her speech implicated a public 
concern, and (3) school officials took an adverse employment action that 
was substantially motivated by her speech.94  If the teacher meets this 
evidentiary threshold, school officials, in order to regulate her speech, 
would need to establish that (1) the school’s interests in providing efficient 
services outweigh the teacher’s interests in commenting on these matters 
and the student’s interests in hearing the speech, or (2) school officials 
would have taken the adverse employment action even in the absence of 
the protected speech.95  The challenges with respect to this test are 
evidenced by lower courts’ struggles to determine whether these elements 
are questions of law, fact, or both.96 
                                                                                                                     
public concern?; (3) Did the government take an adverse employment action that was 
substantially motivated by the speech?; (4) Did the government’s interests in providing 
efficient services outweigh the citizen’s interests in commenting on these matters and the 
public’s interests in hearing the speech?; and (5) Would the government have taken the 
adverse employment action even in the absence of the protected speech?  See, e.g., Eng v. 
Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009); Nagle v. Marron, 663 F.3d 100, 105 (2d 
Cir. 2011).  Courts sometimes analyze these elements in different orders, and the test is 
often phrased in slightly different terms.  See, e.g., Nagle, 663 F.3d at 105 (quoting 
Cotarelo v. Vill. of Sleepy Hollow Police Dep't, 460 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 2006)).  
94 The plaintiff must establish the first three elements.  See Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of 
Educ., 624 F.3d 332, 337-38 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 3068 (2011); Eng, 
552 F.3d at 1070-71. 
95 If the plaintiff succeeds in meeting this threshold, the burden of production shifts to the 
government to establish the last two elements.  See Eng, 552 F.3d at 1071-72; Nagle, 663 
F.3d at 105. 
96 The issues of whether the government took an adverse employment action that was 
substantially motivated by the speech and whether the government would have taken the 
adverse employment action even in the absence of the protected speech are typically 
treated as issues for the fact finder.  See Morris v. City of Colo. Springs, 666 F.3d 654, 
661 (10th Cir. 2012).  Whether a public employee’s speech implicated a public concern is 
a question of law.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 n.7 (1983).  Whether the 
employee spoke as a citizen rather than pursuant to her official job duties is generally 
treated as a mixed question of law and fact.  See SCHNEIDER, supra note 28, § 2:20 
n.188.02.  Finally, whether the government’s interest in providing efficient services 
outweighs the citizen’s interests in communicating on these matters and the public’s 
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1.  Teacher Speech Cases 
  
[39] The current public employee law framework makes no distinction 
between the speech rights of teachers and those of other public 
employees;97 the following two Supreme Court cases involving teacher 
speech rights are discussed first for convenience purposes only. 
   
a.  Teacher Off-Campus Speech:  
Pickering v. Board of Education  
 
[40] The seminal case governing teacher off-campus free speech rights 
under the United States Constitution is Pickering.98  Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court held that Pickering’s speech criticizing school officials 
was protected under the First Amendment.99  In reaching this conclusion, 
the Court refused to provide a definitive test governing when a teacher’s 
off-campus speech can be limited.100  However, the Supreme Court did 
provide some general guidelines, including a general analytical framework 
for analyzing whether a teacher’s off-campus speech is protected under the 
First Amendment.101  
  
[41] Under the guidelines set out in the Pickering decision, at least as 
                                                                                                                     
interests in hearing the speech is a question of law or fact is unresolved.  See id.  (noting a 
federal circuit split).  This Article will not focus on issues solely within the province of 
the fact finder. 
97 See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1968); Connick, 461 U.S. at 
142-43.   
98 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). 
99 Id. at 574-75. 
100 See id. at 568-70.  
101 Id. at 569-73. 
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modified by later case law,102 a teacher’s speech is protected if it satisfies 
a two-part test.  First, the teacher’s speech must involve a matter of 
legitimate public concern.103  Second, if the speech does involve a matter 
of legitimate public concern, a court should employ a balancing test to 
determine whether the employer’s interests in prohibiting the speech 
outweigh the teacher’s interests in making the speech.104  If the speech 
meets both parts of this test, it is protected under the First Amendment.105  
  
[42] The situation in Pickering predates social media.106  In this case, 
Marvin L. Pickering, an Illinois public school teacher, was dismissed from 
his teaching position for sending a letter to a newspaper regarding a 
recently proposed tax increase to support the district schools.107  In his 
letter, Pickering objected to the tax increase, which was earmarked for 
building schools.108  Pickering wrote the letter in response to articles 
supporting the passage of the tax increase and following a vote that 
                                                
102 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). 
103 Id. at 147-48.  Some commentators have concluded that Pickering did not require 
speech implicating a public concern.  See, e.g., D. Gordon Smith, Beyond “Public 
Concern”: New Free Speech Standards for Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 
257 (1990) (observing that “public concern” was merely one of several factors in the 
analysis); Karin B. Hoppmann, Concern with Public Concern: Toward a Better 
Definition of the Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993, 996 (1997) 
(noting that while Pickering did refer to speech upon matters of “public concern,” it 
never identified the degree of public concern required).  
104 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-74. 
105 See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466-67 (1995).  
106 It even predates the rumor Vice President Al Gore invented the Internet.  See 
Transcript: Vice-President Gore on CNN’s ‘Late Edition’, CNN (Mar. 9, 1999 5:06 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/ALLPOLITICS/stories/1999/03/09/president.2000/transcript.gore/. 
107 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564. 
108 Id. at 566. 
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defeated the tax increase.109  In essence, Pickering’s letter criticized the 
Board of Education’s handling of an earlier bond issue and its subsequent 
allocation of financial resources between the school’s educational and 
athletic programs.110  The letter also criticized both the Board and the 
superintendent’s methods of informing the district’s taxpayers of the 
reasons why additional tax revenue was needed.111  In addition, 
Pickering’s letter charged the superintendent of schools with attempting to 
prevent teachers in the district from criticizing the bond issue.112  Some of 
Pickering’s criticism was based on inaccurate information.113 
  
[43] Pickering was dismissed from his teaching position and he 
challenged his dismissal, claiming that his letter was protected speech 
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution.114  Following a full hearing, the Board of Education rejected 
his claims.115  His subsequent appeals to both the Illinois trial court and 
the Illinois Supreme Court were denied.116  The United States Supreme 
Court eventually reversed the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision.117  
  
[44] The Supreme Court rejected the notion that teachers are not 
                                                
109 Id. at 565-66. 
110 Id. at 569.  
111 Id. at 566. 
112 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 566. 
113 Id. at 570, 582. 
114 Id. at 564-65. 
115 Id. at 565.  
116 See id. 
117 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 565. 
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entitled to First Amendment rights, reasoning that “the public interest in 
having free and unhindered debate on matters of public importance . . . is a 
core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”118  
Consistent with this principle, the Court strove to balance the interests of 
the teacher, as a citizen commenting on matters of public concern, and the 
interests of the State, as an employer promoting the efficiency of the 
public services it performs through its employees.119  Noting the myriad 
situations in which teachers can criticize their superiors, the Court refused 
to provide a “general standard against which all such statements may be 
judged.”120  However, the Court did provide some guidance for analyzing 
these issues.121 
  
[45] First, the Supreme Court determined whether the subject involved 
a matter of legitimate public concern.122  Without defining the phrase 
“legitimate public concern,” the Court concluded that the question of 
whether a school system requires additional funding is a matter of 
legitimate public concern.123  On such a question, the Court observed that 
“free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the 
electorate.”124  The Court reasoned that teachers as a class are members of 
the community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to 
how things such as school funds should be allocated; therefore, it is 
essential that teachers be able to speak freely on such questions.125    
                                                
118 Id. at 573. 
119 See id. at 568. 
120 Id. at 569. 
121 See id. 
122 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571. 
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 571-72. 
125 Id. at 572.  
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[46] Because the letter’s subject involved a matter of legitimate public 
concern, the Court then examined whether the employer’s interest in 
prohibiting the speech outweighed the teacher’s right to speak, focusing 
on the letter’s impact on workplace relationships and Pickering’s work 
responsibilities.126  In short, the Court examined whether the actual or 
potential disruption to Pickering’s workplace caused by his letter 
outweighed his free speech rights.  More specifically, the Court examined 
whether the speech would create conflict with his co-workers or 
supervisors, destroy the relationship of loyalty and trust required in the 
employment context, or interfere with the employee’s performance.127  
The Court found the disruption to his employer caused by the letter was 
minimal for a number of reasons.  First, Pickering’s statements were not 
directed at a particular person with whom Pickering would be in contact 
during his daily work as a teacher.128  Consequently, the Court concluded 
that Pickering’s case did not involve any issue of discipline by his 
immediate supervisors at school and Pickering’s actions did not disrupt 
any harmony among co-workers.129  Second, Pickering’s speech did not 
impede his performance of his daily duties in the classroom nor did it 
interfere with the regular operations of the school.130  Notably, the Court 
did not find any disruption to the workplace even though some of 
Pickering’s criticism was inaccurate.131   
  
[47] Furthermore, the school administration’s interests in limiting a 
teacher’s opportunity to engage in public debate are further limited when 
                                                
126 Id. at 569-70. 
127 See Ronald D. Wenkart, The Free Speech Rights of K-12 Teachers After Garcetti, 269 
EDUC. L. REP. 1, 3 (2011).  
128 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 569-70. 
129 Id. at 570.  Of course, Pickering was disciplined; he was fired.  Id. at 564. 
130 See id. at 572-73. 
131 Id. at 570. 
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the teacher is speaking as a member of the general public.132  Where the 
fact of employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the 
subject matter of the teacher’s public communication, the Court concluded 
that it is necessary to treat the teacher as a member of the general 
public.133  Thus, absent proof that the teacher’s statements were knowingly 
or recklessly false, a teacher has a right to speak on issues of public 
importance.134  Consequently, his erroneous statements criticizing his 
employer on a matter of legitimate public concern were protected 
speech.135 
  
[48] Notably, the opinion is silent as to where and when Pickering 
wrote his letter and who read it.  Presumably, however, his letter was not 
written at the school during instructional time.136  Also, some members of 
Pickering’s audience were likely students in the school, possibly even his 
students.  The Court did not qualify its holding even though Pickering’s 
audience likely included some minors. 
   
b.  Teacher On-Campus Speech: Givhan v. 
Western Line Consolidated School District 
 
[49] More than a decade after deciding Pickering, the Supreme Court 
decided Givhan, using Givhan to further explain Pickering.137  Unlike 
Pickering, Givhan did not involve a public communication, off-campus 
                                                
132 See id. at 573. 
133 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572. 
134 See id. at 574. 
135 See id. 
136 See generally Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 (discussing the content and publication of the 
letter).  The briefs filed with the Supreme Court are also silent as to where and when 
Pickering wrote his letter.  
137 See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414 (1979). 
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speech, or even teacher-to-student speech.138  While both Givhan’s speech 
and Pickering’s speech implicated a matter of legitimate public concern,139 
Givhan’s speech, unlike Pickering’s speech, was communicated privately 
to a school administrator during working hours.140  In short, Givhan held 
that when a public employee speaks as a citizen on a matter of general 
concern, the speech is protected under the First Amendment, even if the 
speech is made privately.141   
  
[50] The district court in Givhan ordered the teacher’s reinstatement, 
finding that the primary reason Bessie B. Givhan was discharged was due 
to her criticism of the policies and practices of the school district, 
especially the school in which she was assigned to teach.142  She focused 
her complaints on the school’s alleged racially discriminatory policies and 
practices.143  The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court’s order 
reinstating Givhan, concluding that because Givhan had privately 
expressed her concerns to the principal, her expression was not protected 
under the First Amendment.144  The Fifth Circuit ultimately “concluded 
that there is no constitutional right to press even good ideas on an 
unwilling recipient.”145   
  
                                                
138 Id. at 412-13. 
139 See id. at 414. 
140 Id. at 412. 
141 Id. at 415-16.  A critical, enduring aspect of Givhan is that a public employee’s private 
speech can be protected under the First Amendment.  
142 Givhan, 439 U.S. at 412-13. 
143 Id. at 413. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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[51] The Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that a public employee 
does not forfeit her First Amendment freedoms if she decides to express 
her views privately rather than publicly.146  The Court observed that the 
First Amendment’s protections of government employees extends to 
private as well as public expression.147   
  
[52] However, the Court noted that “striking the Pickering balance in 
each context may involve different considerations.”148  The Court stated, 
“When a teacher speaks publicly, it is generally the content of the 
statements that must be assessed to determine whether they ‘in any way 
either impeded the teacher’s proper performance of his daily duties in the 
classroom . . . or interfered with the regular operation of schools 
generally.’”149  On the other hand, when a teacher speaks privately, this 
communication “may in some situations bring additional factors to the 
Pickering calculus.”150  For example, the Court noted that “[w]hen a 
government employee personally confronts her immediate superior, the 
employing agency’s institutional efficiency may be threatened not only by 
the content of the employee’s message but also by the manner, time, and 
place in which it is delivered.”151  Importantly, the Court, even in the 
context of private speech, focused on the impact of the speech on the 
workplace.152  
                                                
146 Id. at 413-14. 
147 Givhan, 439 U.S. at 413. 
148 Id. at 415 n.4. 
149 Id. (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968)). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. 
152 See Givhan, 439 U.S. at 414 n.3, 415 n.5.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court remanded 
the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with its Mount Healthy 
decision, which was decided after the district court’s decision in Givhan.  Id. at 417; see 
also Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).  
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2.  Other Relevant Public Employee Speech Cases 
 
a.  Public Employee Speech Outside the 
Workplace: NTEU and City of San Diego 
 
[53] Under the public-employee framework, the Supreme Court cases 
do not clarify the extent of First Amendment protection for off-duty public 
employees.  In particular, the cases do not provide clear guidance on the 
degree of public concern that the employee’s speech must implicate, nor 
do they explain how closely the off-duty speech must relate to the 
employee’s official work duties.153  
  
[54] With respect to non-teacher public employee speech occurring 
outside the workplace, the Supreme Court’s leading decisions, United 
States v. National Treasury Employees Union (“NTEU”)154 and City of 
San Diego v. Roe,155 are, on one level, easy to reconcile.  In NTEU, the 
Supreme Court held that a ban on honoraria for public employees was 
unconstitutional even if the speech was work-related because this speech 
might implicate a public concern and pass the Pickering balancing test.156  
                                                                                                                     
Although the district court had concluded that Givhan’s protected speech played a 
substantial role in the school district’s decision not to rehire her, the district court did not 
make any findings concerning whether the school district established, by a preponderance 
of the evidence, that it would have reached the same decision even in the absence of the 
protected speech; therefore, the Court remanded the case.  Givhan, 439 U.S. at 417.  
153 See Mary-Rose Papandrea, The Free Speech Rights of Off-Duty Government 
Employees, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2117, 2130 (2010). 
154 United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 466 n.10, 477 (1995) 
(holding that a ban on honoraria for public employees was unconstitutional even if the 
speech was work-related because this speech might implicate a public concern and pass 
the Pickering balancing test). 
155 City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80, 84 (2004) (holding that a police officer’s 
speech could be censored because his speech did not implicate a public concern). 
156 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 466 n.10, 477. 
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The Court in City of San Diego held that a police officer’s speech could be 
censored because his speech did not implicate a “public concern.”157   
  
[55] However, on another level, one implication of these cases is 
potentially worrisome.  In NTEU, Congress, at least in part, sought to 
regulate federal employees’ speech when the speech was related to the 
employees’ job responsibilities and thus could directly impact the work 
environment.158  In NTEU, the Supreme Court held this regulation 
unconstitutional.159  By contrast, in City of San Diego, the police 
department sought to regulate an “off-duty” officer’s speech even though 
the nexus between the officer’s speech and his job was, at best, 
attenuated.160  Nevertheless, the Court held that the officer’s speech was 
unprotected.161  These cases raise some question as to how closely the 
speech regulation must relate to the employee’s work responsibilities.162 
 
                                                
157 City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 80, 84.  However, if “public concern” is defined 
broadly to include everything that might concern the public, the Court’s holding in City 
of San Diego is more difficult to understand because even prurient speech might 
implicate a “public concern.”  See Papandrea, supra note 153, at 2140-42; see also infra 
Part X(B)(1).  
158 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 459-60. 
159 Id. at 457. 
160 See City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 79, 81. 
161 Id. at 79-80. 
162 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that a government entity has far 
greater leeway to regulate an employee’s speech than to regulate a citizen’s speech.  See 
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1994).  In City of San Diego, the nexus 
between the police officer’s speech and his job responsibilities was attenuated.  Thus, the 
San Diego Police Department, in regulating his speech, was regulating speech on the 
outer fringes of the employment relationship: in short, the San Diego Police Department 
was acting almost in a “sovereign” capacity. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XIX, Issue 2 
 
   
35 
i.  United States v. National Treasury 
Employees Union  
 
[56] In NTEU, the Supreme Court held that a congressional ban 
prohibiting almost all federal employees from receiving honoraria for 
making speeches or writing articles violated the plaintiff-respondents’ 
First Amendment free speech rights.163  In essence, the ban restricted a 
federal employee from accepting honoraria for this expression even when 
the expression was unrelated to work.164  The ban did not directly 
“prohibit[] any speech nor discriminate[] among speakers based on the 
content or viewpoint of their message[].”165  However, the Court 
concluded that the “prohibition on compensation unquestionably 
impose[d] a significant burden on expressive activity,” and therefore 
violated the First Amendment.166 
  
[57] In NTEU, the Justices agreed that Pickering-Connick provided the 
proper test to evaluate the plaintiff-respondents’ facial challenge to 
Section 501(b) of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978.167  The majority 
held that the ban in Section 501(b) was overbroad, regulating more speech 
than allowed under the Pickering-Connick test.168  First, based on the 
types of speech for which public employees had previously received 
honoraria, the Court concluded that much of the banned speech would 
qualify as citizen-expression on matters of public concern rather than 
employee-expression on matters of personal interest.169  Importantly, the 
                                                
163 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 457.  
164 See id. 
165 Id. at 468. 
166 Id. 
167 Id. at 465-66. 
168 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 466-70. 
169 Id. at 466. 
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Court concluded that a public employee speaks as a citizen on matters of 
public concern when the employee’s speech is addressed to a public 
audience, is made outside of the workplace, and involves content largely 
unrelated to the employee’s government work.170  
  
[58] Furthermore, with respect to the second part of the Pickering-
Connick test, which concerns the balancing of the employees’ free speech 
interests against the employers’ interests in an efficient workplace, the 
Court concluded that the Pickering calculus weighed heavily in favor of 
the plaintiff-respondents.171  The Court observed that the government’s 
burden was heavy because the honoraria ban was a “wholesale deterrent to 
a broad category of expression by a massive number of potential 
speakers.”172  Furthermore, the government was required to show that the 
ban would affect actual workplace efficiency.173  The Court concluded that 
the honoraria ban would deter an enormous quantity of speech based only 
on speculation that it might threaten the government’s interest, and the 
government had provided no evidence of misconduct related to honoraria 
in the “vast rank and file of federal employees” it covered.174  
Furthermore, because the vast majority of the speech at issue presumably 
would not involve the subject matter of government employment and 
would take place outside the workplace, the government could not justify 
the ban on the grounds of immediate workplace disruption based on 
Pickering and its progeny.175  In particular, the Court observed that the 
speech did not address audiences composed of co-workers or supervisors, 
but rather involved speech for the general public, further limiting any 
                                                
170 Id.  
171 See id. at 477. 
172 Id. at 467.  
173 Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 467 n.11.  
174 Id. at 472. 
175 Id. at 470. 
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workplace impact effects.176  Ultimately, the Court held that the 
speculative benefits the honoraria ban might provide the government were 
insufficient to justify the burden on the plaintiff-respondents’ 
expression.177 
 
ii.  City of San Diego v. Roe 
 
[59] The police officer’s speech in City of San Diego was made outside 
the workplace and did not involve any workplace grievance issues.178  The 
Supreme Court applied the Pickering-Connick test, holding that the 
officer’s speech did not touch on a matter of public concern and therefore 
was not entitled to protection under the First Amendment.179  The 
circumstances in City of San Diego, however, were rather extreme.  The 
police officer’s speech was commercial speech and, at least in the Court’s 
view, exploited his status as a city police officer.180  Crucial to the Court’s 
decision was the fact that the officer’s speech did not inform the public 
about any aspect of the functioning of the San Diego Police 
Department.181 
 
                                                
176 Id. at 465. 
177 Id. at 477.  Justice O’Connor, concurring in the judgment, explained that section 
501(b) involved a ban on off-hour speech that did not relate to internal office affairs or 
the employee’s status as an employee.  Id. at 480 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983)).  Justice O’Connor added that “[a]s the 
magnitude of intrusion on an employee’s [or at least off-duty employee’s] interests rises, 
so does the [g]overnment’s burden of justification.”  Id. at 483 (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 150). 
178 543 U.S. 77, 81 (2004).  
179 Id. at 84. 
180 Id.  
181 Id.   
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[60] In this case, the City of San Diego terminated a police officer for 
selling videotapes he made and for other related activity.182  The tapes 
showed the respondent engaging in sexually explicit acts, including 
stripping off a police uniform.183  The uniform was not the specific 
uniform of his employer, the San Diego Police Department (“SDPD”), but 
it was identifiable as a police uniform.184  He sold his videos as well as 
police equipment, including official uniforms of the SDPD, on his EBay 
account.185  His account indicated that he was employed in law 
enforcement.186  
  
[61] After Roe’s activities on eBay were discovered, the SDPD held a 
hearing and Roe was directed to stop displaying, manufacturing, 
distributing, or selling any sexually explicit materials.187  Roe removed 
some material from his account, but he did not fully comply with this 
directive.188  The SDPD then terminated Roe.189  Roe sued, claiming the 
SDPD violated his First Amendment free speech rights when it discharged 
him.190 
  
[62] The lower courts disagreed as to whether Roe’s speech implicated 
                                                
182 Id. at 78. 




187 Id. at 79. 
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a public concern.191  The district court held that the sexually explicit, made 
for-profit videos did not involve a "matter of public concern."192  The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Roe’s conduct fell 
within the protected category of citizen commentary on matters of public 
concern.193  Central to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion was that Roe’s 
expression did not involve an internal workplace grievance, took place 
while he was off duty and away from his employer’s premises, and was 
unrelated to his employment.194  
  
[63] The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision, 
holding that Roe’s claim failed for two reasons.195  First, the Supreme 
Court reasoned that Roe’s claim failed under the line of cases protecting a 
public employee’s speech when the speech is made on the employee’s 
own time on topics unrelated to employment.196  In these circumstances, 
the speech is entitled to First Amendment protection unless the 
government can justify its regulation based on something “‘far stronger 
than mere speculation.’”197  The Supreme Court reasoned that this line of 
cases, culminating in NTEU, did not control Roe’s case because the 
speech involved in these cases was unrelated to the claimant’s 
employment and had no effect on the employer’s mission.198  In City of 




193 City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 79-80.  
194 Id.  
195 Id. at 81-82, 84.  
 
196 Id. at 80. 
197 Id. (quoting United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 455 (1995)). 
198 City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 80 (citing Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 
459). 
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San Diego, the SDPD had demonstrated substantial interests of its own 
that were compromised by Roe’s expression.199  In short, Roe took 
“deliberate steps to link his videos and other wares to his police work,” all 
in ways injurious to his employer.200  The use of a police uniform, the law 
enforcement reference in his web site, the listing of the speaker as “‘in the 
field of law enforcement,’” and the debased parody of an officer 
performing indecent acts while in the course of his official duties, all 
served to bring the mission of his employer and the professionalism of its 
officers into serious disrepute.201  Consequently, although the speech was 
made on the employee’s own time and did not involve any particular 
work-related dispute with the SDPD, the speech was “linked to his official 
status as a police officer” and “designed to exploit his employer’s 
image.”202  Thus, Roe’s speech detrimentally affected the employer’s 
mission.203 
  
[64] Second, after concluding that Pickering-Connick provided the 
proper framework for analyzing Roe’s claim, the Supreme Court held that 
his speech was not protected because the videos did not implicate a 
“matter of public concern,” which typically involve matters of government 
policy that are of interest to the public at large.204  The Court noted that the 
“boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined.”205  In 
reaching its holding, the Court reasoned that the interests being protected 
under Pickering-Connick are as much about the public’s interest in 
                                                
199 Id. at 81. 
200 Id. 
201 Id. (quoting Roe v. City of San Diego, 356 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
202 Id. at 84. 
203 City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 84. 
204 Id. at 80-82. 
205 Id. at 83.  
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receiving informed opinion as they are about the employee’s own right to 
disseminate it.206  Relying on its earlier decision in Connick, the Court 
examined “the ‘content, form, and context of a given statement, as 
revealed by the whole record’” to assess whether the employee's speech 
addressed a matter of public concern.207  
  
[65] The Supreme Court explained that “public concern” is something 
that is a subject of “legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general 
interest and of value and concern to the public at the time of 
publication.”208  Therefore, even certain private remarks made at the 
workplace during working hours, such as negative comments about the 
President of the United States, “touch on matters of public concern” and 
should thus be analyzed under Pickering-Connick.209 
  
[66] The Court had little difficulty holding that Roe’s expression did 
“not qualify as a matter of public concern” under any interpretation of the 
public concern test.210  In particular, Roe’s speech did nothing to inform 
the public about any aspect of the SDPD’s functioning or operation.211  
Nor was his speech anything like the speech in Rankin v. McPherson, 
where a co-worker commented privately on political news.212  Roe’s 
                                                
206 Id. at 82.  
207 Id. at 83 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-48 (1983)). 
208 City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 83-84. 




212 Compare id., with Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 381, 392 (1987) (holding that 
a clerical employee’s remark, made privately in a county constable’s office and never 
disseminated to the public, was protected speech) (The employee, after hearing of an 
attempt on the life of then President Reagan, said, “[I]f they go for him again, I hope they 
get him.”).  Rankin was a pre-Garcetti case.  If Rankin were decided today, it would 
likely be decided under Garcetti. 
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expression was widely broadcast, linked to his official status as a police 
officer, and designed to exploit his employer’s image.213  Consequently, 
Roe’s speech was not protected under the First Amendment.214 
 
b.  Public Employee Speech Within the 
Workplace: Connick and Garcetti 
 
[67] The Supreme Court’s decisions regarding non-teacher public 
employee speech within the workplace leave a number of questions 
unanswered.  In particular, the Court has not provided guidance on when a 
public employee acts pursuant to the employee’s official duties215 and the 
Court has not clarified the extent to which Garcetti modifies Connick. 
 
[68] In Connick, the Supreme Court observed that Pickering’s 
balancing test applies only when the employee spoke “as a citizen upon 
matters of public concern" rather than "as an employee upon matters” only 
of private interest.216  In Garcetti, the Supreme Court held that when a 
public employee speaks pursuant to the employee’s "official duties," the 
First Amendment does not protect the employee’s speech, regardless of 
whether the speech implicates a public concern.217  While Garcetti 
represented an opportunity to clarify this area of law, many commentators 
agree the opinion did not achieve this result.218   
                                                
213 City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 84. 
214 See id. 
215 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424 (2006) (refusing to provide a 
comprehensive framework for determining when an employee speaks pursuant to the 
employee’s official duties).  
216 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). 
217 547 U.S. at 422.  
218 See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside the Lines: Garcetti v. 
Ceballos in the Federal Appellate Courts, 262 EDUC. L. REP. 357, 358 (2011). 
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i.  Connick v. Myers 
 
[69] In early 1983, the Supreme Court explained the parameters of 
speech involving "public concern" more fully, ultimately holding in a 5-4 
decision that the First Amendment did not protect a state employee when 
she circulated a questionnaire concerning internal office affairs.219 Sheila 
Myers was employed by the District Attorney’s Office.220  At work, she 
finalized a questionnaire soliciting “the views of her fellow staff members 
concerning office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance 
committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees 
felt pressured to work in political campaigns.”221  Myers distributed the 
survey at work.222  Although some surveys were distributed during lunch, 
others were distributed during working hours.223  Myers was subsequently 
discharged.224 
 
[70] The district court found that Myers’ distribution of the 
questionnaire was the real reason for her termination.225  The district court 
then held that the questionnaire involved matters of public concern and 
that the state had not “‘clearly demonstrated’ that the survey ‘substantially 
interfered’” with the operations of the District Attorney’s Office.226  The 
                                                
219 Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.  
220 Id. at 140. 
221 Id. at 141. 
222 Id.  
223 See id. at 153 & n.13. 
224 Connick, 461 U.S. at 141. 
225 Id. at 142. 
226 Id. 
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Fifth Circuit affirmed.227  
  
[71] The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Myers’ speech was 
unprotected despite reaffirming that speech on public issues occupies the 
“‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.’”228  In 
reaching this result, the Court established a two-part test for determining 
whether a public employee’s speech receives First Amendment 
protection.229  First, the public employee’s speech must implicate a public 
concern.230  Second, if the employee’s speech does involve a public 
concern, a court should determine whether the employer’s interests in 
prohibiting the speech outweigh the employee’s interests in speaking and 
the audience’s interest in hearing the speech.231  Thus, a public employee’s 
speech is protected if it involves a "public concern" and on balance, the 
speaker and audience’s interests in the speech outweigh, or are at least 
equal to, the employer’s interests.232   
  
[72] In determining whether the speech could be fairly characterized as 
constituting speech on a matter of public concern, the Court explained that 
if speech cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, 
social, or other concern to the community, it can be regulated.233  The 
                                                
227 Id. 
228 Id. at 145, 154 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 
(1982)).  
229 Connick, 461 U.S. at 142, 146, 149-50. 
 
230 Id. at 144-45.  See generally 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM 
OF SPEECH § 18:10 (2012) (citing Nichol v. Arin Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 
536, 557 (W.D. Pa. 2003) (“‘Public concern’ is a term of art under the Pickering-Connick 
test, a term ‘measured more by what it is not than by what it is.’”)).  
231 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 140 (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968)). 
232 See id. at 154.  
233 Id. at 146. 
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Court, however, avoided drawing any bright lines, noting that its holding 
should not be read to suggest that speech on private matters falls into one 
of the narrow and well-defined classes of expression which carry so little 
social value, such as obscenity, that the state can prohibit this expression 
by all persons in the jurisdiction.234  The Court observed that when a 
public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, 
but instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent 
unusual circumstances, a federal court is not an appropriate forum.235  
Further, the Court explained that “[w]hether an employee’s speech 
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by examining the 
content, form, and context of a given statement as revealed by the whole 
record.”236  This inquiry into the protected status of speech is “one of law, 
not fact.”237   
  
[73] Because one of the matters in Myers’ survey did touch on a matter 
of public concern, namely whether attorneys in the office were pressured 
to work in political campaigns, the Court moved onto the second part of 
the Pickering test—balancing the interests of both the employer and the 
employee—ultimately holding that these interests weighed in the 
employer’s favor.238  The Court noted that “[w]hen close working 
relationships are essential to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide 
degree of deference to the employer’s judgment is appropriate.”239  The 
Court cautioned that “a stronger showing may be necessary if the 
employee’s speech more substantially involved matters of public 
                                                
234 Id. at 147. 
235 Id.  
236 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48. 
237 Id. at 148 n.7. 
238 See id. at 149-52. 
239 Id. at 151-52. 
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concern.”240   
  
[74] In balancing the competing interests under the second part of the 
Pickering test, the Court weighed Myers’ free speech interests against her 
employer’s interests in curtailing her speech.241  In the second part of the 
test, the “manner, time and place” of the employee’s statement is again 
relevant, as is the context in which the dispute arose.242  In particular, with 
respect to the employer’s interests, the Court examined “whether the 
statement impair[ed] discipline by superiors or harmony among co-
workers, ha[d] a detrimental impact on close working relationships for 
which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impede[d] the 
performance of the speaker’s duties or interfere[d] with the regular 
operation of the enterprise.”243  
   
[75] The majority opinion concluded that Myers’ questions were not 
aimed at helping the public evaluate the performance of a government 
agency but rather at "gathering ammunition" for a battle with Myers’ 
supervisors regarding her transfer.244  The majority observed that Myers’ 
supervisors were not required to wait until the office was disrupted and 
working relationships destroyed before quelling, in the words of a 
supervisor, Myers’ “mini-insurrection.”245 
  
[76] The manner, time, and place in which the questionnaire was 
                                                
240 Id. at 152. 
241 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 140, 154. 
 
242 See id. at 152-53.   
243 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 
U.S. 563, 570-73 (1968)); see Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-54. 
244 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. 
245 See id. at 151-52 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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distributed were crucial to the Court’s disposition.246  Although the Court 
found that Myers’ questionnaire did not impede her ability to perform her 
job responsibilities,247 she did prepare and distribute the questionnaire at 
the office, and the manner of distribution required Myers to leave her 
work and for others to do the same in order to complete it.248  This 
supports the idea that the functioning of the office was disrupted.249  
Finally, the Court observed that “[e]mployee speech which transpires 
entirely on the employee’s own time, and in non-work areas of the office, 
may bring different factors into the Pickering calculus.”250  
 
[77] The context in which the dispute arose is also significant.251  This 
was not a case where an employee, out of purely academic interest, 
circulated a questionnaire.252  Therefore, Myers’ survey was “most 
accurately characterized as an employee grievance concerning internal 
office policy.”253  Again, the Court refused to lay down a general standard 
                                                
246 See id. at 152-53.  The majority opinion ignored Justice Brennan’s critique that the 
context of the message is used twice in the Pickering analysis - both in determining 
whether the speech was political and in evaluating the competing interests in allowing or 
prohibiting the speech.  See id. at 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Justice Brennan 
would have defined public concern more broadly than the majority: “public concern” 
means “’to supply the public need for information and education with respect to the 
significant issues of our times.’”  See id. at 164 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
247 Id. at 151.  
248 Id. at 153. 
249 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 153. 
250 Id. at 153 n.13. 
251 Id. at 153. 
252 Id. 
253 Id. at 154. 
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for deciding all such cases.254 
   
ii.  Garcetti v. Ceballos 
  
[78] The Court’s decision in Garcetti has been widely criticized.255  
However, one positive aspect of the decision is that it attempts to clarify 
when an employee speaks as a “citizen.”256  In short, a public employee 
speaks as a citizen when the speech is not made “pursuant to his official 
duties.”257 
 
[79] In Garcetti, the Court held by a 5-4 margin that the First 
Amendment does not protect a public employee’s speech when the speech 
is made “pursuant to [the employee’ s] official duties.”258  However, the 
                                                
254 Connick, 461 U.S. at 154.  In a later decision, the Court, observed that lower courts 
have struggled to apply the Pickering-Connick test.  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 
410, 418 (2006) (“[C]onducting these [Pickering-Connick] inquiries has sometimes 
proved difficult.”).  
255 See Roosevelt III, supra note 23, at 631, 631 & n.6 (as the title indicates, concluding 
otherwise, but observing that most academic discussion is highly critical).  
256 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418-22. 
  
257 Id. at 421. 
 
258 Id.  Justice Stevens advocated a broader test, emphasizing that the answer to whether 
the First Amendment protects public employee speech, even when the speech is made 
pursuant to the employee’s official duties, should be “sometimes” rather than “never.”  
Id. at 426 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks omitted).  Justice Souter’s 
dissent echoed this sentiment, cautioning that “when constitutional interests clash, [courts 
should] resist the demand for winner-take-all; [instead, they should] try to make 
adjustments that serve all of the values at stake.”  Id. at 434 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
Justice Souter would protect public employee speech if the speech involved “comment on 
official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious wrongdoing, or 
threats to health and safety.”  See id. at 435.  Justice Breyer concluded that because 
Ceballos’s speech was governed by professional canons and supported by special 
constitutional considerations regarding professional duties, the need to protect the speech 
is augmented, and the speech should be protected unless it fails the Pickering balancing 
test.  See id. at 447 (Breyer, J., dissenting).  
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parties in Garcetti agreed that the plaintiff, Richard Ceballos, spoke 
pursuant to his official duties.259  The Supreme Court refused to provide a 
comprehensive framework for determining when an employee speaks 
pursuant to the employee’s official duties.260  Unsurprisingly, lower courts 
have struggled to apply the Garcetti holding.261  
  
[80] Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Garcetti did not involve 
a teacher, lower courts have frequently applied its holding to teacher free 
speech claims, at least those arising from on-campus speech.262  Its 
relevance to off-campus speech, particularly with respect to public school 
teachers, is unclear.  At its core, the Court concluded that much like 
Connick, Garcetti involved a work-related dispute.263 
  
[81] In Garcetti, the plaintiff, Richard Ceballos, claimed that his free 
speech rights were violated when he suffered an adverse employment 
action based on memoranda he wrote regarding a pending criminal case.264  
During this time, Ceballos was a supervising deputy district attorney.265  
At the request of a defense attorney, Ceballos investigated whether an 
                                                
259 Id. at 424.  
260 Id. (noting that since the parties agreed the speech was made pursuant to Ceballos’ 
official duties, this was not the proper “occasion to articulate a comprehensive framework 
for defining the scope of an employee’s duties in cases where there is room for serious 
debate”). 
261 See Bauries & Schach, supra note 218, at 358.  
262 See, e.g., Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2010) (holding that 
Garcetti barred a teacher’s claim arising from the teacher’s filing of a grievance); Mayer 
v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that 
Garcetti governed a teacher’s in-class speech). 
263 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420-21. 
264 Id. at 414-15. 
265 Id. at 413. 
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affidavit used to support a search warrant was inaccurate; he concluded it 
was.266  Ceballos informed his supervisors of his conclusion and then 
wrote a disposition memorandum recommending that the pending charges 
be dismissed.267  Nonetheless, his supervisors proceeded with the 
prosecution.268  Ceballos claimed that, based on his memorandum, he was 
subsequently reassigned to another position, transferred to another 
courthouse, and denied a promotion.269 
  
[82] Unlike the lower courts in Connick, the lower courts in Garcetti 
split as to whether Ceballos’ speech was protected.270  The district court 
granted summary judgment against Ceballos, holding that since Ceballos 
wrote his memorandum pursuant to his employment duties, his speech was 
not entitled to First Amendment protection.271  The Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Ceballos’ allegations of 
wrongdoing in the memorandum were protected speech.272    
 
[83] The Ninth Circuit employed the Pickering-Connick test, first 
concluding that Ceballos’ memorandum satisfied the public concern 
requirement.273  Noting that the memorandum did not create any 
disruption or inefficiency in the workplace, the Court of Appeals 
concluded that, on balance, Ceballos’ memorandum was protected 
                                                
266 Id. at 413-14. 
267 Id. at 414.  Ceballos wrote a follow-up memorandum as well.  Id. 
268 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 414. 
269 Id. at 415. 
270 Id; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141-42 (1983). 
 
271 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 415. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 415-16. 
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[84] The Supreme Court reversed, adding a new threshold requirement 
for public employee speech claims while simultaneously restricting the 
application of the Pickering-Connick test.275  The Court noted that the 
Pickering-Connick line of public-employee speech cases establishes a 
two-part test governing when speech is protected.276  The first prong is 
whether the employee speech implicates a matter of public concern.277  If 
so, the second prong requires the employer to establish that its interests in 
regulating the speech outweigh the employee’s interests in speaking and 
the employee’s and audience’s interests in hearing the message.278  
However, after Garcetti, in order to reach the Pickering-Connick test, a 
public employee must first establish that the employee’s speech was not 
made pursuant to his official duties,279 because an employer can regulate 
speech made pursuant to a public employee’s official duties.280   
 
[85] In reaching this result, the Supreme Court explained the competing 
interests involved in public employee free speech cases.281  An employer 
has significant interests in regulating a public employee’s speech.282  First, 
                                                
274 Id.  
275 See id. at 424, 426 (at least with respect to speech made at work during working 
hours).   
276 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418. 
277 Id.  (finding that if the employee’s speech does not involve a legitimate matter of 
public concern, an employer may regulate the employee’s speech). 
278 See id.  
279 See id. at 421-22. 
280 See id. at 422-23. 
281 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423. 
 
282 See id. at 418-19.  While “[a] government entity has broader discretion to restrict 
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a public employee “must accept certain limitations on his or her freedom” 
because “[g]overnment employers, like private employers, need a 
significant degree of control over their employees’ words and actions[]” in 
order to provide efficient government services.283  Second, public 
employees “often occupy trusted positions in society[,]” and “[w]hen 
[these employees] speak out, they can express views that contravene 
government policies or impair the proper performance of government 
functions.”284  Thus, “[s]upervisors must ensure that their employees’ 
official communications are accurate, demonstrate sound judgment, and 
promote the employer’s mission.”285 
 
[86] On the other hand, the Supreme Court “has recognized that a 
citizen who works for the government is [still] a citizen.”286  “So long as 
employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, they 
must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their 
employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”287  “The Court has 
acknowledged the importance of promoting the public’s interest in 
receiving well-informed views of government employees engaging in 
civic discussion.”288  One key premise underlying the Court’s public 
                                                                                                                     
speech when it acts in its role as employer,” the Court noted that “the restrictions it 
imposes must be directed at speech that has some potential to affect the entity’s 
operations.”  Id. at 418. 
283 Id. at 418.  
284 Id. at 419. 
285 Id. at 422-23; cf. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007).  In Morse, the Court 
found that a school’s prohibition of student speech at a school event did not violate the 
free speech clause because the speech could reasonably be perceived as promoting illegal 
drug use.  551 U.S. at 410.  The Court justified its holding by observing that the school’s 
mission included preventing student drug abuse.  Id. at 408-09. 
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employee free speech cases is that “while the First Amendment invests 
public employees with certain rights, it does not empower them to 
‘constitutionalize the employee grievance.’”289  
  
[87] In weighing these concerns in Ceballos’s circumstances, the 
Supreme Court explained in detail the factors that were not dispositive in 
Garcetti.290  First, it was not dispositive that Ceballos expressed his views 
inside his office, rather than publicly, because First Amendment protects 
some expression made at work.291  Thus, the Court refused “to hold that 
all speech within the office is automatically exposed to restriction.”292  
Second, the Court reasoned that even though the subject matter of the 
memorandum was Ceballos’s employment, this, too, was not 
dispositive.293   
  
[88] The controlling factor, however, was that Ceballos’s “expressions 
were made pursuant to his [official] duties.”294  “Ceballos spoke as a 
prosecutor fulfilling [his] responsibility to advise his supervisor about how 
best to proceed with a pending case . . . .”295  The Court held that when 
public employees make “statements pursuant to their official duties, the 
employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and 
the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer 
discipline.”296   
                                                
289 Id. at 420 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)). 
 
290 Id. at 420-421. 
 
291 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420. 
292 Id. at 420-21. 
293 Id. at 421.  
294 Id. 
295 Id.  
296 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421. 
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[89] The Court reasoned that “[w]hen he went to work and performed 
the tasks he was paid to perform, Ceballos acted as a government 
employee.”297  He “did not act as a citizen when he went about conducting 
his daily professional activities, such as supervising attorneys, 
investigating charges, and preparing filings.”298  Nor did he speak as a 
citizen when he wrote a memorandum addressing the disposition of a 
pending criminal case.299 
  
[90] The Court opined about the danger of undue judicial interference 
in government business, noting that a holding in Ceballos’ favor “would 
commit the state and federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive 
role, mandating judicial oversight of communications between and among 
government employees and their superiors in the course of official 
business.”300  Additionally, the Supreme Court emphasized that “[w]hen a 
public employee speaks pursuant to employment responsibilities . . . there 
is no relevant analogue to speech by citizens who are not government 
employees.”301  Ultimately, the Court concluded that Ceballos wrote the 
memorandum pursuant to his official duties.302  The Court declined to 
“articulate a comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an 
                                                
297 Id. at 422. 
298 Id. 
299 Id. 
300 Id. at 423. 
301 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.  Based on some questionable assumptions, the Supreme 
Court concluded that a powerful network of legislative enactments, including whistle-
blower protections laws and labor codes, will likely protect public employees who expose 
wrongdoing.  See id. at 425.  As Justice Souter noted, however, the whistle-blowing and 
other worker protection statutes are no substitute for First Amendment protection.  See id. 
at 439-41 (Souter, J., dissenting).  At a minimum, the protection will differ depending on 
the local, state, or federal jurisdictions employing the worker.  Id. 
302 Id. at 424. 
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employee’s duties in cases where there is room for serious debate.”303   
 
[91] Furthermore, the Court rejected the notion that employers could 
curtail public employees’ speech rights by creating excessively broad job 
descriptions.304  The Court cautioned that the inquiry into whether speech 
is made pursuant to the official duties of a public employee is “a practical 
one” because “[f]ormal job descriptions often bear little resemblance to 
the duties an employee actually is expected to perform.”305     
  
[92] Finally, the majority opinion ends with a discussion of academic 
freedom, emphasizing that its decision does not apply to cases involving 
speech related to scholarship or teaching.306  The Court remarked that 
expression related to academic scholarship or classroom instruction may 
implicate “additional constitutional interests that are not fully accounted 
for by [the] Court’s customary public employee-speech jurisprudence.”307  
The Court declined to decide whether the analysis would apply in the 
same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or 
teaching.308 
 
                                                
303 Id. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. at 424-25. 
306 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. 
307 Id.  
308 Id.  Lower courts have struggled as to whether this dictum applies to K-12 teacher 
speech or whether this exception applies solely to professor speech at the university level.  
See SCHNEIDER, supra note 28, § 2.20 at n.138.74.  One significant difference between 
teachers and university professors is that professors are expected to produce independent 
scholarship that no reasonable person would impute to the university itself.  See 
Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 207-08 (2d Cir. 2011) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) 
(concluding that Garcetti, properly understood, rests on a government speech rationale); 
see also infra Part IV.C for a further discussion of the government speech doctrine. 
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B.  Another Possible Framework for Regulating Teachers’ Off-
Campus Speech to Students Using Social Media: Treating 
Teachers’ Speech as School-Sponsored Speech 
  
[93] A few courts have regulated on-campus teacher speech under 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,309 but this framework would 
apply only in extremely limited circumstances with respect to teachers’ 
off-campus speech.310  Hazelwood would apply to teacher-student speech 
using social media only if Garcetti does not.  Thus, if a teacher speaks 
pursuant to her official duties, Garcetti provides the proper test.311  
However, assuming that a teacher does not speak pursuant to her official 
duties, Hazelwood would govern if, first, one could reasonably perceive 
the teacher’s speech as the school’s speech and, second, one could 
reasonably characterize the teacher-student interaction as a supervised 
learning experience.312   
  
[94] In Hazelwood, the Supreme Court held that school administrators 
                                                
309 484 U.S. 260 (1988); see, e.g., Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of 
Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 722-23 (2d Cir. 1994); Kramer v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 715 F. Supp. 
2d 335, 353-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting that there is disagreement among the federal 
courts of appeals on whether teacher classroom speech should be analyzed under Garcetti 
or Hazelwood; the court analyzed the issue under both tests).  According to Kramer, the 
Second Circuit is among the courts that have extended the Supreme Court's standard for 
student speech to teachers' instructional speech.  715 F. Supp. 2d at 354.  But see 
Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 198 (determining that a grievance filed by a teacher was 
unprotected speech pursuant to Garcetti without considering the relevance of the 
teacher’s position as an educator under Hazelwood).  Most of the cases applying 
Hazelwood to teachers’ instructional speech were decided pre-Garcetti.  See, e.g., Ward 
v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 453 (1st Cir.1993). 
 
310 Some courts have concluded that Hazelwood does not apply to off-campus student 
speech.  See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 937 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (citing Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 400-01 (2007)). 
311 See 547 U.S. at 424. 
312 See 484 U.S. at 271. 
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could regulate student speech if one could reasonably interpret the speech 
as the school’s speech and the school has a legitimate pedagogical reason 
for regulating the speech.313  The Court reasoned that this standard is 
consistent with the Court’s “oft-expressed view that the education of the 
[n]ation’s youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and 
state and local officials, and not of federal judges.”314  
  
[95] The Court concluded that educators may exercise control over the 
contents of a high school newspaper that is produced as part of the 
school’s journalism curriculum,315 “so long as [the official’s] actions are 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”316  In this case, the 
school principal objected to two articles scheduled to appear in a school 
newspaper.317  One article “described three Hazelwood East students’ 
experiences with pregnancy; the other discussed the impact of divorce on 
students at the school.”318  The school’s journalism students wrote and 
                                                
313 Id. at 273.  The speech in Hazelwood can be interpreted in two ways: as school speech 
under the government speech doctrine, discussed infra Part IV.C, or as student speech 
within a nonpublic forum.  See id. at 276, 270.  The crucial distinction between these 
competing interpretations is that there is no requirement of viewpoint neutrality under the 
former; the only requirement is the reasonableness standard the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments impose on all government action.  See id. at 267, 270, 273.  Under the 
nonpublic forum rationale, the perception that the speech could be interpreted as the 
school’s speech is relevant because this perception provides the school with a rational 
basis for censoring the newspaper.  In short, it is reasonable for a school to want to 
dissociate itself from speech of which it disapproves.  See id. at 266-67, 269-73. 
 
314 Id. at 273. 
315 Id. at 260-61. 
316 Id. at 273.  The Court concluded that the faculty-supervised student newspaper was a 
nonpublic forum.  Id. at 269-70.  With respect to nonpublic forums, the school can 
regulate speech within the forum subject to the rational basis test; regulations supported 
by legitimate pedagogical reasons do not violate the First Amendment.  Id. at 273. 
317 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 263. 
318 Id. at 263.  
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edited the newspaper under the supervision of faculty, and the Board of 
Education provided some of the newspaper’s funding.319 
  
[96] The principal was concerned with, among other things, privacy 
issues, because, although the article used pseudonyms for the girls 
involved, the pregnant students might be identifiable from the story.320  He 
also was worried that “references to sexual activity and birth control were 
inappropriate for some . . . students at the school.”321   
 
[97] The Supreme Court held that since the newspaper was a supervised 
learning experience provided by the school, school officials were entitled 
to regulate the contents of the newspaper in any reasonable manner.322  In 
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted the distinction between requiring 
a school to tolerate particular student speech and requiring a school to 
affirmatively promote particular student speech.323  Ultimately, the Court 
held that school-sponsored publications that “students, parents, and 
members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur 
of the school” can be regulated as long as the school official has a 
legitimate pedagogical reason for doing so.324  The Court defined school-
sponsored activities as those that may “be characterized as part of the 
school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom 
setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to 
impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and 
audiences.”325  
                                                
319 Id. at 262-63. 
320 Id. at 263. 
321 Id. 
322 Hazelwood, 484 U.S at 271, 273. 
323 Id. at 270-71. 
324 Id. at 271, 273. 
325 Id. at 271. 
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[98] The Court emphasized that educators are entitled to exercise 
greater control over school-sponsored speech “to assure that participants 
learn whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or 
listeners are not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their 
level of maturity, and that the views of the individual speaker are not 
erroneously attributed to the school.”326  Schools need to “retain the 
authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that might reasonably be 
perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible sex, or [other 
such] conduct.”327 
 
C.  The Government Speech Doctrine: Garcetti and Hazelwood 
in a Different Light 
  
[99] The government speech doctrine is intertwined with both the 
public employee and school-sponsored speech frameworks.  Some 
commentators contend that the government speech doctrine best explains 
both Garcetti and Hazelwood.328  
  
[100] In essence, the government speech doctrine provides that the First 
Amendment’s free speech clause restricts government regulation of 
private speech, but does not restrict the government’s speech.329  Under 
                                                
326 Id.  
327 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272.  Courts of Appeals are split as to whether Hazelwood 
allows viewpoint based restrictions on student speech.  See Nicholas J. Wagoner, Does 
the 1st Amendment Permit Viewpoint Based Restrictions on School-Sponsored Speech?, 
CIRCUIT SPLITS (Jan. 30, 2012, 5:19 AM), http://www.circuitsplits.com/student-speech/.  
Whether viewpoint restrictions on student speech are allowed may depend on whether 
Hazelwood is best explained as a government speech case or a nonpublic forum decision.  
See Peck ex rel. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 631-33 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
328 See, e.g., Nicole B. Cásarez, The Student Press, The Public Workplace, and 
Expanding Notions of Government Speech, 35 J.C. & U.L. 1, 7, 17-19 (2008). 
329 See Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467 (2009); Nat’l 
Endowment of Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 598 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is the 
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this recent doctrine,330 the Court has held that a city’s selection of a 
permanent monument for a public park constitutes government speech and 
is therefore not curtailed by the First Amendment’s free speech clause.331  
Even though a private organization donated the monument, the speech was 
government speech because the city “‘effectively controlled’ the messages 
sent by the monuments in the Park by exercising ‘final approval authority’ 
over their selection” and by taking ownership of most of the permanent 
monuments.332  In the words of Justice Souter, the city’s selection of a 
permanent monument was government speech because a “reasonable and 
fully informed observer would understand the expression to be 
government speech.”333 
  
[101] Both Hazelwood and Garcetti can be interpreted as “government 
speech” cases, though Garcetti fits less readily within this framework.  
Although Hazelwood predates the government speech doctrine, the 
Court’s conclusion in Hazelwood that educators can regulate school-
sponsored publications that might be perceived to “bear the imprimatur of 
the school”334 fits readily within the government speech doctrine since, in 
these circumstances, the school effectively controls the message.  On the 
                                                                                                                     
very business of government to favor and disfavor points of view . . . .”); see also 
Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 553, 562, 565-67 (2005) (holding that 
generic advertising funded by assessments on beef producers was “government speech,” 
and therefore not restricted by the First Amendment); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 174 
(1991).  Of course, the Establishment Clause, Equal Protection Clause and, ultimately, 
the electoral process do restrict government speech.  Cf. Pleasant Grove City, Utah, 555 
U.S. at 468-69; id. at 482 (Stevens, J., concurring).  
330 The Court first explicitly referred to the “government speech doctrine” in Pleasant 
Grove City, Utah, 555 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
331 Id. at 467-68, 470. 
332 Id. at 473. 
333 Id. at 487 (Souter, J., concurring). 
334 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988). 
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other hand, despite the Court’s mention, at least implicitly, of the 
government speech doctrine within Garcetti itself, Garcetti fits less easily 
within this framework.335  The Court in Garcetti reasoned that 
“[r]estricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s 
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee 
might have enjoyed as a private citizen.”336  “It simply reflects the 
exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has 
commissioned or created.”337  Thus, at least implicitly, the Court 
acknowledged the application of the government speech doctrine.338  
  
[102] However, the government speech doctrine is not an entirely 
convincing explanation for Garcetti.  Presumably, Ceballos was hired to 
exercise independent judgment in his disposition memoranda339 and his 
speech was not speech that a reasonable and fully informed person would 
understand to be government speech, particularly because his speech was 
not made outside the workplace.  However, if the government speech 
doctrine includes any speech that a public employee is required to produce 
within the scope of his employment, as was the case with Ceballos’ speech 
in Garcetti, then Garcetti is consistent with this doctrine.340  Under this 
                                                
335 Roosevelt III, supra note 23, at 635 (arguing that Garcetti is better interpreted as a 
public employee work performance case).  
336 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421-22 (2006). 
 
337 Id. at 422. 
338 See id. 
 
339 Roosevelt III, supra note 23, at 635 (arguing that Garcetti is better interpreted as a 
public employee work performance case); see also Mark Strasser, Ignore the Man Behind 
the Curtain: On the Government Speech Doctrine and What it Licenses, 21 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 85, 107 (2011) (concluding that “the Court did not need to invoke the 
government speech doctrine to decide [Garcetti]”). 
340 See Strasser, supra note 339 (noting that the Court, in Garcetti, implicitly adopted the 
theory that “any statement made within the scope of public employment is (or should be 
treated as) the government’s own speech”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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interpretation, the fact that Ceballos was expected to exercise independent 
judgment is immaterial because his work product bears the imprimatur of 
his office and the public will perceive his speech as the speech of his 
office.  
 
D.  Similar Yet Different: The Framework for Evaluating 
Student Off-Campus Speech, an Analogous Area of Law 
 
[103] At one point, teachers’ and students’ free speech rights were 
roughly comparable.341  Currently, students’ off-campus free speech rights 
exceed their teachers’ off-campus free speech rights.342  Although teachers 
and students are not similarly situated with respect to the First 
Amendment and therefore need not receive equivalent speech protection, 
the disparate development of these areas of law is concerning.  
 
[104] Despite a number of opportunities to do so, the Supreme Court has 
not yet heard a student First Amendment free speech case when the speech 
arises beyond the “schoolhouse gates.”  Lower courts that have addressed 
                                                
341 At least when teachers were “off-duty,” teacher speech rights were roughly 
comparable to student speech rights.  Compare Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 
571-74 (1968) (teacher speech protected when the speech implicates a public concern and 
the school’s interests in prohibiting the speech do not outweigh the speaker’s interests in 
speaking) with Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) 
(student speech protected when the speech is political and the speech will not result or 
foreseeably result in a material or substantial disruption to the school environment).  
Alternatively, because the Supreme Court did not explicitly require that a teacher’s 
speech implicate a public concern in Pickering nor explicitly require that a student’s 
speech be political in Tinker, teacher and student rights were, at least arguably, 
comparable in a different way.  Compare Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-74 (teacher speech 
protected when the school’s interests in prohibiting the speech do not outweigh the 
speaker’s interests in speaking) with Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (student speech protected 
when the speech will not result or foreseeably result in a material or substantial disruption 
to the school environment).   
342 See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Synder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926-27 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (holding that a student’s off-campus speech deserves greater protection than 
“speech that a reasonable observer would view as the school’s own speech”). 
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this issue typically allow schools to regulate off-campus student speech 
under Tinker if the speech arrives on campus.343  Despite the divergence in 
protection provided to off-campus teacher and student speech in recent 
years, Tinker remains an influential framework for analyzing teacher-to-
student off-campus speech.   
 
1.  Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School 
District 
  
[105] Under the Court’s decision in Tinker, a student’s political speech 
may be regulated only if the speech is potentially or actually disruptive to 
the school environment.344  In essence, students have the right to express 
their opinions as long as the expression does not “materially and 
substantially” disrupt school activities.345   
  
[106] In Tinker, the Court sought to balance the free speech rights of 
students with the need for school officials to maintain control over the 
school environment.346  The plaintiffs in Tinker, three high school 
                                                
343 See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that 
Tinker is the appropriate standard for evaluating a student threat made off-campus); J.C. 
ex rel. R.C. v. Beverly Hills Unified Sch. Dist., 711 F. Supp. 2d 1094, 1107 (C.D. Cal. 
2010) (observing that “the majority of courts will apply Tinker where speech originating 
off campus is brought to school or to the attention of school authorities, whether by the 
author himself or some other means”); J.S. ex rel. Synder, 650 F.3d at 926 (assuming 
without deciding that Tinker was the appropriate standard); Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 
F.3d 41, 50 (2d Cir. 2008) (concluding that the Tinker standard was not met, but leaving 
open whether a stricter standard might apply; the extent of this holding is unclear because 
the case involved both on-campus and off-campus student speech).  But see J.S. ex rel. 
Synder, 650 F.3d at 937-39 (observing that lower courts are divided on whether Tinker’s 
substantial disruption test applies to off-campus speech; five concurring justices would 
have provided full First Amendment free speech rights to the student’s off-campus 
speech).    
344 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509.   
 
345 Id. 
346 See id. at 507, 509. 
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students, were suspended for wearing black armbands to school in protest 
of the Vietnam War.347  The Court noted that First Amendment rights are 
available to teachers and students and that “[n]either students [n]or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression 
at the schoolhouse gate.”348  However, the Court also emphasized that 
local school officials must have the ability to “prescribe and control 
conduct in the schools.”349  Because the speech in Tinker was “a silent, 
passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or 
disturbance,” school officials could not prohibit the speech.350 
  
[107] The Court reasoned that personal expression of opinion, even on 
controversial matters, cannot be prohibited unless the speech “‘materially 
and substantially interfere[s] with the requirements of appropriate 
discipline in the operation of the school’” or “collid[es] with the rights” of 
other students.351 The school, however, does not have to wait until a 
disruption occurs before acting:  if facts are present “which might 
reasonably have led school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of 
or material interference with school activities,” the school may ban the 
speech.352 
  
[108] The Court distinguished between a reasonable forecast of 
substantial disruption and an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension of 
disturbance” in some depth.353  It acknowledged that any statement that 
                                                
347 Id. at 504. 
348 Id. at 506. 
349 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 507. 
350 Id. at 508. 
351 Id. at 513 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)). 
352 See id. at 514.  
353 Id. at 508.  
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was different from the viewpoint of another student might cause an 
argument or disturbance, but that under our Constitution, schools “must 
take this risk,”354 because “this sort of hazardous freedom—this kind of 
openness—is the basis of our national strength and of the independence 
and vigor of Americans who grow up and live in this relatively 
permissive, often disputatious, society.”355  A school official must be able 
to show that his or her action to prohibit an expression of opinion “was 
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”356  In 
Tinker, the authorities appeared to have been motivated by a wish to avoid 
the controversy surrounding opposition to the war.357  The Court also 
noted that this particular symbol seemed to have been singled out for 
prohibition.358  Consequently, the prohibition of expression of one 
particular opinion, at least without evidence of material and substantial 
interference with schoolwork or discipline, is not constitutionally 
permissible.359 
  
[109] In Tinker, some disruption to school activities did occur, but it was 
insufficient to justify banning the student speech.360  The Court found that 
                                                
354 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508. 
355 Id. at 508-09. 
356 Id. at 509. 
357 Id. at 510. 
358 Id. at 510-11. 
 
359 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 510-11. 
360 Id. at 514.  According to Justice Black’s dissenting opinion, while the record did not 
demonstrate that the students wearing the armbands shouted, used profane language, or 
were violent, testimony supported the conclusion that their armbands caused comments, 
warnings by other students, the poking of fun at them, and a warning by an older football 
player that other, non-protesting students had better leave them alone.  Id. at 517 (Black, 
J., dissenting).  In addition, Justice Black noted that there was “evidence that a teacher of 
mathematics had his lesson period practically wrecked” by disputes with one of the 
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the wearing of the armbands precipitated “discussion outside of the 
classrooms, but no interference with work and no disorder.”361  Although 
outside the classroom some hostile remarks were directed to the students 
wearing the armbands, “there were no threats or acts of violence on school 
premises.”362  This was not a “material” or “substantial” disruption and 
thus, the school erred in prohibiting the armbands.363  
  
[110] Furthermore, Tinker placed the burden of justifying the prohibition 
of a particular expression of opinion on school authorities.364  With respect 
to the nation’s school systems, the Court noted that public schools “may 
not be enclaves of totalitarianism.”365  The Court reasoned that the 
classroom is a microcosm of the “‘marketplace of ideas,’”366 and that 
“[t]he Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure 
to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a multitude 
of tongues.’”367  Importantly, the principle of student speech cases “is not 
confined to the supervised and ordained discussion which takes place in 
the classroom.”368  “When [the student] is in the cafeteria, or on the 
playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may 
express his opinions, even on controversial subjects . . . .”369  However, 
                                                                                                                     
students wearing an armband.  Id. at 517-18.  Justice Black concluded that the armbands 
did take “the students’ minds off their classwork.”  Id. at 518. 
361 Id. at 514.  
362 Id. at 508. 
363 Id. at 509. 
364 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509-10.  
365 Id. at 511.  
366 Id. at 512.  
367 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
368 Id. 
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the First Amendment does not protect conduct by the student, “in class or 
out of it,”370 “which for any reason—whether it stems from time, place, or 
type of behavior—materially disrupts classwork.”371  The Court did not 
“confine the permissible exercise of First Amendment rights to a 
telephone booth or the four corners of a pamphlet, or to a supervised and 
ordained discussion in a school classroom.”372   
 
2.  Recent Court of Appeals Student Off-Campus 
Speech Cases 
  
[111] As previously noted, the Supreme Court has not yet heard a student 
First Amendment free speech case where the speech arises beyond the 
“schoolhouse gates.”  The Courts of Appeals’ decisions regarding the 
parameters of public school students’ off-campus speech demonstrate that 
this area of law is still in flux.373 
  
[112] The Fourth Circuit374 and most likely the Second Circuit375 employ 
                                                                                                                     
369 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512-13. 
370 There has been some confusion among the lower courts as to whether the phrase “or 
out of [the classroom]” means speech occurring on school premises or whether it extends 
to students’ off-campus speech.  See J.S. ex rel. Synder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 
F.3d 915, 938 n.1 (3d Cir. 2011). 
371 Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513. 
372 Id.  
373 The purpose of this discussion is to demonstrate the divide between teacher and 
student free speech rights with respect to speech off-campus.  At present, the most 
restrictive test courts use to evaluate student off-campus speech is Tinker.  See, e.g., 
Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that Tinker is the 
appropriate standard for evaluating off-campus student speech).  Wisniewski involved a 
student threat against his teacher.  Id.  
374 See Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch. Dist., 652 F.3d 565, 574 (4th Cir. 2011). 
375 Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-39.  The two leading Second Circuit decisions are not 
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a two-tier approach to resolving speech issues arising from student off-
campus speech.  Under this framework, the court first determines whether 
the student speech will foreseeably arrive on campus.376  If so, school 
officials can regulate the speech under Tinker, which allows school 
officials to regulate speech if the speech causes an actual disruption to 
school activities or if it will foreseeably disrupt school activities.377  
  
[113] The Third Circuit may employ a different framework, although the 
framework is difficult to discern from one of its recent decisions involving 
student off-campus speech.378  This recent en banc decision held that the 
student speech was protected under the First Amendment.379  
  
[114] The Third Circuit’s decision in J.S. ex rel. Snyder (J.S.) is 
puzzling, as the court applied the Tinker test to student speech despite 
refusing to decide whether Tinker was the proper standard.380  Ultimately, 
                                                                                                                     
directly on point.  In Wisniewski, the student speech involved threats of violence against 
one of his teachers.  Id.  In Doninger, part of the plaintiff’s speech, her original email 
which was later republished by her off-campus, was composed and sent from campus.  
Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41, 44 (2d Cir. 2008).  Furthermore, the district court 
found that although created off-campus, the speech “was purposefully designed by [the 
student] to come onto the campus.”  Id. at 50.  The Second Circuit also emphasized that 
the student’s punishment was limited; she was not allowed to participate in the school’s 
student government.  Id. at 46.  Ultimately, the Second Circuit concluded that the school 
administrators were entitled to qualified immunity on the plaintiff’s free speech claim 
because the law governing off-campus student speech was difficult for school 
administrators to discern.  See id. at 54.  Thus, the court did not resolve the underlying 
constitutional issues.  
376 See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 40-41; Doninger, 527 F.3d at 
48. 
377 See Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 574; Wisniewski, 494 F.3d at 38-40; Doninger, 527 F.3d at 
48. 
378 See, e.g., J.S. ex rel. Synder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011). 
379 See id. at 930-33. 
380 Id. at 926. 
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the Third Circuit held that the Tinker test was not met, and, therefore, the 
school could not regulate the student’s speech.381  In J.S., the student’s 
speech occurred off-campus and was brought onto campus only at the 
principal’s request.382  The student’s MySpace profile targeted her 
principal, insulting the principal and his family, and accusing him of 
sexual misconduct with students.383  The six dissenting judges, and 
presumably, the five judges not joining in the concurring opinion, would 
have evaluated the student speech under Tinker.384  Of course, the majority 
and dissent disagreed as to how Tinker applied.385 
  
[115] By contrast, five judges in a separate concurrence concluded that 
Tinker does not apply to student off-campus speech and that student off-
campus speech should enjoy the same protections enjoyed by citizens in 
                                                
381 Id. at 928-31. 
382 Id. at 921. 
383 J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 920-21.  The majority concluded that the student’s 
profile of her principal was “so outrageous that no one could have taken it seriously, and 
no one did.”  Id. at 930.  The dissent disagreed with this conclusion.  See id. at 947-48 
(Fisher, J., dissenting). 
384 Id. at 941. 
 
385 The dissent focused extensively on the pernicious effects this type of speech may have 
on educators.  Id. at 946-47 (quoting Jina S. Yoon, Teacher Characteristics as Predictors 
of Teacher-Student Relationships: Stress, Negative Effect, and Self-Efficacy, 30 SOC. 
BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 485, 491 (2002) (“‘Not only does teacher stress affect teachers' 
general attitude toward teaching, but also it is likely to influence the quality of their 
relationships with students’”); Suzanne Tochterman & Fred Barnes, Sexual Harassment 
in the Classroom: Teachers as Targets, 7 RECLAIMING CHILD & YOUTH 21, 22 (1998) 
(“noting that educators who are subject to sexual harassment feel “‘detachment; shame; 
horror; uncertainty; demoralization; fear; feelings of being unappreciated, targeted, 
objectified, belittled, and victimized; sadness; anger; avoidance; feeling defeated; blame; 
separation; and attack’”)).  Furthermore, the dissent observed that “[e]ducators become 
anxious and depressed and feel unable to relate to their students” and lose their 
motivation to teach; their students suffer as a result.  J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 946-
47. 
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the community at large.386  Importantly, the court noted that this case did 
not involve political speech.387  However, the concurring justices 
concluded that the speech was nonetheless protected because there is no 
First Amendment exception for offensive speech that lacks social value.388 
  
V. TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH TO STUDENTS  
USING SOCIAL MEDIA: RECENT CASES 
 
[116] Currently, there are few reported decisions examining a teacher’s 
rights with respect to off-campus speech using social media.389  The two 
                                                
386 J.S. ex rel. Snyder, 650 F.3d at 936. 
387 Id. at 939 (Smith, J., concurring).  Furthermore, according to the concurring opinion, 
the speech need not be political for First Amendment purposes.  Id.  The speech in J.S. 
was merely insulting.  Id.  
388 Id. at 939 (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219-20 (2011)). 
389 Many of these disputes are not litigated or settle privately before a verdict.  See 
Teacher Fired for Ripping Students, Blames Facebook, CBS NEW YORK (Aug. 20, 2010, 
11:23 PM), 
http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2010/08/20/teacher-fired-for-ripping-students-blames-faceb
ook/ (firing teacher for writing on her Facebook that “[t]he town is so arrogant and 
snobby,” and that she was “so not looking forward to another year at Cohasset schools.”); 
see also Fulmer, supra note 10, at ¶ 31 (citing Mario Roldan, Another CMS Teacher 
Faces Termination over Facebook Post, WCNC.COM (Nov. 1, 2009, 6:06 PM), 
http://www.wcnc.com/news/local/68701507.html) (“At least four teachers, of Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Schools have faced disciplinary action due to their social networking 
website activity.”); see also id. (quoting Roldan, supra) (dismissing teacher for 
describing her workplace on Facebook as “the most ghetto school in Charlotte”); see also 
Michael May, Hoover: Caught in the Flash, AUSTIN CHRONICLE, June 23, 2006, 
http://www.austinchronicle.com/news/2006-06-23/378611/ (firing art teacher because her 
partner posted non-erotic, partially nude pictures of her photography webpage).  Other 
cases have been decided on alternate grounds.  In Rubino v. City of New York, No. 
107292/11, 2012 WL 373101, at *6-8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Feb. 1, 2012), the trial court held 
that the termination of the teacher was disproportionate to the teacher’s speech.  In 
reaching this decision, the court did not address the teacher’s First Amendment claim, 
noting that New York law prohibited the court’s reexamination of the hearing officer’s 
conclusion the claim had no merit.  See id. at *5 (noting that a hearing officer’s errors of 
law and fact are not, except in extraordinary circumstances, reviewable).  In this case, the 
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leading district court decisions, however, were both decided in favor of 
school authorities.390 
   
A.  Spanierman v. Hughes 
  
[117] In Spanierman, the court concluded that Garcetti did not apply 
because the teacher was not speaking pursuant to his official duties and 
responsibilities as a teacher.391  Notably, the court observed that the 
teacher was not acting pursuant to his responsibilities as a teacher because 
                                                                                                                     
speech was not made directly to her students, but posted to other adults on the teacher’s 
Facebook page.  See id. at *1.  While the court described her reference to a child’s death 
as “repulsive,” the court held that her termination was disproportionate to her speech.  
See id. at *7-8.  The teacher, one day after a New York City school student drowned 
during a school field trip, posted on her Facebook page that she was “thinking the beach 
sounds like a wonderful idea for my 5th graders! I HATE THEIR GUTS! They are the 
devils [sic] spawn.”  Id. at *1.  In response to another poster’s comments asking whether 
she would save a particular student, the teacher responded, “Yes, I wld [sic] not throw a 
life jacket in for a million!!”  Id.  A number of cases have been tried before 
administrative law judges.  See Emil Protalinski, Teacher Should be Fired for Facebook 
Comment, Judge Rules, ZDNET (Nov. 15, 2011, 6:20 AM PST), 
http://www.zdnet.com/blog/facebook/teacher-should-be-fired-for-facebook-comment-jud
ge-rules/5375 (concluding that a New Jersey teacher who posted on Facebook that she 
was “not a teacher [but] a warden for future criminals” should be terminated).  Other 
cases may be tried shortly.  See ‘It's a Perverted Sin and Breeds Like Cancer’: High 
School Teacher Faces Sack Over Anti-Gay Facebook Comments, MAIL ONLINE (Jan. 13, 
2012, 6:31 AM), 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2086043/Viki-Knox-NJ-teachers-anti-gay-Faceb
ook-comments-Its-sin-breeds-like-cancer.html (termination proceedings have been 
started against a New Jersey teacher based on an anti-gay diatribe she posted on 
Facebook); see also Jonathan Turley, Beaver Damned: Wisconsin Teacher Suspended 
For Picture on Facebook, JONATHAN TURLEY (Feb. 9, 2009), 
http://jonathanturley.org/2009/02/09/beaver-damned-wisconsin-teacher-suspended-for-pi
cture-on-facebook/ (teacher placed on leave as a result of her posting a Facebook picture 
showing her aiming a shotgun at the viewer). 
 
390 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006); see also Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. 
Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 2008). 
 
391Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 309. 
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he was under no “obligation to make the statements he made on 
MySpace.”392  In addition, the court did not use Hazelwood’s framework 
to analyze the speech, presumably because the teacher’s speech could not 
reasonably be perceived as the school’s speech.  Also, the court did not 
discuss any off-campus student speech decisions.  Instead, the court 
analyzed the speech under the Pickering-Connick framework, ultimately 
granting summary judgment to the defendants.393  
  
[118] The speech in Spanierman was extreme.394  Jeffrey Spanierman, a 
Connecticut public high school English teacher, used MySpace, a social 
media website, to communicate with his students.395  Spanierman 
“testified that he used his MySpace account to communicate with students 
about homework, to learn more about the students so he could relate to 
them better, and to conduct casual, non-school related discussions [with 
students].”396  However, his MySpace account contained pictures of naked 
men with “inappropriate comments” underneath.397  Some students 
complained about Spanierman’s MySpace page to school personnel.398  A 
guidance counselor learned of Spanierman’s account, viewed the account, 
and confronted Spanierman about it.399  The counselor suggested that 
Spanierman use only “the school email system for the purpose of 
educational topics and homework.”400  Furthermore, the school guidance 
                                                
392 Id. 
393 See id. at 309, 313.  
394 See id. at 297-98.  
 
395 Id. 
396 Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 297-98. 
397 Id. at 298.  
398 Id. at 313. 
399 Id. at 298.  
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counselor testified that the account would “be disruptive to students.”401  
  
[119] Following his meeting with the school guidance counselor, 
Spanierman deleted his account, but then set up a nearly identical account 
on MySpace with the same people as friends.402  Spanierman was not 
rehired.403 
  
[120] Spanierman sued, alleging among other claims that the school 
administration had violated his First Amendment free speech rights.404  
The district court held that even if the plaintiff’s speech involved a matter 
of public concern under Pickering-Connick, the plaintiff’s claim still 
failed.405  
  
[121] The district court explained that Garcetti did not apply because its 
holding is limited to the expressions an employee makes pursuant to the 
employee’s official responsibilities rather than to statements or complaints 
made outside the duties of employment.406  Despite the plaintiff’s 
testimony that he used his MySpace account to communicate with his 
students about homework and to learn more about the students so he could 
relate to them better, the district court concluded that Garcetti was 
inapplicable, noting that no evidence in the record supported the notion 
that Spanierman was under any obligation to make the statements he made 
                                                                                                                     
400 Id. 
401 Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 298. 
402 Id. 
403 Id. at 299. 
404 Id. 
405 Id. at 314. 
406 See Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 309. 
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on MySpace.407  The district court noted that public employees who make 
public statements outside the course of performing their official duties 
retain some possibility of First Amendment protection because that is the 
kind of activity engaged in by citizens who are not government 
employees.408 
  
[122] The district court employed the Pickering-Connick framework to 
analyze Spanierman’s speech, first examining whether Spanierman’s 
speech might relate to a “public concern.”409  The court stretched to find 
some part of the teacher’s web page that implicated a public concern.410  
The contents of Spanierman’s MySpace page were varied; the profile 
contained comments from the teacher to other MySpace users, comments 
from other users to the teacher, and pictures, blogs, and poetry.411  Even 
though the court found that almost none of the contents on the plaintiff’s 
                                                
407 Id. at 298, 309.  Currently, the Second Circuit employs a different test for determining 
whether an employee’s speech is made “pursuant to his official duties.”  See Weintraub v. 
Bd. of Ed., 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2010).  This test is two-pronged: (1) whether the 
speech is “in furtherance of” an employee’s “core duties,” and (2) whether there is a 
relevant “citizen analogue” to the employee’s speech.  Id. at 198.  Judge Calabresi, in 
dissent, proposed a narrower rule: “an employee’s speech is ‘pursuant to official duties’ 
when the employee is required to make such speech in the course of fulfilling his job 
duties.”  Id. at 208 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).  In short, the employer must in some way 
rely on the employee’s speech, as is the case where the speech is an official 
communication or is used by the employer to promote the employer’s mission.  See id.  
Even under the majority’s broader test, Spanierman’s speech would not qualify as speech 
made pursuant to his official duties: his speech was not in furtherance of any core duty, 
and citizen analogues existed.  Off-campus teacher-to-student social media speech should 
not be regulated under Garcetti regardless of the precise contours of Garcetti’s reach.  
See infra Part VI.A. 
 
408 Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 309 (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423 
(2006)). 
409 Id. 
410 See id. at 310-11. 
411 Id. at 310. 
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profile page touched on matters of public concern, the court concluded 
that one of the plaintiff’s poems, if all ambiguities were construed in the 
plaintiff’s favor, might implicate a matter of public concern.412  However, 
the district court ultimately held that there was no causal connection 
between the plaintiff’s poem and the school’s decision not to rehire the 
plaintiff.413 
 
[123] Furthermore, even if the plaintiff could establish a causal 
connection between the poem and his discharge, the defendants would still 
prevail because the plaintiff’s claim failed the Pickering balancing test.414  
In essence, the defendants had provided sufficient evidence that the 
plaintiff’s conduct on MySpace, as a whole, disrupted school activities.415  
In particular, Spanierman’s discussion on MySpace “with a student about 
‘getting any’ (presumably sex) or a threat made to a student (albeit a 
facetious one) about detention” supported the district court’s conclusion 
that school administrators could have reasonably surmised that 
Spanierman’s MySpace conduct was disruptive to school activities.416  
  
[124] Spanierman’s speech involved egregious, repeated conduct.417  
Therefore, the opinion provides little guidance as to how courts would 
treat less extreme conduct.  Given the sexual overtones and the disruptive 
effect the speech had on school activities, this was not a difficult case. 
 
                                                
412 Id. at 310-11. 
413 Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 311-12. 
414 See id. at 311-12. 
415 See id. at 312. 
416 Id. 
417 See id. at 298. 
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B.  Snyder v. Millersville University 
  
[125] Millersville University denied Stacey Snyder an education degree 
because she had not successfully completed her student-teaching 
experience at a local high school.418  In response to Snyder’s 
“unprofessional” speech on MySpace, the local high school had barred 
Snyder from campus.419  Thus, she could not complete her student-teacher 
practicum and based on this deficiency, Millersville University did not 
award her an education degree.420  
  
[126] The dispositive inquiry was whether Snyder’s role was that of a 
teacher or student.421  Ultimately, the district court found that her role as a 
student-teacher was similar to that of a public employee rather than a 
student.422  Consequently, the court applied public employee speech law 
rather than student speech law.423  
  
[127] Snyder experienced some difficulties during her student-teaching 
placement.424  According to evaluations from both her university professor 
and her supervising teacher, Snyder had issues regarding her competence 
and her over-familiarity with students.425  In particular, “on several 
                                                
418 Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 
2008). 
419 Id.  
420 Id.  
421 See id. at *10, *15. Presumably, if the court had concluded Snyder was a student, her 
comments would have been protected speech.  See id. at *14.  
422 Id. at *15. 
423 See Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *14. 
424 Id. at *4. 
425 Id. at *3-4. 
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occasions, she informed students during class that she had a MySpace 
webpage.”426  
  
[128] In part, Snyder’s difficulties stemmed from two MySpace 
postings.427  The first referenced Snyder’s supervising teacher somewhat 
obliquely, referring to her as “the problem.”428 
 
[A friend of Snyder’s] said that one of my students was on 
here looking at my page, which is fine.  I have nothing to 
hide.  I am over 21, and I don’t say anything that will hurt 
me (in the long run).  Plus, I don’t think they will stoop so 
low as to mess with my future.  So, bring on the love!  I 
figure a couple of students will actually send me a message 
when I am no longer their official teacher.  They keep 
asking me why I won’t apply there.  Do you think it would 
hurt me to tell them the real reason (or who the problem 
was)?429 
 
[129] The other posting was a photograph of Snyder wearing a pirate hat 
and holding a plastic cup containing a mixed beverage with a caption 
reading “drunken pirate.”430  The supervising teacher, although she did 
object to the posting of the photograph, was more upset about the text 
referring to the supervisor as “the problem.”431  The supervising teacher 
concluded that Snyder had acted unprofessionally in criticizing the 
                                                
426 Id. at *5. 
427 Id. at *5-6. 
428 See Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *5-6. 
429 Id. at *5. 
430 Id. at *6. 
431 See id. at *7. 
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supervisor on her web page.432   
  
[130] The plaintiff conceded that her postings involved only personal 
matters rather than any matter of public concern.433  Given Pickering-
Connick’s requirement that public employee speech must implicate a 
public concern in order to be protected, Snyder’s concession that her 
speech was “personal” made this a relatively easy case.434  Unsurprisingly, 
the court returned a verdict in favor of the defendants.435   
 
VI.  IN MOST CIRCUMSTANCES, PICKERING-CONNICK IS THE 
APPLICABLE TEST FOR EVALUATING WHETHER SCHOOLS CAN 
RESTRICT TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH TO STUDENTS USING 
SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
A.  Garcetti Will Rarely Apply to Teachers’ Off-Campus 
Speech to Students Using Social Media 
  
[131] Except in extraordinary circumstances, the holding in Garcetti, 
excluding First Amendment free speech protection for public employee 
speech made “pursuant to [the employee’s] official duties,” is not 
applicable to teacher-to-student off-campus speech using social media.436  
                                                
432 Id. at *8.  
433 Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *16. 
434 See id. at *14, *16.  But what if her comments could have been construed as a critique 
of the teacher-training process?  What if the picture of her with alcohol could be been 
interpreted as a warning not to drink alcohol?  Even if the message regarding her 
supervisor and the picture of her drinking did not implicate matters of public concern, 
what if her MySpace page included other matters of public concern?  In short, some 
creative lawyering may have made this a far more difficult case for the court.  
435 See id. at *16. 
436 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 424-25 (2006).  These extraordinary 
circumstances would include situations in which the social media usage was part of the 
school curriculum.  In this case, school officials could regulate its use.  See id. at 423-25.  
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Even though some teachers’ communications with students using social 
media might foreseeably involve instruction and guidance, thus arguably 
falling within a teacher’s “official duties,” Garcetti should be interpreted 
in its proper context and not be extended to limit this speech.437 
                                                                                                                     
In addition, schools could likely regulate teachers’ communications with students using 
social media during working hours or using school equipment.  See id.  
437 Garcetti has been criticized on many fronts.  See Roosevelt III, supra note 23, at 636.  
Some commentators have argued that the Garcetti holding should apply only to a public 
employee’s “required” speech.  See Weintraub v. Bd. of Ed., 593 F.3d 196, 208 (2d Cir. 
2010) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (proposing that an employee’s speech is “pursuant to 
official duties” when the employee is required to make such speech in the course of 
fulfilling his job duties); see also Bauries & Schach, supra note 218, at 372 (concluding 
that an employee’s speech made “pursuant to official duties" means speech an employee 
could be punished for if she refused to speak, rather than speech “related to” her 
employment or made “in the course” of her employment).  Another commentator has 
concluded that “pursuant to official duties” should encompass all aspects of a public 
employee’s job performance.  See Roosevelt III, supra, at 646.  Yet another concluded 
that an employee’s speech is pursuant to her official duties if the speech is generally 
consistent with the type of activities the employee is paid to perform.  See Wenkart, 
supra note 127, at 6.  While the outer reaches of Garcetti are uncertain, lower courts have 
not limited Garcetti’s application to a public employee’s required speech.  See, e.g., 
Weintraub, 593 F.3d at 198 (holding that a teacher’s complaint concerning classroom 
discipline was made pursuant to his official duties).  Lower courts have considered a 
number of non-exhaustive factors to determine if the speech was made pursuant to an 
employee’s official job responsibilities: whether the employee was required or paid to 
produce the speech, whether the speech was made within the chain of command, whether 
it was made at the workplace, whether it could be perceived as the employer’s speech, 
whether it derived from special knowledge acquired by the employee in the course of her 
employment, and whether there is a citizen-analogue to the speech.  See, e.g., Decotiis v. 
Whittmore, 635 F.3d 22, 32 (1st Cir. 2011).  Regardless of the outer limits of Garcetti, 
Garcetti likely applies only if some of the speech is made during working hours or using 
workplace equipment.  See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 424.  Furthermore, a government entity 
can likely restrict speech under Garcetti if the speech sufficiently distracts the employee, 
her co-workers, or her superiors from performing official job responsibilities.  See 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-53 (1983).  But see Reinhardt v. Albuquerque Pub. 
Sch. Bd. of Ed., 595 F.3d 1126, 1135 (10th Cir. 2010) (concluding that the test for 
whether a teacher’s speech is made pursuant to her official job duties is whether the 
speech was “commissioned” by the employer, not whether the speech was made during 
the employee’s working hours or whether it concerned the subject matter of the person’s 
employment).  Presumably, though, one factor in determining whether the speech was 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XIX, Issue 2 
 
   
80 
[132] Garcetti and Connick both involved a dispute arising during 
working hours and relating to the employee’s work responsibilities.438  
Even though these cases involve both of these factors, it is unclear 
whether both factors are necessary to establish that the plaintiff acted 
pursuant to his official duties.  However, most off-campus teacher-to-
student speech will likely involve neither of these factors.   
  
[133] In essence, Garcetti concerned a public employee’s job 
performance.439  Crucially, the speech in Garcetti occurred at the 
workplace during working hours and involved the use of the employer’s 
workplace, presumably including its technology and materials, to create 
the speech.440  The Court reasoned that when the plaintiff in the case, 
                                                                                                                     
“commissioned” by the employer would be whether the employee’s speech is created 
during working hours or using workplace equipment.  While the outer reaches of Garcetti 
are unclear, Garcetti provides no basis for limiting teacher off-campus speech using 
social media under any of these interpretations. 
438 In particular, the speech in these cases resulted from the claimant’s dissatisfaction 
with working conditions or the work process itself.  See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 413-15 
(Ceballos expressed his concern that the documents submitted to support a search warrant 
were inaccurate); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41 (noting that her questionnaire 
solicited coworkers views regarding “office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a 
grievance committee, the level of confidence in her supervisors, and whether employees 
felt pressured to work in political campaigns”). 
439 See Roosevelt III, supra note 23, at 633. 
440 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420.  Both of these factors may not be required to establish 
that a plaintiff acted pursuant to his “official duties.”  However, Garcetti and Connick 
involved both factors.  As previously noted, lower courts have considered a number of 
non-exhaustive factors to determine if the speech was made pursuant to an employee’s 
official job responsibilities.  See, e.g., Decotiis, 635 F.3d at 32.  The more the employee’s 
role requires confidentiality, policymaking or public contact, the greater the employer’s 
interest in regulating the speech. Christopher B. McLaughlin, The Intersection of the 
First Amendment and Professional Ethics for Government Attorneys, U.N.C. SCH. GOV’T 
1, 10, available at 
http://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/www.sog.unc.edu/files/Microsoft%20Word%20-
%20manuscript_mclaughlin_workplace_and_constitution_0.pdf (citing Sheppard v. 
Beerman, 190 F. Supp. 2d 361, 374 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)).   
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Ceballos, “went to work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform,” 
he acted pursuant to his official duties as opposed to acting as a citizen.441  
In addition, he did not act as a citizen when he went about conducting his 
daily professional activities, such as supervising attorneys, investigating 
charges, and preparing filings.442  Nor did he speak as a citizen when he 
wrote a memorandum addressing the disposition of a pending criminal 
case.443  In short, Ceballos’ speech resulted from an investigation he 
conducted during working hours, presumably using workplace technology 
and materials, resulting in a confrontation with his supervisor at his 
workplace during working hours.  As the Court reasoned, there is no 
citizen analogue for speech like Ceballos’ because his speech arose within 
the context of his required job responsibilities.444  
  
[134] However, when a teacher’s speech is made off-campus and without 
the use of any workplace technology or equipment, the Garcetti holding 
should not apply because under these conditions, a teacher’s speech is not 
made pursuant to the teacher’s “official duties.”  Garcetti should not be 
applied even if the speech involves homework help or some other form of 
guidance and thus falls within the outer stretches of “official duties.”445  
Primary and secondary school public teachers are not required or even 
expected to communicate with students using social media like Facebook 
or MySpace, and, therefore, these communications are not made pursuant 
to a teacher’s official duties.446  Furthermore, these communications will 
                                                
441 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 422 (emphasis added). 
442 Id.  
443 Id.  
444 Id. at 423-24. 
445 See Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 309 (D. Conn 2008) (quoting 
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421). 
446 Many states require unions and school districts to bargain on “wages, hours, and terms 
and conditions of employment.”  Teacher’s Unions and Collective Bargaining: Resolving 
Conflicts, FINDLAW.COM, 
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likely occur after school hours when the teachers are not on school 
premises and will not involve the use of school equipment.447  Therefore, 
unlike the attorney-plaintiff’s speech in Garcetti, these communications 
will almost always not be made pursuant to a teacher’s “official duties” 
even if the communication is consistent with a teacher’s official duties 
while the teacher is present at school.448  
  
[135] Notably, neither of the two most frequently discussed district court 
decisions involving teachers’ free speech claims regarding social media 
communications with students applied the Garcetti holding.449  In 
Spanierman, the district court concluded that Garcetti did not apply 
because the teacher was not obligated to make the speech450 noting that the 
                                                                                                                     
http://education.findlaw.com/teachers-rights/teacher-s-unions-and-collective-bargaining-r
esolving-conflicts.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Thus, the line between “on-duty” and “off-duty” teacher responsibilities may be specified 
in a collective bargaining agreement.   
447 See Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 309.  
448 See id.  In a slightly different context, the Supreme Court acknowledged this point in 
Connick when the Court observed that employee speech which transpires entirely on the 
employee’s own time, and in non-work areas of the office, may bring different factors 
into the Pickering calculus.  Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 153 n.13 (1983).  A 
teacher’s off-campus speech to students using social media, because it does not involve 
use of the employer’s premises, is yet another step removed from the situation described 
in Connick.  
449 See Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 309; see also Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 
07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at *16 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008). 
450 Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 309.  The Second Circuit’s current test is broader.  See 
Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 2010).  This test is two-pronged: 
(1) whether the speech is “in furtherance of” an employee’s “core duties,” and (2) 
whether there is a relevant “citizen analogue” to the employee’s speech.  See id. at 198, 
203, 208.  But even under this broader test, Spanierman’s speech would not qualify as 
speech made pursuant to his official duties—his speech was not in furtherance of any 
core duty, and citizen analogues existed.  Off-campus teacher-to-student social media 
speech should not be regulated under Garcetti regardless of the precise contours of 
Garcetti’s reach.  See supra Part VI.A.  Judge Calabresi, dissenting in Weintraub, 
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record contained no evidence that the plaintiff “was under any obligation 
to make the statements he made on MySpace.”451  Instead, the court used 
the Pickering-Connick standard.452  Similarly, in Snyder, the district court 
analyzed the claim under Pickering-Connick instead of Garcetti.453  
  
[136] The policy concerns enumerated in Garcetti should be construed in 
light of Garcetti’s facts.  One major concern underlying Garcetti was the 
Court’s fear of “constitutionaliz[ing] the employee grievance 
[process].”454  To avoid this result in Garcetti, the Court justified the 
quelling of Ceballos’ speech based on workplace efficiency concerns.455  
However, the district attorney’s speech in Garcetti occurred at the 
workplace, presumably distracting the attorney, his superiors, and others 
from performing their official duties.456  While it is possible that off-
campus teacher-to-student speech using social media might result in some 
workplace disruption, this speech, unlike the speech in Garcetti, will less 
directly impair workplace efficiency.457  Thus, the Garcetti Court’s 
                                                                                                                     
proposed a test similar to the district court’s test in Spanierman.  Judge Calabresi 
proposed that an employee’s speech is “pursuant to official duties” when the employee is 
required to make such speech in the course of fulfilling his job duties.  Weintraub, 593 
F.3d at 208 (Calabresi, J., dissenting).  In short, the employer must in some way rely on 
the employee’s speech, “as where the speech is an ‘official communications’ or is used 
by the employer to ‘promote the employer’s mission.’”  Id. (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 
547 U.S. 410, 422-23 (2006)). 
 
451 Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 309 (D. Conn 2008). 
452 See id. at 309. 
 
453 See Snyder, 2008 WL 5093140, at *14, 16. 
454 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420 (citing Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983)). 
455 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418-19.  
456 Id. at 422-23. 
 
457 This Article contends that the Pickering balancing test is still the proper standard for 
evaluating teacher speech made outside the workplace.  
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workplace efficiency concerns do not justify extending Garcetti to a 
teacher’s off-campus speech to students using social media.  
  
[137] Workplace efficiency concerns are important, but with respect to a 
teacher’s off-campus speech to students, they are better addressed using 
the Pickering balancing test.  This Article’s proposed test for evaluating 
teacher-to-student speech allows school districts to regulate speech based 
on its disruptive effect on school grounds.   
  
[138] Furthermore, in Garcetti, the Court also acknowledged that its 
holding might not be appropriate in an educational context even when that 
context involves on-campus speech.458  The Court declined to articulate a 
comprehensive framework for defining the scope of an employee’s duties 
in cases where there “[may be] room for serious debate.”459  In Garcetti, 
the majority, in discussing academic freedom, declined to decide whether 
this rule would apply to cases involving educational speech.460  The Court 
remarked “that expression related to academic scholarship or classroom 
instruction [may] implicate[] additional constitutional interests that are not 
fully accounted for by this Court’s customary employee-speech 
jurisprudence.”461  These concerns are heightened with respect to the 
regulation of teacher off-campus speech.   
  
[139] Lower courts have often applied the Garcetti requirement to 
                                                
458 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425. 
459 Id. at 424.  
460 Id. at 425.  The Court did not explicitly differentiate between university-level 
professor speech and K-12 teacher speech protections when it discussed academic 
freedom.  See id.  But there may be reasons for extending greater First Amendment 
protection to the former.  See supra note 309. 
461 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.  While these concerns certainly encompass university-level 
professor speech, the extent to which they apply to secondary or primary teacher speech 
remain unclear, since the Court cited only university-level speech cases in support of this 
proposition.  
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teacher speech made on campus during working hours,462 but no federal 
court has yet used Garcetti to evaluate a teacher’s off-campus speech to a 
student.  There is good reason for this: allowing states or school districts to 
limit teacher-to-student speech using social media would cast an 
extraordinarily wide net, essentially prohibiting the electronic equivalent 
of a student-teacher interaction on Main Street.   
  
[140] Furthermore, treating any teacher-student off-campus 
communication as a teacher’s official speech, and therefore unprotected 
speech, would be inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s wariness 
regarding blanket restrictions on public employees’ speech.463  Even when 
a public employee’s speech is made in a work setting, the Court has 
refused to recognize that “all speech within the office is automatically 
exposed to restriction.”464  The Court in Garcetti noted that some speech 
made by a public employee is protected even when the speech occurs 
while the employee is working at his workplace.465  In Connick, the Court 
also addressed this issue, cautioning that its holding should not be read to 
“suggest that speech on [even] private matters falls into one of the narrow 
and well-defined classes of expression which carries so little social value, 
such as obscenity, that the State can prohibit . . . [this] expression by all 
persons in [the] jurisdiction.”466  Importantly, Garcetti did not overturn 
Givhan, a case recognizing a teacher’s free speech rights on campus when 
the speech occurred during working hours.467  Garcetti, of course, did not 
                                                
462 See, e.g., Mayer v. Monroe Cnty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 480 (7th Cir. 
2007).  
463 See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emp. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995). 
464 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420-21.  
465 See id.  
466 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983).   
467 See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412-13, 415-16 (1979). 
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[141] Finally, the Court in Garcetti warned about the danger of undue 
judicial interference in government business, noting that if the Court were 
to hold in favor of the plaintiff, this decision “would commit state and 
federal courts to a new, permanent, and intrusive role, mandating judicial 
oversight of communications between and among government employees 
and their superiors in the course of official business.”469  Because these 
teacher communications would occur outside the course of official 
business, the Garcetti Court’s concerns are not applicable. 
  
B.  Hazelwood Will Rarely Apply to Teachers’ Off-Campus 
Speech to Students Using Social Media 
  
[142] Most, if not all, off-campus teacher-student communications using 
social media will not be school-sponsored speech.  Therefore, Hazelwood 
should rarely, if ever, be applied to regulate this speech. 
  
[143] Under Hazelwood, school administrators can regulate student 
speech if three requirements are met: (1) the speech is part of a school 
supervised learning experience, (2) the speech could reasonably be 
interpreted as the school’s speech, and (3) the school has a legitimate 
pedagogical reason for regulating the speech.470  In Hazelwood, the 
Supreme Court held that school officials “may exercise control over the 
contents of a high school newspaper produced as part of the school’s 
journalism curriculum,”471 so long as the official’s actions were 
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”472  The Court 
                                                
468 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418-19. 
 
469 Id. at 423 (emphasis added). 
470 See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-73 (1988). 
471 Id. at 262, 273. 
472 Id. at 273.  
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concluded that the school principal’s actions were reasonable in 
prohibiting the publication of two articles because of privacy concerns for 
the subject of the stories and for third parties, and because the subject 
matter was inappropriate for some of the younger students at the school.473 
  
[144] While some lower courts have used the Hazelwood test to evaluate 
teachers’ classroom speech,474 these cases invariably involved speech 
related to school curriculum.  Although the Internet does blur the 
boundaries between speech on and off-campus, the Hazelwood test should 
not be applied to a teacher’s off-campus communications with students.  
  
[145] Hazelwood is not the proper test for evaluating teacher-student 
communication using social media for many reasons.  First, Hazelwood 
involved on-campus speech by students.475  For this reason alone, it is 
difficult to apply Hazelwood to teachers’ off-campus speech. 
  
[146] Second and more importantly, crucial to the Court’s holding in 
Hazelwood was its conclusion that the school newspaper was a “school 
supervised learning experience” that might reasonably be perceived as the 
school’s speech.476  The Court defined “school supervised learning 
                                                
473 See id. at 261, 263.  
474 See Kramer v. N.Y.C. Bd. of Educ., 715 F. Supp. 2d 335, 353-54 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) 
(noting that there is disagreement among the federal courts of appeals on whether teacher 
classroom speech should be analyzed under Garcetti or Hazelwood; the court analyzed 
the issue under both tests).  The Second Circuit is among the courts that have extended 
the Supreme Court's standard for student speech to teachers' instructional speech.  Id. at 
354; see, e.g., Silano v. Sag Harbor Union Free Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 42 F.3d 719, 
722-23 (2d Cir. 1994).  But see Weintraub v. Bd. of Educ., 593 F.3d 196, 198 (2d Cir. 
2010) (determining that a grievance filed by a teacher was unprotected speech pursuant to 
Garcetti without considering the relevance of the teacher’s position as an educator under 
Hazelwood). Most of the cases applying Hazelwood to teachers’ instructional speech 
were decided pre-Garcetti.  See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452 (1st Cir. 1993).   
475 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 262. 
 
476 Id. at 270-71, 273.  
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experiences” as those activities that may be characterized as part of the 
school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom 
setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to 
impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and 
audiences.477  The Court’s inclusion of “activities outside the traditional 
classroom” in context refers to school-sponsored activities, such as a 
student newspaper.478   
  
[147] It is highly likely that most, if not all, teacher-student 
communication via social media would not qualify as “school supervised 
learning experiences.”  Particularly if the teacher speech is created off-
campus, without using any school-supplied technology or equipment, it is 
difficult to perceive this speech as part of the school curriculum.  By 
contrast, in Hazelwood, while the school’s journalism students wrote and 
edited the newspaper, this work was formally supervised by a faculty 
member and funded by the local board of education.479  As previously 
discussed, teachers are not required to communicate with students using 
social media.  A teacher who chooses to interact with students using these 
technologies is not, in any formal sense, supervising a student’s learning 
experience, and, therefore, it is difficult to envision most of these 
interactions as part of any formal school curriculum.  Furthermore, unless 
school equipment or technology is used in this communication or unless 
the local school district requires the teacher to communicate in this 
fashion, the school district is not “funding” this interaction.  
  
[148] In sum, even if students might reasonably perceive a teacher’s 
speech to be the speech of the school, the Hazelwood test would not apply 
because it is highly likely that a teacher’s off-campus speech will not be 
part of any formalized school curriculum.  
  
                                                
477 Id. at 271 (emphasis added).  
478 Id. 
 
479 Id. at 262-63. 
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XIX, Issue 2 
 
   
89 
[149] Finally, even if students might reasonably perceive a teacher’s 
speech to be the speech of the school, and even if the teacher’s speech 
might reasonably be interpreted as curricular speech, the Hazelwood test is 
still inapplicable.  If a teacher’s speech is deemed “part of the curriculum” 
and thus a “school supervised learning activity,” Garcetti would govern 
this question because the speech would almost certainly involve a 
teacher’s “official duties.”480  As previously discussed, Garcetti does not 
apply either. 
  
C.  The Government Speech Doctrine Will Rarely Apply to 
Teachers’ Off-Campus Speech to Students Using Social Media 
  
[150] Whatever the outer limits of the evolving government speech 
doctrine and whether or not it is distinct from Garcetti, this doctrine would 
not apply to most, maybe the vast majority, of teacher off-campus 
communications with students using social media since a reasonable 
observer would rarely conclude that this speech was the school’s speech.  
More specifically, since teacher speech in this context will rarely be made 
pursuant to a teacher’s official duties nor qualify as school-sponsored 
speech, the government speech doctrine does not apply.481 
 
D.  Because Garcetti, Hazelwood, and the Government Speech 
Doctrine Rarely Apply to Teachers’ Off-Campus Speech to 
Students Using Social Media, the Applicable Test in Most 
Circumstances is Pickering-Connick 
  
[151] Except in extraordinary circumstances, neither Garcetti, 
Hazelwood, nor the government speech doctrine will apply to a teacher’s 
                                                
480 In these circumstances, Garcetti would govern even when a teacher’s speech pursuant 
to his “official duties” is limited to required speech: if the speech is part of the 
curriculum, the teacher’s speech is “commissioned,” and therefore made pursuant to the 
teacher’s official duties.  See generally Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006). 
481 As previously discussed, there is a significant overlap between Garcetti and the 
government speech doctrine.  See supra Part VI.A.   
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off-campus communications to a student using social media since the 
speech is not made pursuant to a teacher’s official duties, is not school-
sponsored, and is not “government speech.”  Consequently, in most 
circumstances, the appropriate test for evaluating a teacher’s constitutional 
rights with respect to off-campus communications to students using social 
media is Pickering-Connick.482     
  
[152] As previously noted, public employees can challenge government 
restrictions of their free speech rights by bringing a facial challenge to the 
regulation or by bringing an “as applied” challenge, typically a retaliatory 
discharge claim.483  Either way, the governing law is Pickering-
Connick.484  
 
[153] In Pickering, the Supreme Court addressed a teacher’s off-campus 
free speech rights, holding that a teacher’s speech criticizing school 
officials was protected under the First Amendment.485  The Supreme Court 
                                                
482 A public entity’s ability to regulate an employee’s speech is lowest when the 
employee is speaking as a citizen.  See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) 
(plurality opinion) (“[T]he government as employer . . . has far broader powers than does 
the government as sovereign.”).  A public entity’s ability to regulate an employee’s 
speech at the outer fringes of the employment relationship is less than its ability to 
regulate an employee’s required speech.  See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423-24. 
483 See supra Part IV.A.  
 
484 The Pickering balancing test mirrors the Supreme Court’s approach to content neutral 
speech regulations: in short, the Pickering balancing test is an intermediate scrutiny test.  
See Ashutosh Bhagwat, The Test that Ate Everything: Intermediate Scrutiny in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 783, 796 (2007).  Under intermediate 
scrutiny, speech restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest and leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.  
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); see also Waters, 511 U.S. at 
675.  “Narrowly tailored” means the restriction is not “substantially broader than 
necessary to achieve the government’s interest;” it does not require the restriction to be 
the least restrictive means to achieve this goal.  Ward, 491 U.S. at 800; see also Waters, 
511 U.S. at 674-75. 
485 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 564, 572-74 (1968). 
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rejected the notion that teachers are not entitled to First Amendment 
rights, reasoning that “[t]he public[’s] interest in having free and 
unhindered debate on matters of public importance . . . [is a] core value of 
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”486  Under the guidelines 
set out in the Connick decision, a teacher’s off-campus speech must satisfy 
a two-part test.487  First, the teacher’s speech must involve a matter of 
legitimate public concern.488  To make this determination, courts examine 
the “content, form, and context” of the speech.489  Second, if the speech 
does involve a matter of legitimate public concern, courts employ a 
balancing test to determine whether the employer’s interests in prohibiting 
the speech outweigh the teacher’s interests in making the speech and the 
audience’s interests in hearing the speech.490  If the speech meets both 
parts of this test, it is protected under the First Amendment, but if it fails 
either part, the speech is unprotected.491  In other words, schools can 
suppress teacher speech only when the teacher’s speech either fails to 
implicate a public concern or fails the Pickering balancing test.492 
  
[154] Notably, even when a teacher’s social media speech is made in 
private, the First Amendment is still applicable.493  With respect to the 
Pickering balancing test, the analysis of a public employee’s private 
expression may bring additional factors to this calculus, such as the 
                                                
486 Id. at 573-74.  
487 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148-50 (1983).  
488 See id. at 146. 
489 Id. at 147-48. 
490 See id. at 149-50. 
491 See id. at 154.  
492 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149-151, 154. 
493 See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412-13 (1979).  
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manner, time, and place of the employee’s speech.494  However, if the 
speech meets both required elements of the Pickering-Connick test, the 
speech is protected even if it is expressed privately.495  
  
VII. UNDER PICKERING-CONNICK, SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ CATEGORICAL 
BANS OF TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH TO STUDENTS USING SOCIAL 
MEDIA ARE LIKELY OVERBROAD AND THUS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
 
A.  Overbreadth Doctrine: Facial Challenges 
 
[155] In a First Amendment free speech context, litigants are permitted 
to challenge a government speech restriction when it abridges the speech 
rights of parties not before the court, even if the restriction would be 
constitutional as-applied to the litigant.496  Thus, facial challenges are an 
exception to the general notion that constitutional rights are personal.497  
  
[156] A speech restriction is overbroad and therefore unconstitutional 
when the restriction substantially burdens protected speech and the 
restriction is not amenable to a limiting interpretation.498 
  
[157] A remedy based on the overbreadth doctrine is “strong 
medicine.”499  However, this medicine is necessary because the threat of 
                                                
494 Id. at 415 n.4.  
495 See id. at 412-13, 415.  
496 See L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g. Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 39 (1999); see 
also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973). 
497 See L.A. Police Dep’t, 528 U.S. at 39.  
498 See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613-16.   
499 Id. at 613.  The Court noted that the overbreadth doctrine has been employed 
“sparingly, and only as a last resort.”  Id.  This observation is questionable.  See United 
States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1579, 1592 (2010) (holding that a federal statute 
criminalizing the commercial creation, sale, or possession of certain depictions of animal 
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enforcement of an overbroad restriction may deter or chill others’ 
constitutionally protected speech.500  Rather than “vindicating their rights 
through case-by-case litigation, [many people] will choose simply to 
abstain from protected speech.”501  This chilling effect harms society as a 
whole, adversely affecting the marketplace of ideas.502  
 
[158] Nevertheless, the overbreadth doctrine also creates social costs 
when it blocks the application of a speech restriction to constitutionally 
unprotected speech.503  To ensure that these costs do not outweigh the 
benefits of declaring a speech restriction overbroad, a claimant must 
establish that there is a real danger that the restriction will substantially 
burden protected speech.504  In short, a court may find a restriction 
                                                                                                                     
cruelty was overbroad); see also City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 467 (1987) 
(holding that a municipal ordinance making it unlawful to interrupt a police officer 
during the officer’s performance of his duties was overbroad); see also Bd. of Airport 
Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 577 (1987) (holding an airport regulation 
prohibiting the exercise of any First Amendment rights was overbroad).  But see 
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 618 (holding that a state statute prohibiting certain public 
employees from engaging in active, partisan political campaigning was not overbroad, 
even though the statute purportedly restricted the wearing of political buttons or the use 
of bumper stickers).  See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Fact and Fiction about Facial 
Challenges, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 915 (2011) (noting that “rare” facial challenges are not so 
rare). 
500 Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003) (noting that this is especially true when 




504 See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615.  A number of Supreme Court decisions have held that 
speech restrictions substantially infringed on protected speech.  See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 
1592 (concluding that the burden on protected speech was substantial because the animal 
cruelty statute would limit protected speech like hunting magazines and videos); see also 
Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. at 574-75 (concluding that the burden on protected speech 
was substantial because the restriction prohibited any First Amendment expression).  
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overbroad and therefore unconstitutional when “‘a substantial number of 
its applications are unconstitutional, judged in relation to the statute’s 
plainly legitimate sweep.’”505  Thus, “‘[t]he first step in overbreadth 
analysis is to construe the challenged statute [because] it is impossible to 
determine whether a statute reaches too far without first knowing what the 
statute covers.’”506  Notably, “[f]acial overbreadth has not been invoked 
when a limiting construction has been or could be placed on the 
challenged statute” that would remove the threat or deterrence to 
constitutionally protected speech.507  
  
[159] The regulation in Jews for Jesus, Inc. is an example of the 
Supreme Court’s use of the overbreadth doctrine to invalidate a blanket 
ban of speech.508  In this case, the regulation banned all First Amendment 
expression, including talking and reading, within the Central Terminal 
Area of the Los Angeles International Airport.509  The Court concluded 
that no conceivable government interest could justify this categorical 
ban.510  Because the regulation could not be limited to ameliorate this 
                                                
505 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1587 (quoting Washington State Grange v. Washington State 
Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 449 n.6 (2008)).  See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615-16.  A 
restriction should not be invalidated on its face merely because it is possible to conceive 
of a single impermissible application.  City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 458 (1987) 
(citing Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 630 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).  
506 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1587 (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 293 
(2008)). 
507 Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 613, 617-18 (noting that the state interpreted the statute to 
forbid only active, partisan political campaigning). 
508 Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. at 569; see Harman v. City of N.Y., 140 F.3d 111, 124 
(2d Cir. 1998) (holding that a regulation requiring employees of two of New York’s 
largest social services agencies to obtain approval before speaking to the media was 
unconstitutional on both overbreadth and as-applied grounds).  
509 See Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. at 570-71, 574-75.  
510 Id. at 575 (noting that this would be the case even assuming the airport was a 
nonpublic forum). 
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substantial burden on protected speech, the Court held the ban 
unconstitutional.511 
  
[160] Similarly, as previously discussed, in National Treasury 
Employees Union (“NTEU”), the Supreme Court held that a congressional 
ban prohibiting almost all federal employees from receiving honoraria for 
making speeches or writing articles was overbroad and thus violated the 
plaintiff-respondents’ First Amendment free speech rights.512  In essence, 
the ban restricted a federal employee from accepting honoraria for this 
expression, even when the expression was unrelated to work.513  The ban 
did not directly prohibit any speech and did not discriminate “among 
speakers based on the content or viewpoint of their message[].”514  
However, the Court concluded that the prohibition on compensation 
imposed a significant burden on protected expressive activity and 
therefore violated the First Amendment.515 
  
[161] NTEU demonstrated the Court’s willingness to apply facial 
analysis to a workplace regulation.516  Notably, the ban on receiving 
honoraria did not seek to regulate particular employees’ workplace 
responsibilities; rather, the ban attempted to regulate speech on the outer 
fringes of the employment relationship.517  Despite the relative deference 
                                                
511 See id. at 577.  
512 United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995).  In NTEU, 
the Court limited the remedy to employees below grade GS-16.  Id. at 478. 
513 Id. at 457.  
514 Id. at 468.  
515 Id. 
516 See id. at 477-78. 
 
517 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 478. 
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provided by Pickering-Connick’s intermediate level review,518 the Court 
found the ban facially unconstitutional.519  
  
[162] In both Jews for Jesus, Inc. and NTEU, the Supreme Court has 
demonstrated its apprehension regarding broad restrictions on speech, 
particularly when the restrictions prohibit speech before it occurs. 
 
B.  Categorical Bans on Teachers’ Off-Campus Speech to 
Students Are Likely Overbroad and Thus Facially 
Unconstitutional 
  
[163] Categorical bans520 regarding off-campus teacher-to-student 
speech using social media at least arguably prohibit a substantial amount 
of protected speech.  Furthermore, given the absolute proscription on 
speech contained in these bans, courts will be unable to curtail this 
substantial overbreadth by limiting the restriction.  Consequently, school 
districts’ bans within this area of speech are, at least arguably, facially 
unconstitutional.521   
  
[164] Under Pickering-Connick, teacher speech is protected when the 
speech implicates a public concern and survives the Pickering balancing 
                                                
518 See Bhagwat, supra note 484, at 795 (noting that the Pickering balancing test is 
essentially an intermediate scrutiny test).  
519 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 454, 477-78.  NTEU provides a basis for 
facial challenges to public employee workplace speech regulations, and, analogously, 
student speech regulations.  See id. 
520 Many policies regulating teacher-student communication using non-school sanctioned 
social media are categorical bans.  See generally NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION 
SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 1, 2, 4. 
521 In the absence of studies indicating that little speech in this area is protected speech, 
courts should err on the side of protecting teacher speech.  Further study of the content of 
these communications would be helpful; unfortunately, blanket bans make these studies 
impossible.  
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test.522  Certainly, some teacher-student speech using social media would 
implicate a public concern.  In addition, some of this speech would pass 
the Pickering balancing test because the teacher’s interest in uttering the 
speech and the students’ interest in hearing the speech would outweigh the 
school’s interests in censoring the speech.  Therefore, if the amount of 
protected speech restricted is substantial and the composition of the 
audience does not provide a sufficient justification for this ban, then the 
restriction is unconstitutional.  School districts’ blanket bans of this 
speech, at least arguably, curtail a substantial amount of protected speech.  
  
[165] The Supreme Court has demonstrated its wariness of large-scale 
restrictions on public employee speech, at least when the restriction 
prohibits speech before the speech occurs.523  In NTEU, the Court set a 
high bar when it observed that the government, in the context of a blanket 
policy designed to restrict expression by a large number of potential 
speakers, “‘must show that the interests of both potential audiences and a 
vast group of present and future employees in a broad range of present and 
future expression are outweighed by that expression’s ‘necessary impact 
on the actual operation’ of the Government.’”524  A categorical ban of off-
campus teacher-to-student speech using social media likely fails this test.  
  
[166] The Supreme Court, in both Jews for Jesus, Inc. and NTEU, has 
held that regulations restricting large quantities of speech before the 
speech occurs are overbroad and thus unconstitutional even when the bans 
were content neutral.525  In Jews for Jesus, Inc., the Supreme Court 
                                                
522 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.a. 
 
523 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 468; see also Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 
U.S. at 576-77. 
524 Harman v. City of N.Y., 140 F.3d 111, 118 (1998) (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. 
Union, 513 U.S. at 468 (quoting Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571)).  
525 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 468; see also Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 
U.S. at 577.  But see Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 616-17 (1973) (implying that 
the speech restriction protected public employees from being coerced to participate in 
partisan political activities).  
 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology                              Volume XIX, Issue 2 
 
   
98 
observed that the ban was overbroad even if the airport was a nonpublic 
forum.526  A ban on off-campus teacher speech to students using social 
media is similar to the complete ban of all First Amendment expression in 
Jews for Jesus, Inc. because at least in the area of teacher social media 
communications to students off-campus, these policies typically make no 
exceptions for any protected speech.527  Furthermore, these categorical 
bans exceed the ban involved in NTEU.  Notably, the ban in NTEU 
eliminated the financial incentive to engage in speech, but did not forbid 
the speech itself.528  With respect to bans on teacher speech in the social 
media context, the restriction directly regulates speech.  
  
[167] Under these categorical bans, a teacher would be prohibited from 
allowing a student to view her social media page even if the page 
contained her reasons for supporting a local political candidate or, similar 
to the criticism in Pickering, her criticism of the Board of Education’s 
funding priorities.  The Supreme Court has held that speech made 
privately is still protected under Pickering-Connick.529   
 
[168] Moreover, the amount of restricted teacher speech is staggering.  In 
New York City alone, the policy restricts approximately 75,000 
teachers.530 
  
[169] Of course, the Supreme Court precedents mostly involve speech 
                                                
526 Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. at 575.   
527 See NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 1, 
4 (noting that even in the case of a prior restraint, there is at least a possibility that the 
speaker will be allowed to communicate her message).  
528 See Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 468.  
529 See, e.g., Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412, 414 (1979). 
530 See NYC Dramatically Slashes Number of Teachers Granted Tenure, CBS NEW YORK 
(July 27, 2011, 10:27 PM), http://newyork.cbslocal.com/2011/07/27/nyc-dramatically-
slashes-number-of-teachers-granted-tenure/. 
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between adults.  However, banning this speech because the audience is 
students is inconsistent with the First Amendment for many reasons.  First, 
at least some of these students will have reached the age of majority.  
Second, and more importantly, there is no limit as to when students should 
begin learning about the political process and other current issues.  While 
some issues might not be appropriate for the maturity level of younger 
students, a complete ban is a flawed response to this concern.  The 
Supreme Court in Pickering protected the teacher’s speech even though 
some of his audience could have been his own students.  The Court did not 
distinguish among Pickering’s audience members based on age, student 
status, or voting eligibility.  Furthermore, the Court’s observation that 
“free and open debate is vital to informed decision-making by the 
electorate”531 also applies to the future electorate.  
  
[170] Unsurprisingly, the only time that a court has addressed a 
categorical ban of this nature, the court enjoined the speech restriction.532  
The court concluded that “social networking is extensively used by 
educators.”533  Furthermore, the court found the “breadth of the 
prohibition [to be] staggering.”534  Consequently, the court held that the 
                                                
531 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968). 
532 See, e.g., NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES, supra note 
2, at 4 (2012).  A more narrowly drawn ban restricting particular conduct, such as sexual 
assault, would be constitutional.  But school districts typically ban all speech in order to 
address issues like inappropriate sexual contact between teachers and students. See also 
David W. Chen and Patrick McGeehan, Social Media Rules Limit New York Student-
Teacher Contact, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/nyregion/social-media-rules-for-nyc-school-staff-
limits-contact-with-students.html?pagewanted=all.  The impetus behind the NYC DOE’s 
ban was inappropriate relationships between teachers and students that began or were 
conducted using social media.  Notably, the DOE’s policy does not address teacher cell 
phone use.  Teachers can thus still call students, although they can still be disciplined for 
inappropriate conduct.  See id. 
533 Amended Order Entering Preliminary Injunction, supra note 12. 
534 Id.  
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AHSPA would have a significant “chilling effect” on free speech.535  
Since this “chilling effect” was sufficiently immediate, the court held that 
the resulting injury was irreparable.536  Other categorical bans on this type 
of speech are likely similarly unconstitutional. 
 
VIII.  UNDER PICKERING-CONNICK, SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ MORE 
NARROWLY DRAWN RESTRICTIONS OF TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS 
SPEECH TO STUDENTS USING SOCIAL MEDIA WILL PROBABLY NOT BE 
OVERBROAD 
  
[171] More narrowly drawn restrictions governing off-campus teacher-
to-student speech using social media will probably not be overbroad.  For 
example, speech prohibiting a teacher from disclosing confidential student 
information or engaging in sexually predatory speech would not be 
facially unconstitutional.  The constitutionality of these restrictions would 
need to be addressed on an as-applied basis.  However, instead of 
narrowly restricting teacher speech in this more focused manner, many 
districts have categorically banned all teacher-to-student speech using 
social media.537   
 
IX.  UNDER PICKERING-CONNICK, SCHOOL DISTRICTS’ CATEGORICAL 
BANS OF TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH TO STUDENTS USING SOCIAL 
MEDIA WILL BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL “AS-APPLIED” TO AT LEAST 
SOME TEACHER SPEECH 
  
[172] A categorical ban of off-campus teacher speech to students using 
social media may also be unconstitutional under the more common “as-
applied challenge.”538  In an “as-applied” challenge, the litigant argues that 
                                                
535 Id. 
536 Id. 
537 See NYC DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION SOCIAL MEDIA GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at 1, 
4. 
538 Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 587 F.3d 966, 974 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing Santa Monica Food 
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the law is unconstitutional as applied to the specific facts of the claimant’s 
case.539   
  
[173] Under Pickering-Connick, teacher speech is protected when the 
speech implicates a public concern and survives the Pickering balancing 
test.540  For many of the same reasons a categorical ban would be 
unconstitutionally overbroad, the ban would also be unconstitutional as 
applied to a specific claimant.  Notably, at least some teacher-student 
speech using social media would implicate a public concern and at least 
some of this speech would also pass the Pickering balancing test because 
the teacher’s interest in uttering the speech and the students’ interest in 
hearing the speech would outweigh the school’s interests in censoring the 
speech.  Consequently, in at least some circumstances, a ban on teacher 
speech would be unconstitutional as applied to this teacher speech under 
the current Pickering-Connick test. 
  
[174] The Pickering balancing test is essentially an intermediate scrutiny 
test.541  Therefore, intermediate scrutiny cases are helpful are helpful in 
understanding Pickering.  
 
[175] Under an intermediate scrutiny analysis, speech restrictions must 
                                                                                                                     
Not Bombs v. City of Santa Monica, 450 F.3d 1022, 1034 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
539 Reed, 587 F.3d at 974 (citing Santa Monica Food Not Bombs, 450 F.3d at 1034). 
540 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.a. 
 
541 See Bhagwat, supra note 484, at 792.  Intermediate scrutiny applies when courts 
determine the constitutionality of content-neutral speech restrictions enacted by a 
government entity in its “sovereign” capacity.  See id. at 791-92.  Courts employ the 
Pickering-Connick standard to analyze public employee free speech issues, at least when 
Garcetti does not apply.  See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80-82 (2004) 
(analyzing the plaintiff’s speech in under the Pickering-Connick standard).  These 
standards overlap.  In particular, the time, place, and manner factors involved in 
intermediate scrutiny are relevant in analyzing both the public concern and balancing 
requirements of Pickering-Connick.  See id. at 80-81. 
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(1) serve a significant government interest, (2) leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of the information, and (3) be 
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.542  “Narrowly tailored” means that 
the restriction is not “substantially broader than necessary to achieve the 
government’s interest:” it does not require the restriction to be the least 
restrictive means to achieve this goal.543  The latter two components of 
this test are particularly instructive in understanding Pickering.  
  
[176] While categorical bans of off-campus teacher-to-student speech 
using social media leave open ample traditional channels of 
communication for the information, in the social media age, this may not 
be sufficient.  City of Ladue is illustrative even if distinguishable.544  
When the City of Ladue prohibited a venerable, cost-effective way of 
communicating important speech using homemade signs on property 
owners’ lawns, the Court held the restriction unconstitutional.545  The 
Court noted its historical “concern with laws that foreclose an entire 
medium of expression.”546  In particular, the Court reasoned that 
“[r]esidential signs are an unusually cheap and convenient form of 
                                                
542 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 675 (1994); see also Ward v. Rock Against 
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).  
543 Ward, 491 U.S. at 800; see Waters, 511 U.S. at 675.  
544 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 58 (1994).  This case is not directly on point.  
In City of Ladue, the Court assumed, arguendo, that the restrictions were content-neutral, 
but ultimately subjected the restrictions to a heightened standard of review.  See id. at 49, 
58-59. As one commentator has observed, despite citing many content-neutral cases 
involving intermediate scrutiny, the Court applied a more stringent standard because of 
the long constitutional tradition of respecting “individual liberty in the home,” including 
the liberty to speak there.  Bhagwat, supra note 484, at 790.  In effect, the Court 
subjected the regulation to strict scrutiny.  Commentators have speculated that a 
heightened standard of review may be appropriate when the speech occurs on private 
property.  See, e.g., id. at 790-91.  
545 See City of Ladue, 512 U.S. at 58-59.  
546 Id. at 55. 
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communication,” for both the affluent and the less-than-affluent, and no 
“practical substitute” for this speech may exist.547  
  
[177] Similarly, although social media may not qualify as a “venerable” 
means of communication, categorical bans on teacher-to-student off-
campus speech using social media foreclose an entire medium of 
expression and this medium is relatively inexpensive.  Furthermore, given 
the amount of time people devote to using social media, there may be no 
“practical substitute” for this communication.  Therefore, in our electronic 
age, keeping open traditional channels of communication may not be 
enough.   
  
[178] But even assuming these bans serve a legitimate government 
interest and leave open ample channels of communication, these bans may 
also be unconstitutional as applied to particular teacher speech because 
they are substantially broader than necessary to achieve the government’s 
interest.  More specifically, if the legitimate government interest is 
protecting students from predatory sexual conduct, prohibiting all off-
campus teachers to student social media speech is similar to killing a fly 
with a bazooka.548  Presumably, the vast majority of teacher speech will 
not involve predatory sexual conduct. 
  
X.  DIFFICULTIES WITH THE CURRENT APPROACH TO REGULATING 
TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH TO STUDENTS USING SOCIAL MEDIA 
 
A.  Pickering-Connick Revisited 
 
[179] School officials’ interests in limiting a teacher’s opportunity to 
engage in public debate is most limited when the teacher is speaking as a 
member of the general public, and at least some teacher social media 
speech will be made in the teacher’s role as a member of the general 
                                                
547 Id. at 57.  
548 States miss a social-media education opportunity, supra note 73. 
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public.  As the Court in Pickering observed, where “the fact of 
employment is only tangentially and insubstantially involved in the 
subject matter of the public communication by the teacher . . . it is 
necessary to regard the teacher as a member of the general public.”549  
  
[180] Under Pickering-Connick, school authorities can regulate teacher 
speech when the speech does not implicate a public concern or the speech 
fails the Pickering balancing test.550  Therefore, any teacher speech that 
addresses a matter of public concern is protected regardless of whether the 
medium of expression involves social media or whether the primary 
audience is students, unless the speech fails the second part of the 
Pickering test.  In essence, school authorities can regulate a teacher’s 
speech to students, at least when the speech implicates a public concern, 
only when the school’s interests in prohibiting the speech outweigh the 
teacher’s interests in disseminating the information and the audience’s 
interests in hearing the information.  
 
B.  One Major Drawback of the Current Law: Under 
Pickering-Connick, Teacher Speech is Protected Only if the 
Speech Implicates a Matter of Public Concern 
 
[181] The Pickering-Connick test has one major drawback.  Under this 
test, school officials can censor any teacher-student speech that does not 
implicate a public concern, regardless of the outcome under the Pickering 
balancing test.551  In particular, the requirement that the speech implicate a 
public concern might enable school officials to regulate a significant 
amount of teachers’ communications with students using social media.552   
                                                
549 Pickering v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968).  
550 See discussion supra Part IV.A.1.a. 
 
551 See generally Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 (of course, school officials can also prohibit 
teacher speech that fails the Pickering balancing test).  
552 To date, no systematic studies analyzing the types of speech that might occur between 
teachers and students using non-school-sanctioned social media are available.  But a 
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[182] As this Article suggests, teachers’ off-campus speech rights using 
social media should be more fully protected: in particular, teacher speech, 
absent disruption to the work or learning environment, should be protected 
because the speech is made at the outer fringes of the employment 
relationship.553  Consequently, this Article proposes eliminating the public 
concern requirement with respect to teacher speech in this context.554 
 
1.  A Long-Standing Struggle for Lower Courts: 
Deciding Whether Speech Implicates a Public Concern 
  
[183] The Supreme Court recently observed, more than forty years after 
its decision in Pickering, that “‘the boundaries of the public concern test 
are not well defined.’”555  Legal commentators have repeatedly voiced this 
same concern.556  Whether speech implicates a “public concern” has as 
                                                                                                                     
significant portion of this speech might not implicate a public concern. As discussed 
more fully infra Part X.B.1, in the context of social media, the “public concern” threshold 
would not provide a pretrial, gatekeeping function. 
 
553 As explained more fully infra Part X.B.3, the public concern element is best treated, at 
least in the context of off-campus teacher-to-student speech using social media, as a 
limitation on the reach of Garcetti’s holding, rather than as a separate element.   
554 Given the doctrinal confusion created by the “public concern” requirement and the 
adequacy of the Pickering balancing test to address the competing free speech concerns, 
the “public concern” requirement should be eliminated for all public employees. The 
focus of this Article, however, is on teachers using social media to communicate with 
students in an off-campus setting.  Given the interactive, rapidly evolving nature of social 
media speech and the indirect benefits this speech might generate, a public concern 
limitation is particularly unnecessary.   
555 Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1216 (2011) (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 
543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004)). 
556 One legal commentator has criticized the public-concern requirement because of its 
“inherent elasticity.”  See Pengtian Ma, Public Employee Speech and Public Concern: A 
Critique of the U.S. Supreme Court’s Threshold Approach to Public Employee Speech 
Cases, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 121, 125 (1996).  The Supreme Court’s explanations of 
“public concern” “‘have provided enough guidance to confuse everyone.’”  Id. at 131 
(quoting D. Gordon Smith, Beyond “Public Concern”: New Free Speech Standards for 
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much to do with creative lawyering as it does with the speech itself.557   
 
[184] With respect to “public concern,” the Supreme Court recently 
summarized its guidelines in Snyder.558  “Speech deals with matters of 
public concern when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter 
of political, social, or other concern to the community,’”559 or when it “‘is 
a subject of legitimate news interest; that is, a subject of general interest 
and of value and concern to the public.’”560  In contrast, private speech is 
speech “‘solely in the individual interest of the speaker and [the speaker’s] 
audience’”561 that does nothing to inform the public about any aspect of 
the employing agency’s functioning or operation.562   
                                                                                                                     
Public Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 258 (1990)).  Another commentator has 
suggested that employees can manipulate the requirement by stating “‘virtually any 
criticism of a public employer in terms that will satisfy the public concern test.’”  David 
L. Hudson, Jr., Balancing Act: Public Employees and Free Speech, 3 FIRST REP. 2, 25 
(Dec. 2002), 
http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/madison/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/FirstReport.
PublicEmployees.pdf (quoting Lawrence Rosenthal, Permissible Content Discrimination 
Under the First Amendment: The Strange Case of the Public Employee, 25 HASTINGS 
CONST. L.Q. 529, 556 (1998)).  A number of commentators have concluded that the 
fundamental problem with the “public concern” threshold test is that no one knows how 
“public concern” is defined.  See id. at 25 (citing Smith, supra, at 258); Darryn Cathryn 
Beckstrom, Note, Reconciling the Public Employee Speech Doctrine and Academic 
Speech after Garcetti v. Ceballos, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1202, 1221 (2010) (noting that “[i]t 
is unclear what constitutes a matter of public concern under the public employee speech 
doctrine”). 
557 See Hudson, supra note 556, at 25 (citing Rosenthal, supra note 556, at 556).  
558 See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1211. 
 
559 Id. at 1216 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)).  
560 Id. (quoting City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 83-84). 
561 Id. (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 762 
(1985)). 
562 Id. (quoting City of San Diego, 543 U.S. at 84). 
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[185] Deciding whether speech implicates a public or private concern 
requires courts to examine the content, form, and context of the speech.563  
“In considering [the] content, form, and context, no factor is dispositive, 
and it is necessary to evaluate all the circumstances of the speech, 
including what was said, where it was said, and how it was said.”564  In 
Snyder, the Court observed that reaching as broad a public audience as 
possible was one aspect in evaluating whether the content implicated a 
public concern.565  This is true even when part of the speech is false, as it 
was in Snyder.566   
  
[186] In addition to the content, form, and context of the speech, courts 
may also examine the motivation behind the speech.567  This inquiry 
involves determining whether the public concern or private grievance 
aspect of the speech was the primary motivation behind the speech.568   
                                                
563 Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1216 (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761). 
564 Id.  The public concern requirement also involves courts in evaluating the content of 
the speech, something the First Amendment generally forbids. 
565 See id. at 1217. 
566 See id. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting).  The Supreme Court concluded that protest signs 
at a soldier’s funeral were protected speech.  See id. at 1219. The signs stated, “You’re 
Going to Hell,” and “God Hates Fags.”  Id. at 1213.  These sentiments suggested, falsely, 
that the solder was gay.  Id. at 1225 (Alito, J., dissenting).   
567 See SCHNEIDER, supra note 28.  If speech involves both public and private 
motivations, it is simpler for courts to err on the side of classifying speech as implicating 
a public concern and concentrate on the disruption issue.  See SMOLLA, supra note 230.   
568 See SMOLLA, supra note 230.  A speaker’s motive is generally relevant but not 
dispositive.  Sousa v. Roque, 578 F.3d 164, 166 (2d Cir. 2009), aff’d, 410 Fed. App. 411, 
411 (2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 104 (2011); SMOLLA, supra note 230; see also Ma, 
supra note 556, at 133.  But “if an examination of the ‘point of the speech in question’ 
reveals that the speech is not intended to bring wrongdoing to light or raise issues 
because they are of public concern, but instead is intended to further some purely private 
interest, the speech is not protected even though it touches upon an issue of public 
concern.”  16B MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 46:76 (3d ed. 2012) (citing Vukadinovich v. 
Bartels, 853 F.2d 1387, 1390 (7th Cir. 1988)).  
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[187] As many commentators have observed, the “public concern” 
requirement has created “doctrinal confusion.”569  In particular, it is 
unclear whether the “public concern” inquiry is normative or 
descriptive.570  In other words, there is confusion over whether courts 
should focus on what should be a public concern or what the public is 
concerned about.571  In addition, it is unclear how large the audience must 
be to qualify as “public” and how interested this audience must be to 
qualify as “concerned.”572  The vagaries of this standard make it difficult 
to determine whether speech is protected, thereby potentially chilling 
protected speech.573  Judge Posner has argued that the public concern test 
is simply a way for distinguishing between speech that has social value 
and speech that does not.574  However, this statement masks unresolved 
difficulties with the public concern test.575  
 
[188] Underlying this “doctrinal confusion” is another fundamental 
issue: who decides what constitutes a public concern?  At present, “public 
concern” is a question of law.576  But are judges best situated to determine 
                                                
569 See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 153, at 2145.  
570 Id. at 2144.  
571 See id. 
572 Id.; see also Hoppmann, supra note 103, at 1015 (on problem with defining “public 
concern” is how much of the public must be interested in order for the concern to qualify 
as public: requiring more than a few interested people runs counter to the anti-
majoritarian emphasis of First Amendment jurisprudence).      
573 See Papandrea, supra note 153, at 2145.  
574 See id. (citing Eberhardt v. O’Malley, 17 F.3d 1023, 1027 (7th Cir. 1994)). 
575 As discussed within this section, the public concern standard is imprecise, allows too 
much leeway for subjective judicial value judgments, and provides insufficient guidance 
regarding whether judges or the general public should determine social value. 
576 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 148 n.7 (1983).   
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what should concern or does concern the public?577 
  
[189] For many of these reasons, lower courts, in a general public 
employee context, have declined to apply the public concern test in certain 
circumstances,578 embraced a “broad conception” of public concern,579 or 
                                                
577 The Supreme Court has not definitively resolved whether hierarchies of protected 
speech exist.  The Court has often acknowledged that speech on public issues occupies 
the “highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values.”  Id. at 145, 154 (quoting 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913 (1982) (quoting Carey v. Brown, 
447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980))) (implying that a hierarchy exists).  The Court has, however, 
recently refused to recognize new categories of unprotected speech.  See, e.g., U.S. v. 
Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1592 (2010).  Furthermore, even if these hierarchies of 
protected speech should exist, the question remains as to whether judges are best situated 
to determine these hierarchies.   
578 See Papandrea, supra note 153, at 2145-49 (discussing the lower court decisions); see 
also Eberhardt, 17 F.3d at 1026-27; Flanagan v. Munger, 890 F.2d 1557, 1564 (10th Cir. 
1989)).  The “public concern” threshold does not apply to artistic endeavors.  Eberhardt, 
17 F.3d at 1026-27 (reasoning that the plaintiff’s novel was presumptively protected by 
the First Amendment, even if the novel did not implicate a public concern).  Nor does it 
apply to nonverbal expression when the speech does not occur at work or when the 
speech is not about a work-related subject.  See Flanagan, 890 F.2d at 1560, 1564 
(concluding that the “public concern” test did not apply when the speech involved a 
police officer’s ownership interest in a video store, which rented some sexually explicit 
videos, because this nonverbal expression was not made at work nor about work).  And 
there is some question as to whether the “public concern” test applies to hybrid 
constitutional claims, those involving intertwined First Amendment claims such as free 
speech and free association.  See Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 196 (2d Cir. 
2003) (assuming the teacher’s speech implicated a public concern).  The “public 
concern” test has many purposes.  According to the Seventh Circuit, the purpose of the 
“public concern” requirement is not to fix the boundaries of the First Amendment, but 
rather to allow courts to distinguish between entirely personal grievances and statements 
of broader concern regarding a public employee’s job.  Eberhardt, 17 F.3d at 1026.  As 
one commentator observes, “public concern” is “‘measured more by what it is not than 
what it is.’”  SMOLLA, supra note 230 (quoting Nichol v. ARIN Intermediate Unit 28, 268 
F. Supp. 2d 536, 558 (W.D. Pa. 2003)).  Courts tend to conclude that speech implicates a 
public concern so long as the employee’s speech is not merely about mundane grievances 
exclusively of interest to the affected employee.  Id. (citing Nichol, 268 F. Supp. 2d at 
558).  But, at present, Garcetti likely eliminates most employee, grievance-related 
speech, particularly if the speech is made at work.  The Second Circuit has observed that 
the purpose of the “public concern” threshold is to provide a gatekeeping function for 
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sidestepped the issue by holding that other aspects of the claim were not 
established.580  
  
[190] In light of these concerns, some commentators have advocated 
eliminating the public concern test and applying a general balancing test 
instead.581  In the context of off-campus teacher speech using social 
media, the “public concern” threshold is an unnecessary requirement since 
the balancing aspect of the Pickering test adequately protects all 
                                                                                                                     
public employee speech claims.  Melzer, 336 F.3d at 193.  The threshold applies when 
the speech is directed to the employer, made at the place of employment, or directly 
concerns the employer in some way.  Id.  But the amount and interactive, fluid nature of 
social media speech likely undermines this gate-keeping function as well. 
 
579 Papandrea, supra note 153, at 2145-46, n.150 (citing Berger v. Battaglia, 779 F.2d 
992, 997, 999 (4th Cir. 1985) (concluding that performing in “blackface” implicated a 
public concern)).  If a public employee’s message implicates both a public concern and a 
private matter, the speech is protected, unless the employer can prove it would have 
disciplined the employee despite the protected public concern speech.  See Spanierman v. 
Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310-11 (D. Conn. 2008) (observing that a poem about the 
Iraq war on the claimant’s web page might implicate a matter of public concern, even 
though the poem was tangential to the dispute); see also Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-49.  A 
plaintiff may have a personal interest in the matter, but this should not be an overriding 
one.  See Johnson v. Ganim, 342 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2003).  But, at times, courts have 
refused to define “public concern” to include anything that garners the public’s attention, 
particularly if that interest is prurient.  See City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 84-85 
(2004). 
580 See Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (holding that even if the teacher’s speech 
implicated a matter of public concern, his claim failed on other grounds); Melzer, 336 
F.3d at 200 (assuming the speech implicated a public concern, but holding that the 
Pickering balancing test weighed in favor of the defendants); Papandrea, supra note 153, 
at 2146 (citing Dible v. City of Chandler, 515 F.3d 918, 927, 929 (9th Cir. 2008)).  
581 See, e.g., Ma, supra note 556, at 123.  Alternative approaches have also been 
proposed.  See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 153, at 2120 (proposing, at least 
presumptively, full First Amendment protection for off-duty, non-work related public 
employee speech, unless the speaker is perceived to be speaking for the employer or is 
interfering with a clearly articulated message from his employer, or unless the speech 
indicates the employee is unfit to perform the duties of his position). 
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stakeholder rights.  Furthermore, Pickering’s balancing test brings some 
parity between the treatment of off-campus social media speech for 
teachers and students.  
  
[191] Speech in the social media context adds additional complications 
to this “doctrinal confusion.”  The amount of social media speech and its 
rapidly changing nature pose special problems for the public concern 
requirement.  A typical Facebook page, for example, contains numerous 
text postings and a variety of pictures and videos.582  These postings likely 
involve some political or religious speech as well as speech on personal 
matters.583  A Facebook user can also share messages, comments, pictures, 
and video with other users.584  Furthermore, the information is updated 
rapidly; about 62% of Facebook users update their status at least once 
every two weeks.585  Most Facebook users comment on other users’ 
statuses even more frequently, at least one to two days per week.586  Thus, 
social media involves extensive amounts of rapidly changing, interactive 
speech.  
  
[192] In terms of the “public concern” threshold, the nature of social 
media speech poses a number of particular problems.  First, the amount 
                                                
582 See Kyle A. Ferachi, Social Media for Employers and Lawyers Who Advise 
Employers, THOMSOM REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Nov. 14, 2011), 
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/Insight/2011/11_-_November/Social_m
edia_for_employers_and_lawyers_who_advise_employers/. 
583 Id.  
584 See Mark Zuckerberg, Our Commitment to the Facebook Community, THE FACEBOOK 
BLOG (Nov. 29, 2011, 12:39 PM), 
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=10150378701937131. 
585 See Keith N. Hampton et. al., Social Networking Sites and Our Lives, Part 2: Who are 
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and interactive nature of social media speech may make it even more 
difficult for courts to distinguish speech implicating a public concern from 
unprotected speech.  In a similar context, appellate courts have struggled 
to apply the “public concern” threshold to hybrid First Amendment 
claims, those involving intertwined free speech and free association, 
because of the challenges involved in determining whether an 
association’s speech implicates a public concern.587  As the Second Circuit 
has observed, it is problematic for a court to determine whether the 
activity of an association—that speaks and acts in a myriad of different 
ways—relates to a matter of public concern.588  Associations may deliver 
many different statements at many different times and places under many 
different circumstances.  “What statements, at what locations and in what 
context are the ones that should be analyzed is shrouded in uncertainty.”589  
The extensive, interactive, and rapidly evolving nature of social media 
creates similar uncertainties as to whether a teacher’s social media speech 
implicates a public concern.   
  
[193]   Second, and relatedly, given the broad test for “public concern” 
and the varied contents of a typical social media page like Facebook, it is 
likely that some aspect of a social media page will implicate a public 
concern.590  Consequently, any benefit of judicial efficiency inuring from 
                                                
587 See, e.g., Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 196 (2d Cir. 2003). 
588 See id. 
 
589 Id.  
590 See Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310-11 (D. Conn 2008).  When 
government employees comment on matters outside the issues of their workplace, “they 
are more likely to be perceived as commenting on issues of public concern.”  SMOLLA, 
supra note 230.  Courts tend to conclude that speech implicates a public concern so long 
as the employee’s speech is not merely about mundane grievances exclusively of interest 
to the affected employee.  Id. (citing Nichol v. Arin Intermediate Unit 28, 268 F. Supp. 2d 
536, 558 (W.D. Pa. 2003)).  Social media communication will almost assuredly include 
speech on matters outside of workplace issues.  
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the “public concern” threshold will be lost in the context of social media591 
because courts can less readily decide before trial, as a matter of law, that 
claims do not implicate a matter of public concern.  Instead, in each case, 
courts will need to determine whether the claimant’s adverse employment 
action was a result of the employee’s “public concern” speech rather than 
other unprotected speech or conduct.592  This inquiry is generally a 
question of fact.593  Thus, any judicial efficiency benefit of maintaining the 
“public concern” threshold, at least in the social media arena, is likely 
illusory.   
  
[194] A broad interpretation of “public concern” in the context of 
teachers’ off-campus speech to students using social media would achieve 
the same result as eliminating the “public concern” element.  Teachers 
could argue that even if the expression’s content does not implicate a 
matter of public concern, these communications help develop better 
teacher-student relationships and thus foster a better on-campus learning 
environment.  Moreover, since improved public education is a matter of 
public concern, this element is established by the context of the message 
even if the content fails to implicate a matter of public concern.594  
Nevertheless, a more forthright approach would be to dispense with this 
requirement altogether. 
 
                                                
591 See Melzer, 336 F.3d at 193 (according to the Second Circuit, one purpose of the 
“public concern” threshold is its gatekeeping function).  
592 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 681 (1994). 
593 See id. at 668-72.  
 
594 Thus far, the only court to encounter this “bootstrap” argument did not explicitly 
address it.  See Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292.  In addition, such a broad interpretation 
of “public concern” is not easy to reconcile with the Supreme Court’s decision in City of 
San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 78, 84-85 (2004), a case involving off-duty speech by a 
police officer.  
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2.  The Double-Counting of "Public Concern" 
  
[195] Dispensing with this element would have the additional advantage 
of eliminating the redundancy of evaluating this element twice: once as a 
distinct threshold element and again within the Pickering balancing test.595  
As numerous commentators have noted, this is duplicative.596  
 
3.  Garcetti’s Silver Lining? 
  
[196] One benefit of the Garcetti decision is that it allows employers to 
regulate public employees’ expressions made pursuant to their official 
duties and thereby avoids allowing employees to constitutionalize private 
work grievances.  Consequently, the need for a “public concern” threshold 
is greatly reduced.  In short, after Garcetti, the “public concern” element is 
less crucial to bar grievance-related claims, particularly if these disputes 
are pursued at the workplace.   
  
[197] Garcetti granted school districts, as employers, greater ability to 
regulate teachers’ performance of their official duties.597  However, given 
the increased control Garcetti allows school districts as employers, the 
offset should be that a school district’s ability to regulate a teacher’s off-
duty off-campus speech is more limited.598  In summary, the silver lining 
in Garcetti is that although public employees have fewer speech rights 
                                                
595 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Seog 
Hun Jo, The Legal Standard on the Scope of Teachers’ Free Speech Rights in the School 
Setting, 31 J. L. & EDUC. 413, 427 (2002).  
596 See, e.g., Ma, supra note 556, at 138-39.  Justice Brennan raised this issue in Connick.  
See Connick, 461 U.S. at 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).   
597 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (holding that when public employees 
make statements pursuant to their official duties, they are not speaking as citizens for 
First Amendment purposes, and thus the Constitution does not insulate their 
communications from employer discipline).  
 
598 Lower courts have not yet interpreted Garcetti in this manner.   
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while performing their official duties, they should have greater free speech 
rights while off-duty.599  In fact, as this Article proposes, the Pickering 
balancing test alone is sufficient to protect the competing concerns 
involved in teachers’ off-campus speech to students. 
 
XI.  A PROPOSED TEST FOR EVALUATING TEACHERS’ OFF-CAMPUS 
SPEECH TO STUDENTS USING SOCIAL MEDIA: SIMPLIFICATION BY 
SUBTRACTION 
  
[198] The proposed test seeks both to protect teachers’ speech rights off-
campus and to streamline a court’s analysis in this context.  With respect 
to the two decisions involving teachers’ off-campus speech using social 
media to communicate with students, namely Spanierman and Snyder, the 
speech in Spanierman would remain unprotected under the proposed test 
while the speech in Snyder would be a much closer question, with her 
speech probably protected under the First Amendment.600  
 
[199] In order for a teacher’s speech to receive First Amendment 
protection under the proposed test,601 the teacher would need to 
                                                
599 In a more generalized public employee context, the “public concern” element could be 
viewed as a limitation on Garcetti—that speech is unprotected only if the employee 
speaks pursuant to the employee’s official duties and the speech does not involve a 
legitimate “public concern.”  But the majority opinion in Garcetti rejected this approach.  
A complete discussion of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article.  
600 The court held that Snyder’s claim was barred because her speech did not implicate a 
public concern.  See Snyder v. Millersville Univ., No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140, at 
*14-16 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 3, 2008).  The court made no mention of any adverse impact on 
the classroom-learning environment because of Snyder’s speech.  Nor did the court 
explain whether Snyder’s speech would have sufficiently disrupted workplace harmony 
to fail the Pickering balancing test.  Because the workplace disruption stemmed largely 
from the supervising teacher’s response to mild, indirect criticism, Snyder’s speech 
would probably survive the Pickering balancing test.  
601 The speech must also foreseeably arrive on campus.  In the context of student speech, 
school administrators can discipline a student’s off-campus speech if the speech will 
foreseeably come to the attention of school administrators.  See Wisniewski v. Bd. of 
Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2007).  However, given the context of the speech 
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demonstrate that her speech was made outside her official job duties rather 
than pursuant to her job duties and that it could not reasonably be 
perceived as the latter.  A teacher’s official job duties would include her 
employer’s reasonable performance expectations regarding her teaching 
duties.602  These reasonable expectations would likely include most speech 
made during working hours or using school equipment when the teacher’s 
speech is subsidized or “commissioned” by her employer.  If the teacher 
meets this burden, the school would then need to establish that its interests 
in maintaining an effective learning environment and an efficient 
workplace outweighed the teacher’s interests in speaking and her students’ 
interests in hearing the speech.603  In this context, the school must 
demonstrate some level of actual or foreseeable disruption to the 
workplace or the learning environment, but the level of disruption will 
vary with the nature of the speech.  In short, a school must tolerate more 
disruption with respect to speech implicating a public concern.  With 
respect to other teacher-student speech, the school needs to demonstrate a 
much lower level of disruption.  Furthermore, in evaluating whether the 
teacher’s speech disrupts or will disrupt the learning environment, 
particularly the classroom learning environment, courts should provide 
some deference to school officials’ decisions regarding the age-
appropriateness of the speech.  In evaluating whether the teacher’s speech 
                                                                                                                     
involved in this Article, speech made directly from a teacher to a student, the 
foreseeability that this speech will enter the school environment is assumed.  
602 Teacher collective bargaining agreements often specify working hours and 
responsibilities; many states require unions and school districts to bargain on “wages, 
hours, and terms and conditions of employment.”  Teacher’s Unions and Collective 
Bargaining: Resolving Conflicts, supra note 446. 
603 School officials would also need to establish that the communication would 
foreseeably arrive on campus.  In the context of this Article’s focus on communications 
by teachers to students using social media, school officials would likely face few 
challenges in establishing this element.  But if a student were to “hack" or gain unlawful 
access to a teacher’s social media page, it is unlikely this foreseeability requirement 
would be met.  The proposed test still requires a court to examine the content of the 
teacher’s speech, but current law also requires this step.  See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. 
Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415 (1979). 
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disrupts or will disrupt workplace relationships between school 
employees, courts should not show the same degree of deference to school 
officials’ determinations.  
  
[200] This proposed test does not require a teacher to prove that her 
speech implicated a public concern.  It simply requires the school to 
tolerate more disruption for speech involving public matters.  This 
recognizes the difficulties courts have faced in defining public concern 
and the particular challenges courts will confront in defining public 
concern in the context of social media.  Furthermore, it recognizes that the 
school district is regulating speech occurring on the outer fringes of the 
employment relationship.  Of course, the proposed test does not eliminate 
the challenge in defining the contours of “public concern,” but it allows 
courts more flexibility to treat this as one factor in weighing the competing 
concerns.   
  
[201] Importantly, given the special characteristics of teacher-to-student 
communication, particularly the potential confidentiality issues and the 
fact that the vast majority of primary and secondary students are minors, 
teachers should not receive full First Amendment protection for this 
speech.  However, this type of teacher speech should be protected if it 
passes the Pickering balancing test. 
  
[202] Furthermore, the proposed test simplifies the current test to address 
Justice Brennan’s double-counting concerns because the content and 
context of the speech is evaluated just once in the Pickering balancing 
test.604  In short, the test attempts to achieve a crucial First Amendment 
jurisprudential goal of properly balancing the many competing interests.605   
 
                                                
604 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 157 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
 
605 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (“The problem in any case is 
to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting 
upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting 
the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.”).  
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[203] Finally, the proposed test would make the analysis of off-campus 
teacher speech more consistent with the treatment of off-campus student 
speech.  As previously discussed, most circuits use Tinker to evaluate off-
campus student speech.606  Tinker provides that student speech can be 
regulated if it causes actual or foreseeable disruption to the school 
environment.607  Furthermore, at least in the Third Circuit’s recent 
decision, the student off-campus speech was protected even though the 
speech was not political speech.608 
  
A.  The Teacher Must Establish that Her Speech Was Made 
Outside Her Official Job Duties Rather than Pursuant to Her 
Job Duties and Could Not Reasonably Be Perceived as Speech 
Made Pursuant to Her Official Job Responsibilities 
  
[204] As previously discussed, except in rare circumstances, teachers are 
not obligated or even encouraged to communicate with students using 
social media beyond the school day or using school equipment.609  
Furthermore, the teacher must establish that her off-campus speech using 
social media could not reasonably be perceived as speech made pursuant 
to her teaching responsibilities.  Therefore, if the teacher can establish that 
she is neither acting in her official capacity nor perceived to be acting in 
her official capacity when she engages in this type of communication, she 
meets the first part of the test.  With respect to most teacher-student off-
campus communications with students using social media, this element 
should be met. 
                                                
606 See supra Part IV.D.2. 
607 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
608 See J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 926 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(observing that although Tinker involved political speech, Tinker has not been confined 
to just political speech) (citing Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 215-17 
(3d Cir. 2001)).  See also Wisniewski v. Bd. of Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(noting, in dictum, that protected speech includes “student expression”). 
609 See supra Part VI.A.  
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B.  The Teacher Need Not Establish that Her Speech 
Implicated a Public Concern 
  
[205] Even when the content of teacher speech involves no public 
concern, this speech should be entitled to some First Amendment 
protection.610  Under the proposed test, a teacher’s speech receives 
additional protection if it does involve a “public concern,” but it receives 
some protection even if it fails to do so.    
  
[206] Protecting teacher-to-student communication even when the 
communication does not involve a “public concern” is consistent with 
many educational studies assessing the value of using social media to 
enhance students’ educational experience.611  Unfortunately, at present, no 
court has fully addressed the policy considerations in regulating teacher-
to-student communications using social media.    
 
C.  School Officials Must Demonstrate That They Can 
Regulate the Speech Under the Pickering Balancing Test 
  
[207] Importantly, under this proposed test, teachers’ off-campus speech 
rights are not protected to the full extent of the First Amendment.  Under 
the Pickering calculus, school officials may still limit teachers’ speech in 
this context, but only if the school can demonstrate that its interests in 
curtailing the speech outweigh both the teacher’s interests in the speech 
                                                
610 Unless it falls into a traditional First Amendment exception like child pornography, 
the speech should be entitled to some protection.  See, e.g., N.Y. v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 
764-65 (1982). 
611 See Social Networking in Schools: Educators Debate the Merits of Technology in 
Classrooms, HUFFINGTON POST, (last updated May 27, 2011, 6:12 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/27/social-networking-schools_n_840911.html 
(concluding that students using social media were practicing useful skills); see also 
Educational Benefits of Social Networking Sites, UMNEWS, (July 10, 2008), 
http://www1.umn.edu/news/features/2008f/UR_191308_REGION1.html (concluding that 
social media offers many benefits in the college learning environment).  
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and the audience’s interests in the speech.612  More specifically, courts 
should focus on whether the speech caused an actual or foreseeable 
disruption to the administrative functioning of the school or its learning 
environment and whether this disruption was offset by the teacher’s and 
students’ interests in the message.613  In other words, the disruption must 
be sufficient to impair or foreseeably impair employer discipline, damage 
close working relationships, impede the performance of the speaker’s 
duties, or interfere with the regular operation of the enterprise.614 
  
[208] Even when the teacher speech does not directly involve a public 
concern, school officials would need to demonstrate some level of 
disruption to the school environment in order to regulate the speech.  
However, the school officials’ required showing of disruption would be 
significantly less when the speech does not implicate a public concern.  In 
short, the less the speech involves a public concern, the less disruption to 
the school environment school officials need to demonstrate to restrict the 
speech.615 
                                                
612 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1968).  The Pickering 
“balancing test is less a matter of calculating and comparing absolute values than it is a 
process that looks at all the circumstances in a given situation and determines which 
interest weighs more heavily.”  Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 197 (2d Cir. 2003) 
(emphasis in original). 
613 See Tinker v. De Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969). 
614 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (employer satisfies this test by 
demonstrating an actual disruption or a reasonable prediction of disruption); see also 
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (the plurality opinion gives substantial 
weight to government employers’ reasonable predictions of disruption).  The government 
employer “is more likely to meet its burden when an employee’s disruptive activity 
occurs in the workplace than when the equivalent activity occurs on an employee’s own 
time, away from work.”  Melzer, 336 F.3d at 197 (citing Connick v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 
138, 152-53 (1983)). 
615 In a slightly different context, the Supreme Court has already employed this approach.  
In Connick, the Court cautioned that the District Attorneys Office might have to make a 
stronger showing of disruption if the employee’s speech more substantially involved 
matters of public concern.  Connick, 461 U.S. at 152 (the Court’s observation was made 
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[209] While not perfect, the Pickering balancing test is a time-tested 
approach for resolving these disputes.  It best answers Justice Stevens 
concerns about First Amendment free speech jurisprudence: “when 
constitutionally significant interests clash, resist the demand for a winner-
take-all [and] try to make adjustments that serve all of the values at 
stake.”616 
 
1.  The Teacher’s Interests in Communicating and the 
Students’ Interests in Hearing the Speech 
  
[210] The teacher and students’ interests in the speech would, of course, 
vary based on the content of the speech.  The more political the speech, 
the greater the teacher interests in making the speech and the greater the 
student interests in hearing the speech.617  As the Pickering Court 
observed, “[t]eachers are, as a class, the members of a community most 
                                                                                                                     
when weighing the employee’s interests in prohibiting the speech against the employee’s 
interests in making the speech).  
616 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 434 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  The 
Pickering balancing test requires an analysis of the nature of the employee’s position, the 
context of the employee’s speech, and the extent to which it disrupts the organization.  
See McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 278 (4th Cir. 1998).  When considering these factors, 
courts should examine whether the speech (1) impairs discipline by superiors, (2) impairs 
harmony among co-workers, (3) has a detrimental effect on close relationships, (4) 
impedes the performance of the public employee’s duties, (5) interferes with the 
operation of the agency, (6) undermines the mission of the organization, (7) is 
communicated to the public or to co-workers in private, (8) conflicts with the 
responsibilities of the employee within the organization, and (9) makes use of the 
authority and public accountability the employee’s role entails.  McLaughlin, supra note 
440, at 10 (citing McVey, 157 F.3d at 278).  The more the employee’s role requires 
confidentiality, policy making or public contact, the greater the employer’s interest in 
regulating the speech.  See id. (quoting Sheppard v. Beerman, 190 F. Supp. 2d 361, 374 
(E.D.N.Y. 2002)).   
617 See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 (2011) (“‘[S]peech on public issues 
occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values’” (quoting 
Connick, 461 U.S. at 145)).  
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likely to have informed and definite opinions” as to education-related 
issues and “it is essential that they be able to speak out freely on such 
questions.”618  It is also important that teachers be allowed to speak, at 
least off-campus, on less consequential issues without fear of discipline.   
  
[211] The nature of a teacher’s responsibilities is another consideration 
in the Pickering balancing test.  The level of protection afforded to an 
employee’s activities varies with the amount of authority and public 
accountability that the employee’s position entails.619  “A position 
requiring confidentiality, policymaking, or public contact lessens the 
public employer’s burden in [disciplining] an employee for expression that 
offends the employer.”620  A public school teaching position requires a 
high degree of trust.621 
  
[212] Depending on the circumstances, the nature of a teacher’s 
responsibilities may support allowing or restricting a teacher’s speech.  
Public school teachers certainly have student-confidentiality 
responsibilities and a degree of public accountability.622  Nevertheless, 
although teachers may be required to have some contact with students’ 
parents or guardians, they are not usually required to interact with the 
general public.  Furthermore, a typical public school teacher will have 
few, if any, policymaking duties.  Thus, the nature of a teacher’s 
                                                
618 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968). 
619 See Rankin, 483 U.S. at 390-91.  
620 Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 197 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing McEvoy v. Spencer, 
124 F.3d 92, 103 (2d Cir.1997)).   
621 See id. at 198. 
622 See, e.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2006) (protecting student records); see also, e.g., Code 
of Prof’l Conduct for Teachers, REGS. CONN. STATE AGENCIES § 10-145(d)-400(a) (West 
2012).  Nothing in this Article is intended to curtail any teacher-confidentiality 
requirements under federal or state law.  Breaching student-confidentiality will, of 
course, tip the balance in favor of the school. 
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responsibilities with respect to particular speech will be a fact-specific 
inquiry.   
2.  The School’s Interests in Prohibiting Speech 
  
[213] Under the proposed test, courts would need to weigh the school’s 
interests in prohibiting the speech against the teacher’s interests in 
speaking and the students’ interests in hearing the speech.  The school has 
a number of important interests, such as providing an effective learning 
environment,623 including protecting students from teacher predatory 
conduct, and ensuring an efficient workplace.624 
  
[214] With respect to providing an effective learning environment, courts 
should provide some deference to school administrators in weighing the 
competing interests.625  In the context of primary and secondary school 
teacher speech using social media, the student-audience’s interests in 
hearing the information may be limited by age or maturity level.626  Courts 
                                                
623 Providing an effective learning environment would encompass teachers’ 
inappropriate, but non-predatory, disclosures to students. 
624 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572-73 (1968) (to determine whether 
Pickering’s speech was disruptive, the Court examined whether the speech interfered 
with his effectiveness in the classroom or with workplace harmony).  The Court found 
that the disruption to his employer caused by the letter was minimal: the Court concluded 
that Pickering’s speech did not impede his performance of his daily duties in the 
classroom nor did it interfere with the regular operations of the school.  See id.  
Workplace harmony was not disrupted because Pickering’s statements were not directed 
at a particular person with whom Pickering would be in contact during the course of his 
daily work as a teacher, Pickering’s speech did not involve any issue of discipline by his 
superiors, and Pickering’s speech did not impact his relationships with his co-workers.  
Id. at 569-70. 
625 See Wenkart, supra note 127, at 19-20. 
 
626 See Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684-86 (1986) (providing some 
deference to school officials’ conclusion that a student’s in-school speech was lewd).  
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should provide some deference to school authorities in these 
circumstances because school administrators are best situated to decide 
what is appropriate for K-12 students’ maturity levels.627  
 
[215] In addition, protecting students from teacher predatory conduct and 
the speech facilitating this conduct is an obviously important school 
interest.  Within this context, school administrators are best situated to 
determine what speech is indicative of predatory conduct.  Thus, the 
courts should provide some deference to school authorities’ conclusions 
regarding predatory conduct. 
  
[216] An effective learning environment extends to all school activities.  
Because parental involvement in public education is crucial for its success, 
courts should consider, in some circumstances, disruption created by 
parents as well.628  Any parental disruption would need to affect the 
school’s ability to provide an effective learning environment.  
  
[217] Additionally, with respect to efficient workplace concerns, 
workplace harmony is as important in schools as it was in the District 
Attorney’s Office in Connick.629  However, courts need not provide any 
particular deference to school authorities in these circumstances because 
school officials have no particular expertise regarding workplace 
employment issues.  
                                                
627 See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 418 (2007) (citing Fraser, 478 U.S. at 
683). 
628 See Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 199 (2d Cir. 2003) (reasoning that any 
disruption created by parents can be characterized as internal disruption to the school 
because the parents threatened to remove their children from the school, impairing the 
school’s reputation, and impairing educationally desirable cooperation between parents, 
teachers, and administrators).  In Melzer, the Second Circuit held that the school could 
discipline a high school teacher based on the teacher’s advocacy for legalizing sex 
between adult men and boys.  See id. at 200.  In these circumstances, the court concluded 
the discipline did not result from a “heckler’s veto.”  Id. at 199.   
629 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 165 (1983). 
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[218] Finally, the extent of the restriction on teacher speech is relevant in 
assessing the school’s interests in prohibiting the speech.630  With respect 
to both facial and “as-applied” challenges, a school must demonstrate that 
the benefits of a categorical ban outweigh the competing interests.631  
Depending on the circumstances, this may be a heavy burden.632 
  
XII.  THE PROPOSED TEST BRINGS THE PROTECTION OF TEACHER-
STUDENT OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH CLOSER TO THE PROTECTION OF 
STUDENT OFF-CAMPUS SPEECH UNDER TINKER 
  
[219] Employing Pickering in this fashion also provides some rough 
parity between the treatment of teachers’ off-campus student speech and 
students’ off-campus speech.  Student off-campus speech is generally 
regulated under Tinker,633 which provides that off-campus student speech 
                                                
630 See Harman v. City of N.Y., 140 F.3d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 1998) (in the context of 
discussing prior restraints, the Second Circuit noted that “concerns that lead courts to 
invalidate a statute on its face may be considered as factors in balancing the relevant 
interests under Pickering”). 
631 See id.; see also supra Part VII(B) for a discussion of these interests.  
632 See Harman, 140 F.3d at 118 (concerns underlying a facial challenge are relevant in 
balancing the interests under Pickering); see also U.S. v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 
513 U.S. 454, 466-67 (1995) (noting that, in the context of a facial challenge, the 
government’s burden was heavy because the honoraria ban was a “wholesale deterrent to 
a broad category of expression by a massive number of potential speakers”).  
633  Tinker involved student on-campus, political speech.  See Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 512-14 (1969).  There is some question as to 
whether student off-campus speech must also be political to be protected.  See J.S. ex rel. 
Synder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915, 939 (3d Cir. 2011) (Smith, J., 
concurring).  A number of lower courts analyzing off-campus student speech do not 
explicitly require nor even discuss whether the student speech was political.  See, e.g., 
Evans v. Bayer, 684 F. Supp. 2d 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2010).  In Evans, the district court 
applied Tinker to the student’s off-campus speech on her Facebook page.  See id. at 1367, 
1370.  The student established a Facebook page entitled, “Ms. Sarah Phelps [one of the 
student’s teachers] is the worst teacher I’ve ever met.”  Id. at 1367.  The district court 
held that the speech was protected speech because school activities were not disrupted 
and school administrators could not reasonably forecast that a substantial disruption 
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can be regulated if the speech causes “substantial and material disruption” 
to the school environment.634  Under Tinker and the lower court cases 
interpreting Tinker, there is no public concern requirement.635  
Furthermore, the proposed test maintains existing parity regarding the 
employers’ burden: Tinker, like Waters, places the burden of justifying the 
prohibition of a particular expression of opinion on the school 
authorities.636 
  
[220] Although teachers and students are not similarly situated with 
respect to their First Amendment rights, it seems incongruent that 
students’ speech receives more protection than their teachers’ speech. 
 
XIII.  CONCLUSION 
  
[221] Movements to ban teacher-to-student communication using social 
media are misguided.  These categorical bans are likely facially overbroad 
and may be subject to successful “as-applied” challenges as well.  A better 
                                                                                                                     
would occur.  See id. at 1373.  The court did not discuss whether the student’s speech was 
political.  In a typical student off-campus speech case, the dispositive inquiry is whether 
the student speech was disruptive.  See, e.g., Kowalski v. Berkeley Cnty. Sch., 652 F.3d 
565, 572 (4th Cir. 2011).  In Kowalski, the Fourth Circuit applied Tinker’s disruption test 
to the student’s off-campus speech, holding that the student’s web page, “Students 
Against Sluts Herpes,” which criticized another student, was sufficiently disruptive under 
Tinker to be regulated.  Id. at 572-73.  The Court did not discuss whether the student’s 
speech was political.  Similarly, most off-campus student threat cases are decided on 
disruption grounds rather than political speech grounds.  See, e.g., Wisniewski v. Bd. of 
Educ., 494 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that the student’s claims were properly 
dismissed by the district court because, under Tinker, it was reasonably foreseeable that 
the student’s off-campus threats would disrupt the school environment). 
 
634 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513-14. 
635 But see supra note 633 (under a narrow reading of Tinker, a student’s on-campus 
speech may need to be political to be protected). 
636 See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509; Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality 
opinion).  
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approach to regulating these communications would be to evaluate the 
speech under the Pickering balancing test.  
  
[222] As long as a teacher’s communication is not made pursuant to her 
official duties or the message’s recipient could not reasonably conclude 
the expression was made in a teacher’s official capacity, a school should 
be allowed under Pickering to restrict this type of speech only when the 
school’s interests in prohibiting the speech outweigh the teacher’s interests 
in making the speech and the student’s interests in hearing the speech.  In 
a departure from current law, this proposed test would not require that the 
teacher’s speech implicate a matter of public concern in order to receive 
First Amendment protection.  
  
[223] Under the Pickering balancing test, to restrict a teacher’s off-
campus speech to a student using social media, a school administrator 
would need to demonstrate that the school’s interests in maintaining an 
effective learning environment or efficient working environment outweigh 
the teacher’s and student’s free speech interests.  In balancing these 
interests, courts should focus on whether the speech caused an actual or 
foreseeable disruption to the administrative functioning of the school or its 
learning environment and whether this disruption was offset by the 
teacher’s and students’ interests in the message. 
  
[224] The political nature of the speech would be a crucial component in 
weighing these concerns: the more political the speech, the greater the 
level of disruption that school administrators would need to demonstrate in 
order to restrict the speech.  However, even speech with no political 
import would require some on-campus disruption, whether actual or 
foreseeable, to limit this type of teacher-student communication.  
  
[225] This proposed framework attempts to honor the competing policies 
underlying free speech jurisprudence: balancing a public teacher’s off-
campus rights to free speech with a school district’s interests in providing 
an age-appropriate learning environment and efficient working 
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environment.637  The framework recognizes that while the government, as 
an employer, can at times limit employees’ speech based on workplace 
efficiency concerns, the government’s ability to restrict employees’ speech 
is far more limited when the government seeks to restrict speech at the 
outer fringes of the employment relationship.638  The proposed framework 
for regulating teacher-to-student communication using social media also 
recognizes the special relationships existing within schools and therefore 
does not provide full First Amendment protection to teacher off-campus 
speech with students.  Instead, it provides extensive protection for teacher 
off-campus speech since the framework requires some disruption to the 
working or learning environment before a teacher’s speech can be 
regulated.  Finally, this framework engenders some parity between the 
treatment of off-campus teacher speech using social media and off-campus 
student speech using social media.639  The Pickering balancing test is a 
time-tested approach for resolving these types of free speech disputes and 
sufficiently protects the interests of teachers, students, and school 
administrators.  
 
                                                
637 The Supreme Court has justified First Amendment free speech protection on two 
grounds: the rights of the speaker to engage in the speech and the rights of the audience 
to hear the speech.  The Court “has never endorsed one theory to the exclusion of the 
other.”  Roosevelt III, supra note 23, at 641. 
638 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 671 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he government as employer 
indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign”).  This Article 
posits that, at least in most circumstances, school districts will be regulating teachers’ off-
campus, social-media speech to students almost in a “sovereign” role, rather than an 
employer role, because the restrictions involve speech on the fringes of the employment 
relationship.   
639 For a general comparison of public employee and student free speech rights, see 
Lowery v. Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 596-600 (6th Cir. 2007).  In deciding a student free 
speech claim, the Sixth Circuit analogized to public employee cases.  See id. 
